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Abstract 
 
This research explored an asymmetrical concept of personnel management, 
specifically whether status, rank, is an artificial barrier to employing qualified enlisted 
personnel in some company grade officer duties.  It takes the approach under the Human 
Capital Theory and questions whether rank plays a roll in effective performance and 
whether eliminating rank as a criterion to employment, in some duties, can support Air 
Force transformation efforts, without negatively affecting culture (i.e. chain-of-command, 
customs and courtesies).  It describes a concept where more emphasis is put on meeting 
the knowledge, education, experience, and training qualifications and the required rank 
be interchangeable between enlisted and officer airmen.  Key support factors include: 
increase in enlisted education level; reduction in end strength; undermanned career fields; 
and salary difference between enlisted and officer airmen.   
Some of the findings were statistically implausible due to limitations in the data 
and offered no significant data but other findings were significant and lend themselves 
toward the idea that status has little affect on one’s ability to perform effectively.  This 
research also provided extensive qualitative information that indicates managing 
personnel knowledge is the important aspect of human capital management.                 
This concept is not intended to be a model of equality toward all airmen but is 
attempting to increase the capability of the Air Force within the existing manpower and 
budget constraints by putting the right person, in the right place, at the right time. 
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AN ASYMMETRICAL LOOK AT AIR FORCE HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: 
MORE EMPHASIS ON QUALIFICATIONS AND LESS ON RANK 
 
I.  Introduction 
Military Transformation 
Transformation is meant to identify, leverage and even create new underlying 
principles for the way things are done.  Transformation is meant to identify and 
leverage new sources of power.  The overall objective of these changes is simply 
– sustained American competitive advantage in warfare.   
 
Vice Admiral (ret) Arthur K. Cebrowski 
Director, Office of Transformation   
www.oft.osd.mil/what_is_transformation.cfm 
 
The above mentioned quote, a ceaseless United States Air Force mission and an 
uncertain future coupled with a smaller force structure suggests a transformation in 
personnel management is required in order to sustain the competitive advantage in 
warfare.  In their article “Breaking Ranks:  U.S. Commanders Need Flexible Ways to 
Manage Personnel,” Asch and Hosek specify President George W. Bush proposed a 
realignment of military forces, bringing 60,000 – 70,000 home from overseas bases and 
deploy as necessary to help manage military personnel in meet emerging mission needs.  
Further, the ongoing military transformation, sought by U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld, requires a major rethink of personnel management even extending to a shift in 
military culture.  The military personnel system must begin to produce greater variations 
in career paths to allow greater flexibility in assignments and place a higher value on 
innovation, intelligent risk taking, and entrepreneurship.  One of Asch and Hosek’s 
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suggested tools to help personnel managers develop airmen for transformation is to 
provide more choices in job assignments (Asch and Hosek, 2004a:16).  Liebowitz states:   
The GAO [Government Accounting Office] and OPM [Office of Personnel 
Management] further stress the need for cultural transformation as a new model 
for government organizations.  These agencies indicate that government 
organizations will need to become less hierarchical, process-oriented, stovepiped, 
and inwardly focused.  They will need to become more partnerial, results-
oriented, integrated, and externally focused.  (Liebowitz, 2004:8)   
 
Portions of the U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, pages 31-35, identify 
the new technology that is transforming aircraft and weapon systems is by no means the 
beginning or end of transformation.  Equally important are the organizational concepts 
that capitalize on technological advances and allow the Air Force to transform.  The Air 
Force has embraced a new personnel vision and strategic plan to transform its human 
capital management.  The strategy integrates people with technology by determining 
what personnel capabilities are required to meet the technological advancements and 
developing the right competencies in airmen to meet mission requirements.  The 
manpower, personnel, and training communities are redefining how the Air Force puts 
the right people in the right place at the right time with the most effective use of 
resources.  The strategy focuses on the effectiveness of the mission outcome and the 
required personnel capabilities to meet it.  While improving the Air Force’s return on 
investment in its people, this strategy is moving us from a regulatory-established 
construct to a performance-based construct where the measures of merit are successful 
mission outcomes.  Two of the components of this strategy include: (1) synchronizing 
training, education, and experience to create innovative, flexible, and capable airmen who 
can successfully employ air and space power; and (2) implementing a robust strategic 
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planning construct while understanding the Air Force investment in people (Department 
of the Air Force, The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, 2004:31-35).  The 
Force Development Branch Guide on Force Development specifies:   
We [Air Force] has a smaller force today, one which is experiencing a very high 
[operation] tempo, while absorbing high technological growth; we must therefore, 
better utilize the time and effort of our [Air Force] people.  It is logical then, that 
as an institution, we optimize development in the future so our investment in 
people and their investment in the Air Force best meet the needs of our service 
and the nation.  (AFPC, Force Development Branch Guide on Force 
Development, 2005:2) 
 
Transformation is a continuous process that will result in the most efficient use of 
resources.  Alternatively, some qualified Air Force personnel could be employed in duties 
regardless of their rank while not violating the chain-of-command or customs and 
courtesies.            
Importance: Personnel Transformation   
Using technology [transactional methods] is one way the personnel management 
community is undergoing a transformation of how it delivers personnel services and 
manages its human capital resources.  In the Air Force Personnel Center’s (AFPC), Force 
Development Focus, Number Two article, page one, the Personnel Service Delivery 
transformation is replacing many of the labor intensive processes with web-based, self-
service technology (i.e., LeaveWeb, MyPay, Virtual Military Personnel Flight, etc).  The 
plan is to use technology to compensate for a smaller force allowing personnel to perform 
more value-added work for airmen and commanders (AFPC, Force Development Focus, 
Number Two, 04:1-3).  Also, a force development strategy is being implemented.  Force 
development is multidimensional blending experience, skills, knowledge, and motivation 
to refine the skills and competencies each airmen hold.  Through deliberate career 
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planning and development, airmen are assigned to meet mission requirements in ways 
that capitalize on the Air Force’s investment in training and education (Department of the 
Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1, 2004:22).  Furthermore, to support the 
goals of transformation, the values and beliefs that define military culture will have to 
emphasize innovation and entrepreneurship within the bounds of the military’s chain-of-
command environment, and recognize the importance of flexibility in managing 
personnel (Asch and Hosek, 2004b:7).  Offering more choices in duty and job 
assignments to service members could help personnel managers to achieve 
transformation to meet future mission needs (Asch and Hosek, 2004a:16).     
Factors: Enlisted Education, Reduced End Strength, Undermanned Career Fields, 
and Enlisted/Officer Pay Differences 
Enlisted Education 
Enlisted personnel in the Air Force are better educated and more technically 
informed than ever.  Advanced skill courses and leadership education are standard and 
promotions are more centralized and skill-based (Kirby and Naftel 01:2-3).  Although a 
college education is not a duty requirement for enlisted positions (DOD Directive 
1304.26, 1993:6), the number of enlisted personnel with master degrees or higher has 
steadily risen over the past 16 years.  Statistics from the AFPC, Enlisted Demographics 
for FY90 through FY04, showed an increase from 1,338 in FY90 to 1,933 in FY04, (a 
30.78% increase).  The same source shows the number of enlisted personnel with 
bachelor degrees in FY90 at 13,862 and 13,065 in FY04.  The trend fluctuated, but 
remained approximately steady with a 5.7 percent drop over all (AFPC, Reports and Data 
Retrieval Branch, Enlisted Demographics for FY89-FY04, 2005).  Additionally, enlisted 
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personnel have been afforded the opportunity to attend the Air Force Institute of 
Technology (AFIT) under the Enlisted-to-AFIT Program.  The program is in its fourth 
year and each year approximately eight to ten enlisted personnel are accepted to receive 
an AFIT master degree.  To date, 19 Air Force enlisted personnel have graduated from 
AFIT, with 19 in the program at this time (nine graduating in March 2005 and ten in 
March 2006).  According to, The Chief’s Sight Picture, General Jumper maintains that in 
the future more enlisted men and women will attend AFIT.  We are also developing ways 
to leverage the skills of those who already possess advanced education and examining 
how other educational programs could support Enlisted Force Development (Jumper 
03:1).  In contrast to the increase in the number of enlisted personnel with higher 
education degrees is the reduction of Air Force personnel end strength.   
Reduced End Strength 
When combining the total number of personnel from the AFPC Enlisted and Officer 
Demographics for FY90 through FY04, the statistics show a total of 530,863 airmen in 
FY90 reduced to 374,746 in FY03 (a 29.4 percent drop) (AFPC, Reports and Data 
Retrieval Branch, Enlisted Demographics for FY89-FY04, Reports and Data Retrieval 
Branch, Officer Demographics for FY89-FY04, 2005).  More recently, the AFPC 
Interactive Demographic Analysis System (IDEA) shows a force size of 347,474 at the 
end of November 2005 when combining enlisted and officer demographics, an additional 
7.3 percent drop from FY03 (AFPC, IDEA Report, Officer Demographic(s) and AFPC, 
IDEA Report, Enlisted Demographic(s), 2005).  What toll has this reduction taken on the 
Air Force as an organization?  One area has been the increase of critical fields; jobs that 
require certain skill sets yet the pool of candidates to draw from has shrunken.    
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Undermanned Career Fields 
There are many undermanned career fields in the Air Force that require qualified 
personnel.  For example, the electrical engineering (62ExE) and acquisition manager 
(63A, program manager) career fields are under strength.  The acquisition career field has 
sufficient lieutenants, but is consistently undermanned at higher ranks; captain, major, 
and lieutenant colonels are about 78% manned.  The manning shortfall could be largely 
offset if more acquisition officers continued in acquisition assignments (Galway and 
others, 05:35).  The electrical engineering (EE) field is cited the most often as chronically 
and critically under strength because it is a large field.  Although authorizations have 
been reduced, only 75 percent of the positions are filled and only 66 percent of those 
positions go beyond the lieutenant grade (Galway and others, 05:25).  Many of these duty 
positions are neither strategic in nature (i.e. those that are not part of a strategy, plan of 
action, or chain of command), nor interface with senior echelons, foreign 
military/governments and outside organizations consistently.           
Enlisted/Officer Pay Differences 
It is known that the overall cost of employing enlisted personnel is less than that 
to employ officers.  Based on data from the Total Human Resource Managers’ 
Information System, an Air Force reporting and analysis tool that receives end-of month 
data from major personnel data systems, the average enlisted and officer retirement grade 
between FY95 and FY05 was Master Sergeant (MSgt) and Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) 
respectively and the average time-in-service (TIS) is 21.3 and 23.1 years respectively.  
Using the 2006 basic pay, basic allowance for housing (BAH), with dependents, and 
  7
basic allowance for subsistence (BAS), retrieved from the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service (Department of Defense, Monthly Basic Pay Table, ’06 BAH Rates, 
and BAS Rates, 2006), and a basic 50 percent of basic pay retirement pay at 20 years, 
Table 1 shows the general difference in payments between a Lt Col and MSgt with in 
these categories.   
 
Table 1.  Lt Col, MSgt Pay Comparison Table.       
 Base Pay    (TIS, 20 years) BAH BAS 
Total Pay         
(Base, BAH, BAS) 
50% Basic Pay as 
Retirement Pay 
Lt Col $7,003.80 $1,531.00 $183.99 $8,718.79 $3,396.60 
MSgt $3,565.80 $1,010.00 $267.18 $4,842.98 $1,454.10 
Difference $3,438.00    $521.00    $83.19 $3,875.81 $1,942.50 
 
 
It is understood this information about the cost difference is a brief overview but 
it shows the magnitude of the differences in, base, BAH and BAS pays between a Lt Col 
and MSgt ($3,875.81), and retirement pay ($1,942.50) who serve 20 years of active duty 
service.  This cost difference represents the cost savings of employing enlisted personnel 
in place of officers in the event both remain in the Air Force for at least 20 years.  This 
example does not imply the Air Force should employ a MSgt in place of a Lt Col.  
However, in general, it is cheaper for the Air Force to employ enlisted personnel, which 
could lead to increasing the Air Force’s capability assuming Air Force personnel levels 
are dependent on budgetary concerns.                   
Even with less end strength, the Air Force is still progressively transforming to 
meet the challenges of the future.  Personnel management transformation is taking full 
advantage of technology to get the most value-added performance of human capital as 
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noted previously.  However, there appears to be a window of opportunity to explore the 
possibility of interchanging selected positions with officer or enlisted personnel.  Officer 
and enlisted personnel receive first class educations from similar institutions; are trained 
or can be trained for similar positions; and have similar experiences that can meet the 
future needs of the Air Force.  However, these highly qualified personnel are then 
separated by rank, employed separately, with some enlisted personnel not fully utilizing 
their education, training, and/or experiences that the Air Force has provided.     
Purpose 
This research investigates whether employing qualified enlisted personnel, in the 
ranks of technical sergeant (TSgt), master sergeant (MSgt), and senior master sergeant 
(SMSgt), in duties designated for company grade officers (CGOs), who are employed in 
non-rated, non-strategic technical and management duty positions, is an acceptable 
realignment of human capital and supports current Air Force transformation efforts.  This 
research will briefly cover the affects this concept has on Air Force organizational 
culture.  The factors discussed above: increase in enlisted education; reduction in end 
strength; undermanned career fields; and enlisted/officer pay differences are the rationale 
for this research but will not be analyzed any further.      
Figure 1 below simply illustrates that some duty positions are commensurate with 
the respective education, training, and experience of both enlisted and officer personnel.  
Both ranks can share employment in this area (non rank dependent), which could increase 
manning flexibility for the personnel management system, potentially reducing several 
under strength retention problems and supporting personnel management transformation. 
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Figure 1.  Potential Enlisted, Officer Force Overlap. 
 
The premise of this research is that the Air Force could benefit more if qualified 
enlisted personnel were employed in some specialties currently reserved for company 
grade officers.  In essence, based on the AFPC Enlisted Demographic education statistics 
above, the Air Force has 13,065 enlisted personnel with bachelors degrees and 1,933 
enlisted personnel with masters degrees that are employed in positions where a high 
school diploma is desirable but not mandatory (DOD Directive 1304.26, 1993:6).  This 
gap between not requiring a college education for the position, combined with enlisted 
personnel who because of their rank, are not considered for other duties commensurate 
with their respective education level, raises the question of why is the Air Force not better 
utilizing this segment of its human capital?  This is not to say that all the Air Force’s 
return on investment is lost by employing enlisted personnel in non degree required 
duties; any educated Air Force member can improve their organization, regardless of the 
level of organization in which they serve.  However, there are approximately 15,000 
college educated enlisted personnel, which is an untapped resource that if leveraged 
could increase the Air Force’s capability at the same time lowering personnel 
employment costs.  Enlisted personnel who under the current method (i.e., maintain full 
time Air Force job and attend night school using tuition assistance, etc) receive a 
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bachelors degree in the appropriate field and have or can receive any appropriate training 
could be considered for some of the same assignments as CGOs, who have the same 
education and training.  The Air Force, through its educational services programs, pays 
for a significant amount of enlisted personnel’s education cost and only sometimes 
requires an additional time-in-service commitment.  Flamholtz and Lacey indicate that:  
If a company offers to pay for MBA training for its employees, that company 
should be able to offer a lower wage than other similar companies which do not 
have such a plan.  Alternatively, this training could be viewed as a fringe benefit 
offered to employees who are expected to stay with the firm.  Providing such 
training as a fringe benefit expresses the firm’s interest in the employee’s 
development (Flamholtz and Lacey, 1981:40).   
 
Furthermore, TSgt, MSgt, and SMSgts may bring more on-the-job experience to 
these CGO positions because of their time in service, experience in management, and 
technical knowledge in fields they were previously assigned.  Authorizing the 
employment of these enlisted personnel in duties commensurate with their education, 
training, and experience levels may improve the manning levels in under strength 
specialties; thereby, reducing the number of critical fields and saving the Air Force 
money by not having to provide bonus pay as it currently does.   
This thesis research will follow a qualitative approach using the human capital 
theory (HCT) as a basis to ultimately suggest that this interchanging rank concept is a 
method of strategic management of human capital that will support transformation.  The 
focus will be to determine (1) if rank is an artificial barrier and whether rank can be 
eliminated as a criterion to employment, in some situations, without violating the chain-
of-command or customs and courtesies; (2) whether this potential interchangeable rank 
concept approach to personnel management supports personnel management 
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transformation; and (3) if this significantly affects Air Force culture with a focus on 
chain-of-command and customs and courtesies.  Surveys will be used to collect research 
data. 
Research Questions 
 
This research seeks to answer the following questions:   
¾ What effect would rank have on one’s ability to perform effectively in accordance 
with existing Air Force criteria?   
¾ What effect would this interchangeable rank concept have on personnel 
transformation efforts?   
¾ What effect would this interchangeable rank concept have on Air Force culture?       
Overview of Remaining Chapters  
This chapter briefly introduced Air Force personnel transformation efforts.  It 
discussed that personnel transformation as well as technology are required to meet the 
challenges ahead.  It acknowledged Personnel Service Delivery and force development as 
the Air Force’s approaches to personnel transformation.  It then identified factors such as 
the increase in education level of enlisted personnel, the reduction of Air Force 
personnel, the under strength of some company grade office career fields and the cost 
difference in employing enlisted versus officer airmen.  Finally, it introduced the 
interchangeable rank concept in some CGO positions, allowing qualified enlisted 
personnel to fill some CGO positions as an acceptable concept to personnel management, 
while supporting transformation and not negatively affecting Air Force culture, chain of 
command or customs and courtesies.        
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As an overview of the remaining research, chapter II will review surrounding 
literature to gain insight into HCT, transformation, and organizational culture and how 
they relate to the Air Force.  Chapter III will examine the methodology used in this 
research and chapter IV will explain the results.  Finally, chapter V will summarize and 
conclude the research as well as provide opportunities for future research.   
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II. Literature Review   
Preface 
 Numerous publications have been written about Human Capital Theory (HCT) 
and its relationship to the overall strategic management of a business/agency.  The 
following literature review starts with a brief history of HCT.  It continues by tracing 
HCT from D. M. McGregor’s “Theory X, Theory Y,” then describes HCT as a strategic 
resource through the 21st century.  The review then gives a federal government view 
point of HCT, then the Department of Defense and finally the Air Force.  It continues 
with a brief history of the enlisted force and ends with a discussion about organizational 
culture.   
Due to the narrowness of this subject, available public literature does not 
specifically address whether eliminating the criterion of rank and allowing the 
interchanging of enlisted personnel and company grade officers in some technical and 
management duty positions, based on established qualification required to perform 
effectively, has an effect on the Air Force as an organization.  Creswell suggests one of 
the chief reasons for conducting a qualitative study is that the study is exploratory; not 
much has been written about the topic or population being studied, and the researcher 
seeks to listen to informants and to build a picture based on their ideas (Creswell, 
1994:21).  The issues to consider are: (1) does interchanging rank in some duties have an 
effect on effective performance?; (2) does interchanging rank support Air Force 
personnel transformation efforts?; and (3) does interchanging rank affect the Air Force’s 
organizational culture?         
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Human Capital Theory (HCT) 
HCT is not a new field.  Machlup explains the first estimate of a nation’s stock of 
human capital was probably made around 1676 by Sir William Petty; however, Petty did 
not use his estimate in support of any substantive hypothesis or in connection with any 
theoretical model for the derivation of causal connection.  Human capital (HC) had been 
part of the economic and statistical literature for almost 300 years before it became 
popular by Schultz and Becker in the 1950s.  Theodore Schultz applied the notion of 
human capital to the economics of education, particularly to an explanation of the 
increase in productivity of human resources; he also examined the relationship between 
human capital and economic growth.  Becker engaged in more technical research in 
mathematical and statistical economics, computing rates of return to the investments 
people have made in their own skills and efficiency in self improvement through 
schooling and training.  Schultz (1970) as reported by Flamholtz and Lacey denotes since 
then, the growth of the study of HCT was due to the unexplained rise in economic value 
of man that led to the concept of human capital.   Schultz (1961) also explains the 
development of HCT is the result of an attempt to explain the differences in income and 
productivity between human beings as well as between nations (Flamholtz and Lacey, 
1981:19-20).    
Human Capital Definition Overview 
HCT has been defined from several personnel and organizational view-points.  
Davenport explains that Schultz (1961) was the first to use the term human capital in his 
article, Investment in Human Capital.  Since then, other economists have assigned several 
other terms to human capital but most agree that human capital comprises skills, 
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experience, and knowledge.  Some, like Becker, added personality, appearance, 
reputation, and credentials to the definition and management consultant Richard 
Crawford suggests human capital consists of skilled and educated people (Davenport 
1999:18-19).  Flamholtz and Lacey indicate it is the premise of HCT that expenditures on 
human beings constitute investments, which will produce future returns.  Their HCT is 
based on the concept that people possess skills, experience, and knowledge, which can be 
viewed as a form of capital.  Expenditures on education, training, and health are viewed 
as investments from which returns are expected to flow in the form of increased 
productivity and wages.  Often human capital results tie back to personal growth and 
earnings from investing in one self; however, Flamholtz and Lacey cite Mayer, Fama, 
and Schwert as saying this HCT can be extended from individuals to organizations.  In 
analysis, inexplicable differences in return on equity and in growth rates among firms can 
be found.  Differences in human capital available to firms may explain these observed 
variations in return.  Flamholtz and Lacey continue that HCT is intended to explain why 
individuals invest in themselves and how such investments affect their earnings as well as 
show how organizations behave in decisions involving acquisition, development 
(training) and conservation of those who possess human capital.  This does not assume 
the organization owns the individuals possessing the human capital but that the 
organization can act as though the individuals are part of its capital (Flamholtz and 
Lacey, 1981:3-29).  More recently, Liebowitz defines human capital as the collective 
experience, knowledge, and expertise of those contributing to an organization’s mission.  
His primary interest is in the organization’s employees and the knowledge they hold.  
Liebowitz also uses Josefek and Kauffman’s definition: the stock of knowledge, skills, 
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and abilities embedded in an individual that result from natural endowment and 
subsequent investment in education, training, and experience (Liebowitz, 2004:2).  One 
of the well-documented facts of modern labor economics is that education and training, 
or what economists call human capital investments, have high payoff in terms of income 
and productivity.  Increases in human capital have traditionally translated into rising 
productivity and growth in earnings (Denison 1985:15).   
 Schultz (1971) as reported by Eugene B. McGregor Jr. in his book Strategic 
Management of Human Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities, explains human capital 
investments can take many forms:  improved selection methodologies, smart recruitment 
systems, supportive compensation systems, education, on-the-job training, manpower 
migration, health maintenance, and research and development (R&D) activity.  HC is 
defined not by the number of available workers, but by what the workers are capable of 
doing (McGregor E. B., 1991:26).  McGregor continues that worker capability, however, 
is itself a multifaceted and extremely slippery notion.  Becker (1964), Schultz (1971) and 
Thurow (1970) state:  
 Theoretical formulations suggest that HC can be divided into general and specific 
 categories.  General HC consists of the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) 
 that are common to many jobs and employers.  Specific HC are the KSAs 
 uniquely preferred and valued by a single employer.  In general, the task is to 
 manage the portfolio of KSAs against the changing requirements of jobs designed 
 to fulfill the missions of agencies and corporations.  Thus, managers will need to 
 be evaluated not only on the extent to which they meet nominal productivity goals 
 but also on “their stewardship regarding the enhancement of the HC assigned to 
 them" (Fossum et. Al., 1986, p. 372).  (McGregor E. B., 1991:26).   
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From Douglas M. McGregor’s Theory X and Theory Y to the 21st Century 
 
 This section will synopsize the overarching organizational theory that HCT falls 
under and afterwards, a brief look to the future of how HCT can be used as a strategic 
management tool for the Air Force in its current transformation efforts.     
 For a long time, managers have been interested in the behavior of people in 
organizations.  However, it has only been since about 1957 when basic assumptions 
about the relationship between organizations and people truly began to change.  It was 
this change that led to organizational behavior perspective or human resource theory 
(HRT) (Shafritz and Ott, 2001:147).  Shafritz and Ott point out HRT draws on a body of 
research and theory built around four basic assumptions: 1) organizations exist to serve 
human needs (rather than the reverse); 2) organizations and people need each other; 3) 
when the fit between the individual and the organization is poor, one or both will suffer; 
and 4) as reported by Shafritz and Ott, Bolman and Deal (1997, pp. 102, 103) a good fit 
between individual and organization benefits both human beings find meaningful and 
satisfying work and organizations get the human talent and energy that they need 
(Shafritz and Ott, 2001:146).   
 HCM’s basics roots lie within one of HRT’s areas of motivation.  One motivation 
theory is Douglas M. McGregor’s “Theory X and Theory Y.”  In his article “The Human 
Side of Enterprise,” D. M. McGregor articulates how managerial assumptions about 
employees become self-fulfilling prophecies; managerial assumptions cause employee 
behavior.  He labeled two sets of contrasting assumptions “Theory X” and “Theory Y,” 
both of which are ways of seeing and thinking about people that, in turn, affect their 
behavior.  Theory X represents a restatement of the tenets of the scientific management 
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movement.  Theory X holds that human beings inherently dislike work and will avoid it if 
possible; most people must be coerced, controlled, directed, or threatened with 
punishment to get them to work toward achievement of organizational objectives.  
Humans prefer to be directed and to avoid responsibility and will seek security above all 
else.  In contrast, Theory Y suggests that people are not passive and do not inherently 
dislike work and that work can be a source of satisfaction.  People will exercise self-
direction and self-control, if they are committed to organization objectives.  People will 
seek to accept responsibility; avoidance of responsibility is not natural; it is a 
consequence of experiences.  The essential task of management is to arrange 
organizational conditions and methods so people can achieve their own goals by directing 
their efforts toward organizational objectives.  This is the process of creating 
opportunities, releasing potential, removing obstacles, encouraging growth, and providing 
guidance.  It is what Peter Drucker has called “management by objectives” in contrast to 
“management by control.”  It does not involve the abdication of management, the 
absence of leadership, the lowering of standards, or the other characteristics usually 
associated with the approach under Theory X.  With D. M. McGregor’s work as a basis, 
organizational behavior assumes that under the right circumstances, people and 
organizations will grow and prosper together and that [that even then] the intellectual 
potential of most humans is only partially utilized at work (Shafritz and Ott, 2001:148-
149, 179-184).  Kochan, Orlikowski, and Cutcher-Gershenfeld point out while D. M. 
McGregor’s Theory Y sparked important innovations in human resource practices, it did 
not challenge fundamental assumptions underpinning the twentieth century 
organizational model.  If, as is widely recognized, human capital and knowledge are the 
  19
most important sources of value for the twenty-first-century organization, then 
fundamental assumptions about the relationship between work and organizations will also 
need to be challenged (Kochan and Schmalensee, 2003:85, 113).  Human capital and 
knowledge [management] are considered together because they can be linked.  Liebowitz 
defines knowledge management as the process of creating value from an organization’s 
intangible assets; it deals with how to best leverage knowledge that is derived from the 
organization’s human capital.  Knowledge management and human capital strategy 
should be aligned with the organizational mission and strategy in order to maximize the 
contributions of the organization’s human capital (Liebowitz, 2004:11).  Both concepts 
will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.     
Strategic Management  
 E. B. McGregor, Jr. explains the: 
 Awareness of the strategic role of human resources in modern organizations has 
 penetrated management literature and practice (Meyer, 1978; “Personnel 
 Widens,” 1979; Douglas, Klein, and Hunt 1985; Fombrun, Tichy, and Devanna, 
 1984; Odiorne, 1984).  A few prescient analysts (Machlup, 1962; Chorafus, 1968; 
 Drucker, 1968; Shultz, 1971) grasped early the significance of human resources in 
 information-based societies and economies.  For the most part, however, social 
 scientists and practitioners have been slow to understand the profound changes 
 required when trained intelligence is the critical ingredient required in what is 
 now commonly referred to as the postindustrial age.  (McGregor E. B., 1991:9-
 10) 
 
 E. B. McGregor explains that a discontinuity exists in this postindustrial age.  
McGregor writes that Brickner (1981), Scientific American (1982), and Reich (1983) 
indicate that when final products are physical things or routine services, the workforce is 
significant only at an operational or tactical level.  When the final products are smart 
products and complex services, humans and their knowledge become the critical input 
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and are inseparable from the final output.  Thus, what is strategic about strategic human 
resource management is the management of the workforce’s knowledge so that this 
resource is converted into final knowledge products and ever-changing production 
techniques.  It means that productivity is increasingly linked to the trained human 
intellect.  In postindustrial systems, occupation refers less to a position in a production 
process and more to classes of work based on knowledge and skill requirements 
(McGregor E. B., 1991:11-12).  Human capital can be linked to knowledge management, 
which is the process of creating value from an organization’s intangible assets.  
Knowledge management deals with how best to leverage the knowledge throughout the 
organization.  This knowledge base is derived from the organization’s human capital.  
The knowledge management and human capital strategy should be aligned with the 
organizational mission and strategy in order to maximize the contributions of the 
organization’s human capital.  Knowledge management should be a key pillar in an 
organization’s human capital strategy.  (Liebowitz 2004: 11, 14).  The transformation in 
work systems underway today involves a shift from industrial to knowledge-based work 
systems that blur the lines between managerial and non-managerial work.  These systems 
assume that in a knowledge-based economy, high levels of performance can only be 
achieved by organizing work in ways that allow workers to use and deepen their 
knowledge and skills, with an emphasis on horizontal interrelationships among diverse 
groups and the coordinated use of teams, cross-functional task forces, and cross-
organizational alliances and networks (Kochan and Schmalensee, 2003:89-90).  The 
strategic importance of human capital changes forever the way both public and private 
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sector managers must think about workforce management (McGregor E. B., 1991:12).  
This in turn will affect the way organizations meet future challenges.                    
 E. B. McGregor then explains that the workforce management problem is to give 
operational meaning to the idea that it [the problem] involves making the right people 
available in the right place at the right time, defining “the right people” based on either 
the products they produce or their functional role in the production process, or the 
knowledge, skill, and abilities they possess.  The latter is particularly important where 
knowledge-intensive technology is strategic to the final outcome.  Typically, personnel 
management offices and managers, who concentrate on the individual persons of a 
bureau or agency, focus only on one small piece of the puzzle.  More strategically 
positioned personnel offices work with the issues associated with the human resources 
required to achieve [organizational] goals.  They start the workforce management 
discussion on the requirements side and make a deliberate connection with the workforce 
availability (McGregor E. B., 1991: 60, 68).   
 Is human capital management concerned with the human or the knowledge the 
human holds?  Liebowitz suggests if people form the body of an organization, then their 
knowledge is the blood that keeps the organization alive.  As a result, management of that 
knowledge (“knowledge management”) must be a central part of an organization’s 
human capital strategy (Liebowitz, 2004:63).  Experts on intellectual capital as reported 
by Marr say human capital is often defined as part of intellectual capital or the intangible 
resources of firms, which many believe is the most important intangible resource of 
firms.  Guy Ahonen (2000) emphasizes that human capital is the only generative 
intangible and the central element of intellectual capital.  Barney (1991) says as a 
  22
resource [intellectual capital] contributes to a sustainable competitive advantage if it is 
valuable, rare, difficult to imitate, or hard to substitute.  Teece (1998) adds that this 
means that a competitive advantage of firms in today’s economy does not result from 
market position by difficult-to-replicate knowledge-based assets and the manner they are 
developed.  Teece (et al. 1997) goes on to say this understanding led to the development 
of another concept in strategic management; the dynamic capability, which is the ability 
to achieve new forms of competitive advantage by appropriately adapting, integrating, 
and reconfiguring organizational skills, resources, and competencies to match the 
requirements of a changing environment (Marr, 2005:30, 96).  This synopsis provides a 
brief overview of HCT as it relates to HRT and some various distinctions between 
knowledge management, human capital and intellectual capital.  Next, the review 
highlights some literature that focuses on HCT within the federal government.              
A Federal Focus of Human Capital  
 Liebowitz cites Susannah Figura’s article, Human Capital: The Missing Link, in 
Government Executive Magazine: 
 most federal managers and human resources specialists are still more focused on 
 short-term needs than long-term ones.  It would be better for human resources 
 departments to be rated on a more strategic scale rather then a tactical one.  Such 
 rating criteria might be: conducts strategic analysis of present and future human 
 resources needs and workforce planning; able to obtain needed employees; able to 
 maintain a workforce with a mix of skills that matches its needs; and ability to 
 motivate and reward employees to support strategic and performance goals.  
 (Liebowitz 2004: 6)   
  
 In December 2002, the General Accounting Office (GAO) published a report for 
the Secretary of Defense, Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed to Help 
Maintain Momentum of DOD’s Strategic Human Capital Planning.  It indicates in 
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January 2001, the GAO designated strategic human capital management as a 
government-wide, high-risk area and stated that one of the pervasive human capital 
challenges facing federal government was a lack of strategic human capital planning and 
organizational alignment and the President, in August 2001, placed human capital at the 
top of his management agenda and (GAO 2002b:4).  The GAO released A Model of 
Strategic Human Capital Management that identified four critical cornerstones and eight 
critical success factors for managing human capital strategically.  Figure 2 shows these 
cornerstones and success factors. 
   
 
Figure 2.  GAO Model (GAO 2002a:8).    
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 All of the critical success factors reflect two principles that are central to the 
 human capital idea:  (1) People are assets whose value can be enhanced through 
 investment.  As with any investment, the goal is to maximize value while 
 managing risk and (2) an organization’s human capital approaches should be 
 designed, implemented, and assessed by the standard of how well they help the 
 organization achieve results and pursue its mission.  For each of the eight critical 
 success factors noted in Figure 2, Figure 3 describes three levels of 
 managing people that are typical of an organization.  Level one is unlikely to have 
 effectively put the two principles into practice; level two is where organizations 
 are taking steps to apply them; and level three, being the ultimate level, is where 
 an organization has made these principles an integral part of its approach to doing 
 business, and can see demonstrable results for having done so.  Progressing to 
 level three, which every agency strive to accomplish, will take considerable time, 
 effort, and resources on behalf of organizational leadership to successfully 
 manage the required change and will take long-term commitment to value human 
 capital as a strategic asset.  (GAO 2002a:8-9) 
  
 
 
Figure 3.  GAO Approaches to Human Capital Management (GAO 2002a:9).     
 
 Highlighting the integration and alignment factor that falls under the strategic 
human capital planning cornerstone, the GAO report indicates:  
 Effective organizations integrate human capital approaches as strategies for 
 accomplishing their mission as well as programmatic goals and results.  
 Furthermore, high performing organizations stay alert to emerging mission 
 demands and human capital challenges and remain open to reevaluating their 
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 human capital practices in light of their demonstrated successes or failures in 
 achieving the organization’s  strategic objectives.  (GAO 2002:20-21)  
 
21st Century  
 The direction of human capital management in the 21st century was discussed in a 
GAO testimony, "Human Capital: Managing Human Capital in the 21st Century:"  
as the value of people increases, so does the performance capacity of the 
 organization, and therefore its value to clients and other stakeholders.  As with 
 any investment, the goal is to maximize value while managing risk.  Second, an 
 organization’s human capital approaches must be aligned to support the mission, 
 vision for the future, core values, goals, and strategies by which the organization 
 has defined its direction and its expectations for itself and its people.  An 
 organization’s human capital policies and practices should be designed, 
 implemented, and assessed by the standard of how well they help the organization 
 pursue these intents and achieve related results.  It is clear that, in many 
 government entities, the transition to performance management – and along with 
 it, to strategic human capital management – will require a cultural transformation.  
 Hierarchical management approaches will need to yield to partnerial approaches.  
 Process oriented ways of doing business will need to yield to results oriented 
 ones.  And siloed organizations will need to become integrated organizations if 
 they expect to make the most of the knowledge, skills, and abilities of their 
 people.  (GAO 2000:7) 
 
Next, this literature review focuses on the Air Force and its HC strategy.     
 
Air Force Human Capital 
 Until this point, the literature in this review discussed human capital from a 
civilian, commercial business, point-of-view.  However, the GAO report, Human 
Capital: Major Human Capital Challenges at the Department of Defense and State, 
states the human capital issues for the Department of Defense are not fundamentally 
different from those facing other federal agencies today.  The human capital problems of 
the Department of Defense can be seen as part of a broader pattern of human capital 
weaknesses that have eroded mission capabilities across the federal government.  Human 
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capital remains as the critical link to reforming and modernizing the federal government’s 
management practices (GAO 2001: 1-2).   
Air Force Flight Plan 
Summarizing the Air Force's Human Capital Management Transformation 
according to The U.S. Air Force Transformational Flight Plan explains that as part of the 
new Total Force Development construct, a new personnel vision and strategic plan to 
transform human capital management has been adopted.  The strategy integrates people 
with technology by defining required human capabilities and developing the right 
competencies in airmen to meet mission requirements.  Facilitated through organizational 
alignment, business process transformation and reengineered delivery systems, the 
manpower, personnel and training communities are optimizing how the Air Force puts 
the right people in the right place at the right time for the most effective use of resources.  
The intent is to transform the Air Force personnel system to be agile and responsive to 
changing requirements while efficiently serving all airmen.  It was clear the personnel 
community needed to shift thinking from how to meet a given threat to thinking in terms 
of developing capabilities for war fighters, which resulted in a new Personnel Vision and 
a Personnel Strategic Plan.  This led to a new set of goals focused on a transformed view 
of the traditional personnel lifecycle.  The new Personnel Strategic Plan supports the 
President’s Management Agenda, incorporates feedback from a recent GAO report, and 
is directly linked to the new Air Force core competencies.  Accordingly, the effects-based 
strategy focuses on mission outcomes and required capabilities while optimizing the Air 
Force’s return on investment in its people and moves us from a regulatory-based 
construct to a performance-based construct where the measures of merit are successful 
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mission outcomes (Department of the Air Force, The U.S. Air Force Transformation 
Flight Plan, 2004:34-35).        
Force Development  
The Force Development Construct grew out of a Chief of Staff of the Air Force 
initiative launched in July 1999 to examine and recommend actions necessary to prepare 
the Air Force Total Force for the 21st Century.  The intent was a transition in Total Force 
development from a rigid, one size fits all, with functionally independent career path 
pyramids, to a flexible, competency-based, deliberate development model that rests on 
institutional needs and requirements.  Force Development will be executed in three parts 
— Officer, Enlisted, and Civilian across the active and reserve components (Department 
of the Air Force, Air Force Handbook 2003:22).  The Force Development Branch Guide 
on Force Development elaborates that civilian, reserve, guard, and enlisted force 
development will execute initiatives using officer force development as a benchmark.  
Force Development is executed through the Development Team Meeting Process and has 
three distinct phases:  administrative, execution, and analysis (AFPC, Force Development 
Branch Guide on Force Development, 2005:7).    
The purpose of the total force policy is to provide key leadership policies for 
managing human resource and career field development at the tactical, operational, and 
strategic levels through Total Force Development.  The goal is to better prepare our total 
force to successfully lead and accomplish rapidly evolving global missions, while 
fulfilling airmen’s personal and professional expectations to the greatest extent possible 
consistent with mission accomplishment (Department of the Air Force, Air Force Policy 
Directive 36-26, 2004:1).  Further defined, force development is a series of experiences 
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and challenges, combined with education and training opportunities, that are directed at 
producing airmen who possess the requisite skills, knowledge, experience, and 
motivation to lead and execute the full spectrum of Air Force missions.  Force 
development programs specify how the Air Force leverages its investment in its people.  
The Air Force has determined there are clearly identifiable skill requirements for airmen 
who have experiences in more than one connected career area.  Force development 
defines the occupational skill combinations and then facilitates the education, training, 
and assignment processes to produce a sufficient capability within the personnel 
inventory.  Force development is executed through policies, force management strategies, 
and prioritization of resources. Finally, these programmatic decisions are executed 
through deliberate management of Air Force programs and operations in the field to 
achieve the desired objectives (AFDD 1-1, 2004:14-15).   
Force development processes are focused to produce and maximize the 
capabilities of airmen.  When force development shifts its primary focus to tactical 
processes or individual aims, airmen can be erroneously viewed as commodities, and the 
whole force suffers.  Effective integration of force development is centered on capability-
based requirements.  Education and training are critical components of the force 
development construct and represent a large investment of resources and are the primary 
tools in developing airmen (AFDD 1-1, 2004:19-24).   
Finally, the Air Force Handbook describes force development as:   
is doctrinally based and focuses on three levels:  (1) tactical - gaining knowledge 
and experience in primary skill, combined with education and training 
experiences; (2) operational - continued widening of experience and increased 
responsibility within a related family of skills; and (3) strategic - developing a full 
breadth of experience and leadership perspective at the joint, inter-governmental, 
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and international levels.  Force Development provides individuals with tailored, 
connected education and training to appropriately prepare them for an additional 
Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC). These AFSC pairings are based on Air Force 
requirements, providing the Air Force its necessary leadership talent and the 
individual with a higher level of mission competence.  Force Development will 
provide a competency based development process by connecting the depth of 
expertise in the individual’s primary career field (AFSC) with the necessary 
education, training and experiences to produce more capable and diversified 
leaders.  (Department of the Air Force, Air Force Handbook 2003:22)   
 
Air Force Specialties 
 
 How does the Air Force define human capital?  Air Force human capital can be 
defined using the Officer and Enlisted Classification Air Force Instructions (AFI)         
36-2105 and 36-2108, respectively.  In general, both AFI 36-2105, Officer Classification, 
and AFI 36-2108, Enlisted Classification, describes the mandatory standards of each 
specialty job qualification for effective performance in terms of “knowledge,” 
“education,” “experience,” “training,” and “other” such as physical standards, security 
clearances, certifications, etc.  The definition of each term, as described in both AFI     
36-2105 and AFI 36-2108, are generally the same, but each AFI uses different wording.  
Neither instruction defines duties inherent to all officers or enlisted airmen 
comprehensively (Department of the Air Force, AFI 36-2105, 2004:6 and AFI 36-2108, 
2004:7).  All Air Force specialties are described in one of these AFIs, which are divided 
by enlisted and officer rank categories.  This shows rank is the first qualifier that 
classifies officer duties (AFI 36-2105) from enlisted duties (AFI 36-2108) and is the first 
role in the employment selection process for Air Force airmen and is part of its 
organizational culture.  The Air Force has non-rated, mid-level technical and 
management duties that are filled by company grade officers where their status associated 
with rank is not critical (i.e. their function is not strategic and interface with senior 
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echelons, foreign military/governments and outside organizations is limited) and these 
duties could be performed by anyone who meets the qualifications, regardless of rank.       
 Generally, certain officer ranks are tied to each level of force development.  As an 
example, Figure 4, shows the career pyramid for a, 63A, Acquisition Manager.  It can be 
seen that company grade officers are generally employed at the tactical level; majors and 
Lieutenant Colonels at the operational level; and mainly colonels the strategic level.  It is 
at the tactical level rank that there is often little importance of the rank of the person in 
the duty position due to the lack of supervisory requirements.  It is at this lower level that 
the interchangeable rank concept can be useful.  Next will be a brief look at the Air 
Force’s enlisted history.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Acquisition Manager Career Pyramid 
(Head Quarters AFPC Career Planning Diagrams & Utilization Charts, 2006) 
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Enlisted as a Career Force 
Since the establishment of the National Security Act in 1947, United States Air 
Force (USAF) enlisted personnel have played a vital role in making the USAF an 
exceptional independent service.  The start of a career enlisted force, to support the 
independent USAF, began in 1954 with the signing of a memorandum by Defense 
Secretary Charles E. Wilson that eliminated joint Army and Air Force recruiting 
(Grandstaff, 1997:94).  During this period of time of post Korean War exodus, enlisted 
personnel retention was low and the Womble Committee Report studied retention to 
explain why services were losing personnel and what specific actions could be taken to 
reverse the poor retention trend (Grandstaff, 1997:173).  The USAF findings showed the 
most competent personnel enlisted for the training, to escape the draft, or to find college 
training and used the USAF as a stepping stone and did not see the USAF as a career 
(Grandstaff, 1997:180).  To improve retention, retaining competent enlisted workers was 
stressed, which was a significant shift in Air Force thought.  The Air Force was relying 
on highly skilled workers but took actions to retain career minded personnel, recognizing 
that older, possibly married members, in their second reenlistment were valuable to the 
stability of the Air Force.  Some of the incentives used to retain enlisted personnel were: 
specialized skills training to meet the demand of increasing technology; encouraged off-
duty education; and started tuition assistance programs.  Noncommissioned officer 
(NCO) academies were established and enlisted career paths were developed to 
standardized training and promotion requirements.  One of the most important changes 
was base commanders assigning certain officers’ jobs to NCOs such as supply officers, 
records management (jobs usually assigned to field grade officers (major and above), and 
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training specialists (Grandstaff, 1997:184).  By fiscal year 1957, first term reenlistment 
rates increased an average of 128 percent and career retention increased from 70.2 
percent to 91.4 percent and the USAF continued to focus on retaining only individuals 
capable of comprehending technical training and those willing to make the USAF a 
career (Grandstaff, 1997:187).  These changes were the start of an experienced, career 
enlisted force.  Over the next 20 years, additional changes took place that recognized 
enlisted personnel’s leadership and management capabilities.  In 1958, the warrant officer 
ranks were eliminated and the ranks of senior master sergeant and chief master sergeant 
were created [further increasing the responsibilities levied on enlisted personnel].  The 
expertise and skills of NCOs continued as officers vacated more jurisdictional space to 
them, and they began to serve in the Titan program as missile launch officers and in the 
top rungs of middle management (Grandstaff, 1997:195).  This was the start of a career 
enlisted force but Kirby and Naftel explain that although “careers” for officers have been 
the subject of debate in the United States for over 200 years, the idea of careers for 
enlisted members of the military services is a relatively recent development.  Since the 
beginning of the All Volunteer Force in 1973, career considerations have come to the 
forefront.  How enlisted members are accessed, trained, promoted, and transitioned has 
also changed significantly over the years (Kirby and Naftel 2001:2-3).  Most of these 
changes, that make the enlisted force a career force, are still in effect and since 1973 
enlisted personnel have continued to become more knowledgeable, educated, trained, and 
experienced.  There are more instances of enlisted personnel performing at levels 
commensurate with a higher rank such as commandants, senior personnel managers, and 
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most recently, the Enlisted-to-AFIT program shows promise in the enlisted force and 
their propensity for increased responsibilities.     
So far, this literature review has traced HCT, using HRT as an umbrella, from the 
civilian to the government to the Air Force perspective.  The interchangeable rank 
concept requires an organizational culture that is capable of embracing it as a change for 
the better and an increase in capability for the Air Force in the long run.     
Organizational Culture 
In Shafritz and Ott book “Classics of Organization Theory,” culture is part of 
organizational life that influences the behavior, attitudes, and overall effectiveness of 
employees.  It is what the employees perceive and how this perception creates a pattern 
of beliefs, values, and expectations.  Edgar Schein (1993) defines culture as a pattern of 
shared basic assumptions – invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it 
learns to cope with the problems of external adaptation and internal integration – that has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore, to be taught to new members as 
the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.  Bohm (1990) 
says one of the main problems in resolving intercultural issues is that we take culture so 
much for granted and put so much value on our own assumptions that we find it awkward 
and inappropriate even to discuss our assumptions or to ask others about their 
assumptions.  We tend not to examine assumptions once we have made them but to take 
them for granted, and we tend not to discuss them, which makes them seemingly 
unconscious.  If we are forced to discuss them, we tend to examine them but to defend 
them because we have emotionally invested in them (Shafritz and Ott, 2001:373-374).   
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An organization that emphasizes rules, policies, procedures, chain of command 
and centralized decision making has a bureaucratic culture.  The military, government 
agencies, and firms started and managed by autocratic managers are examples of 
bureaucratic culture (Gibson and others 2003:36).  The Air Force is a bureaucratic 
culture, with the chain of command having a distinction between officer and enlisted 
personnel.  This distinction is often required in order to maintain a clear chain-of-
command and control of the forces.  Air Force Doctrine Document 2–8 defines command 
and control as the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission 
(AFDD 2-8:57).  Because of the requirement of a chain-of-command in a military 
organization, professional relationships are essential to the effective operation of all 
organizations, both military and civilian, but the nature of the military mission requires 
absolute confidence in command and an unhesitating adherence to orders that may result 
in inconvenience, hardships or, at times, injury or death.  This distinction makes the 
maintenance of professional relationships in the military more critical than in civilian 
organizations (AFI 36-2909:2).   
The interchangeable rank concept is not intended to violate our culture in terms of 
chain-of-command or customs and courtesies and it is further believed that its existence 
will not accelerate the propensity for personnel, officer and enlisted airmen, to violate the 
chain-of-command and/or customs and courtesies.         
Conclusion 
 This literature review started with a brief history along with several definitions of 
HCT.  It continued by tracing HCT from D. M. McGregor’s “Theory X, Theory Y,” then 
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describes HCT as a strategic resource.  The review then gives a federal government view 
point of HCT, then the Department of Defense and finally the Air Force.  It continues 
with a brief history of the enlisted force, showing increases in capabilities, 
responsibilities, education, and a propensity toward being career airmen.  The review 
ended with a discussion about organizational culture.  Cultural change within an 
organization challenges the “norm.”  HCT growth is an outcome of the technological as 
well as the conceptualized growth over the past 60 years.  The research questions for this 
thesis, interchangeable rank concept, challenges the Air Force’s organizational culture 
today; however, its explanation and intent is valid in this era of asymmetrical warfare, 
reduced airmen end-strength, shrinking budgets, and increases in enlisted human capital.        
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III.  Methodology 
Introduction 
 Data for this research was collected using a web based survey that was sent to a 
random selection of active duty Air Force airmen between the rank of technical sergeant 
and colonel throughout the Air Force.  Lists of names and associated e-mail addresses 
were provided from several different locations:  CEPME/DOA provided lists of 13,558 
NCO academy graduates and 3,503 SNCO academy graduates; and AFCMO provided a 
list of 4,352 colonels.  These three lists were adjusted, removing all non active duty 
airmen, then each list was alphabetized and a random select of e-mails were selected.  
The entire lists were not used due to time constraints; 709 personnel were selected from 
the NCOA list; 840 from the SNCOA list; and 470 from the Colonel list.  Also, 947 
active duty Air Force students at the AFIT were surveyed that consisted mainly of 
students between the rank of Second Lieutenant through Major and 22 enlisted students.  
Finally, AF/DPPF provided a list of 107 enlisted career field managers, which was used 
in whole.   
The rationale behind this method of selecting respondents (other that the career 
field managers) was the airmen that go to Air Force schools/academies are from all parts 
of the Air Force, not a focused group such as a select career field or major command.  
The randomly selected respondents selected from these lists met the rank requirement of 
this research and was a representative sample of the Air Force.  For the purposes of this 
research, the survey was publicly available from 19 December 2005 through 10 January 
2006 at http://www.afit.edu/en/Surveys/dromano/ Survey/.  The survey was sent to a total 
of 3,073 e-mail addresses and reached 2,758; 315 e-mails returned an administrative 
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error, therefore, it was considered that the survey did not reach these respondents.  
Additionally, some respondents commented, via e-mail, that the survey was 
malfunctioning on the computer he/she was using to complete the survey.  These 
respondents were informed this was a known problem that happened on some computers 
and that it was an individual computer configuration issue and were advised to try a 
different computer.  Being an anonymous survey and not sure the number of airmen who 
had a problem and did not mention it, the number of respondents that made one 
unsuccessful attempt at the survey is unknown.   
Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire consisted of 97 items and three comment sections.  A cover 
page was included that described the purpose of the survey and stressed to the 
respondents that their participation was voluntary and their responses were anonymous.  
Respondents were asked to select from a six point Likert scale or make a selection based 
on their personal demographics (i.e. education level, age, etc).  Non-Likert scale items 
were numerically coded so they can be statistically analyzed.  For example, an item that 
required a respondent to answer “yes” or “no,” would have a “yes” response coded as a 
“one” and a “no” response coded as a “two.”  Please see Appendix A for further details 
about the cover letter and survey.  The items used to construct the questionnaire were 
based on definitions from Air Force guidance.  A small portion of the items in the 
organizational culture section were taken from an existing scale.  These items were 
modified to be specifically relevant to this research.   
An informal pilot test of the survey was conducted using eight airmen, four AFIT 
students and four airmen from other locations (Marietta GA, McGuire AFB NJ, Fairchild 
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AFB WA, and Okinawa Japan) as well as committee members.  The respondents in the 
pilot study were asked to answer the questionnaire and provide feedback about the 
language used, directions, layout, ease-of-use, length and clarity.  After all necessary 
changes another pilot test was conducted using approximately 18 AFIT students.  These 
students were briefed on this research topic, then asked to complete the survey to 
determine the appropriateness of the items for the research.  Again, all necessary 
corrections were made before the final version of the questionnaire was posted on the 
web-page.  None of the pilot test respondents had previous knowledge of the survey.     
Coding  
The survey was divided into nine sections.  Each section of the survey has been 
coded to keep the data and structure of the methodology in order.  For example, section 
one below relates to section one of the survey and is coded “S1,” section two below 
relates to section two of the survey and is coded “S2,” etc.  Further, code “Q6.21” refers 
to section six, item (question) 21 and code “Q8.4” refers to section eight, item four.     
Statistical Analysis 
Statistical data analysis was conducted using Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS), software version 13.0.  Appropriate descriptive and inferential statistics 
were used to analyze the data collected from the questionnaires, with regression analysis, 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), or independent paired t-tests being the primary means of 
answering the hypotheses.  Factor analysis was used as post hoc analysis to further 
explore the data.     
Multiple regression analysis will be used to determine the correlation between the 
independent variable(s), moderating variables (when used) and the dependent variable.  
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When there are two continuous interval or ratio variables, one of which can be identified 
as an independent variable and the other as a dependent variable, regression analysis is 
the appropriate technique to measure the relationship between them and assess its 
significance (Alreck and Settle, 2004:329).  When the independent variables are analyzed 
with the moderating variable separately, the intent is to determine the amount of impact 
the moderating variable has on the regression model.  When the independent variables are 
analyzed together against the dependent variable, the independent variables will be 
ordered hierarchically based on the pair comparison results from Section Six (S6).   
An ANOVA is the appropriate technique to determine if the mean values of the 
dependent variable for each category of the independent variable are significantly 
different.  A paired t-test is used when there are only two categories/means, a special case 
of an ANOVA (Alreck and Settle 2004:318).   
Before statistically analyzing the data, SPSS cross-tabbing was used to determine 
errors, missing data, etc as well as any trends that may be evident.  SPSS crosstabs 
produce “two-way to n-way” cross-tabulations for variables that have a limited number or 
string values.  In addition to cell count, cell percentages, expected values, residuals, and 
optional measures of association can be obtained (SPSS Users Guide, 1986:337).  Each 
case was examined to determine whether the responses to the items were sound overall 
and was based on the amount of missing data and number and type of mistakes found 
when cross-tabbing the data.   For example, a respondent indicating his or her age as 21 
year old and rank as a major, or if none of the demographic data were completed, would 
be indications of unreliable data.  The remainder of this chapter describes each section of 
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the questionnaire in more detail along with information about the methodology and 
statistical analysis used to analyze the data and answer the hypotheses.   
Using statistical functions in SPSS, the reliability and validity of the survey was 
checked to statistically measure how repeatable the survey was and the level of random 
error and systematic bias in the data.  Random error is the unpredictable error that occurs 
in all research and may be caused by many different factors but is affected primarily be 
sampling techniques.  No instrument is perfect, so some error will occur during the 
measurement process.  The lower the measurement error, the closer the data are to the 
truth (Alreck and Settle, 2004:58-60).  To lower the chance of random error, a large, 
random, and representative sample size was selected across all rank categories from TSgt 
– Col.  The only limitation to the number of respondents selected from the lists of 
names/e-mails provided was the amount of research time available.  The internal 
consistency of the scales and sub scales was determined using a Cronbach Alpha.  
Besides determining a survey item’s or scale’s reliability, its validity, or how well it 
measures what it sets out to measure, must also be assessed (Alreck and Settle, 2004:58-
60).  The two pilot tests, an assessment by the research committee members attempted to 
improve its validity.  Also, the survey used branching techniques that only allow airmen 
to answer selected questions based on their previous responses.  For example, airmen 
who never served in a supervisory capacity (i.e. answered “No” to the question in section 
III) were not allowed to provide their perception in Section Five (S5), which is only 
concerned with supervisor respondent’s views.               
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Section One – Education Demographics (S1)  
The first section (S1) consisted of an 11 item scale that determined the amount of 
college education each respondent received while he/she was in the Air Force, the general 
category of each degree held at the time he/she completed the questionnaire, and whether 
he/she was a full or part-time student.  It asks three basic questions - the amount of 
education at the time he/she entered the military, the amount of education he/she has 
now, and the general category his/her degree is in, if applicable.  Respondents were asked 
to select the education level and type of degree that applied.  The respondents did not 
have to answer all 11 items because the survey used a branching technique that only 
showed each respondent the items that were applicable to them, based on their answers to 
the first and second questions.  Using this information, along with basic demographic 
data, it can be determined how much education a category of airmen (i.e. officer, 
enlisted) received while in the Air Force.  Furthermore, using this data combine with the 
cost the Air Force pays for college education can provide an estimated amount of money 
the Air Force spends on college education for its airmen.       
Section Two - Effective Performance, Employee Perception (S2)   
 The second section (S2) consists of a 38 item scale that addressed hypotheses one 
through five:   
¾ H1:  Respondents’ perception of status will not moderate the individual 
relationships between the independent variables knowledge, education, 
experience or training and the dependent variable effective performance. 
 
¾ H2:  Enlisted (TSgt-SMSgt), officer (CGO), and leader (CMSgt and Field Grade 
Officers (FGO)) respondents will not differ on their perception of the effect status 
has on the individual relationships between knowledge, education, experience or 
training and effective performance. 
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¾ H3:  Respondents’ perception of knowledge, education, training, or experience, 
individually, will significantly increase the ability to determine effective 
performance.   
 
¾ H4:  Enlisted (TSgt-SMSgt), officer (CGO), and leader (CMSgt and FGO) 
respondents will not differ on their perception of the affect knowledge, education, 
training, or experience, individually, will have on the ability to determine 
effective performance. 
 
¾ H5:  Respondents’ perception of knowledge, education, experience, and training 
will significantly increase the ability to determine effective performance, while 
status, indoctrination, and PME will not significantly increase the ability to 
determine effective performance.     
 
 The scale was divided into eight sub scales.  Seven of the sub scales represent 
certain preparations or traits that a respondent may have and each constitute an 
independent variable (i.e. knowledge, education, training, experience, status, 
indoctrination, and professional military education (PME)).  The eighth sub scale 
represents the dependent variable, effective performance.  Each variable will be 
explained in detail later in this section of the methodology.   
The intent of the second section of the survey was to determine what preparations 
or traits the respondents have that they perceived important for them to perform 
effectively (the dependent variable) in their current Air Force Specialty (AFS).  The 
respondents were specifically asked to consider only the representative duties, 
responsibilities, or requirements to perform in the AFS and not to consider their 
supervisory, management, or leadership roles that may be inherent to their position.  As 
an example, an aircraft maintenance specialist, research engineer, or an acquisition 
manager, who may also supervise airmen, would only consider what it takes to 
effectively perform the representative duties and responsibilities of the job and would not 
consider their possible associated supervisory role.  Respondents who were strictly 
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supervisors, managers, leaders, or students were asked to base their responses on their 
experience from the most recent position, where they performed the representative duties 
and responsibilities of their AFS.  Respondents were asked to select the number that 
appropriately indicates the extent to which they agreed with each statement about 
preparations or traits that may have helped them to effectively perform the representative 
duties and responsibilities of their AFS.  A six point Likert scale was used as shown in 
Figure 5.   
 
 
 
 
 
The items that will make up the seven independent variables and one dependent 
variable (sub scales) were developed based on the following definitions.  Please see 
Appendix A for the wording of each item.  No known scales were available to develop 
these items:   
¾ Knowledge is the factual understanding and practical military skills required to 
perform at the qualification level (AFI 36-2105, 2004:6).  Three items, Q2.2, 
Q2.10, and Q2.21, were used to determine the respondent’s perception whether 
knowledge was important to them in order for them to perform effectively. 
¾  Education is specific academic subjects or disciplines, or courses of study 
required or desired to succeed in the specialty (AFI 36-2105, 2004:6).  Five items, 
Q2.3, Q2.12, Q2.23, Q2.30, and Q2.35, were used to determine the respondent’s 
0 
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Strongly 
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Figure 5. Likert Scale. 
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perception whether education was important to them in order for them to perform 
effectively.    
¾ Experience is having performed in specialty duties needed for upgrade to the 
qualified level (AFI 36-2105, 2004:6).  Four items, Q2.5, Q2.14, Q2.25, and 
Q2.32, were used to determine the respondent’s perception whether experience 
was important to them in order for them to perform effectively.    
¾ Training is military courses training for or contributing directly to effective 
performance (AFI 36-2105, 2004:6).  Six items, Q2.4, Q2.13, Q2.19, Q2.24, 
Q2.31, and Q2.37 were used to determine the respondent’s perception whether 
training was important to them in order for them to perform effectively.     
¾ Status for the purposes of this research includes time-in-grade, time-in-service, 
military status (i.e. as a company or field grade officer, noncommissioned officer 
or senior noncommissioned officer status), or rank/grade.  Seven items, Q2.6, 
Q2.11, Q2.16, Q2.20, Q2.26, Q2.33, and Q2.38, were used to determine the 
respondent’s perception whether their status was important to them in order for 
them to perform effectively.     
¾ Indoctrination, for the purposes of this research, includes the training all military 
members receive during entry such as basic military training, officer training 
school, or in processing at inbound bases.  Three items, Q2.7, Q2.17, and Q2.27 
were used to determine the respondent’s perception whether their indoctrination 
training was important to them in order for them to perform effectively.   
¾ Professional Military Education, for the purposes of this research, includes 
military courses such as airmen leadership school, noncommissioned officer 
  45
academy, senior noncommissioned officer academy, or squadron officer school.  
Four items, Q2.9, Q2.18, Q2.28, and Q2.34, were used to determine the 
respondent’s perception whether their professional military education was 
important to them in order for them to perform effectively.   
¾ The term “Effective Performance” was defined as meeting the minimum 
requirements as established in the guidance the respondent followed (i.e. technical 
order, military standard, federal acquisition regulation, air force instruction, etc) 
to perform their job.  Six items, Q2.1, Q2.8, Q2.15, Q2.22, Q2.29, and Q2.36 
were used to determine the respondent’s perception of what constitutes effective 
performance.   
A typical item in these sub scales included, "To perform effectively, I require factual 
understanding of the technical part of my AFS" or "To perform effectively, I require a 
certain rank/grade."  Table 2 shows all the variables and their associated items on the 
survey.   
 
Table 2.  Section Two Variables and Items.   
Variables Items 
Knowledge  Q2.2, Q2.10, Q2.21 
Education  Q2.3, Q2.12, Q2.23, Q2.30, Q2.35 
Experience  Q2.5, Q2.14, Q2.25, Q2.32 
Training  Q2.4, Q2.13, Q2.19, Q2.24, Q2.31, Q2.37 
Status  Q2.6, Q2.11, Q2.16, Q2.20, Q2.26, Q2.33, Q2.38 
Indoctrination  Q2.7, Q2.17, Q2.27 
Professional Military Education Q2.9, Q2.18, Q2.28, Q2.34 
Effective Performance Q2.1, Q2.8, Q2.15, Q2.22, Q2.29, Q2.36 
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 Based on the definition of Air Force human capital (in chapter two), the specialty 
qualifications that the Air Force has established in the officer and enlisted classification 
instructions can be represented in three different human capital models.   
 Hypothesis one analyzed four models where the four independent variables (1) 
knowledge, (2) education, (3) experience, and (4) training were individually regressed 
against the dependent variable, effective performance, with status as a moderating 
variable; hypothesis three analyzes the same relationship as in hypothesis one without 
status as a moderating variable; and hypothesis five will regress all seven of the 
independent variables (knowledge, education, experience, training, status, indoctrination, 
and PME) together against the independent variable, effective performance.  The job 
qualification criterion “other” as discussed in chapter two and AFI 36-2105 and 36-2108, 
was excluded to simplify the model.   
Hypotheses One and Two Evaluation Design 
Since rank, which is part of the independent variable status, separates all Air 
Force duties into two categories (i.e. officer duties and enlisted duties), one research 
question is whether the variable status moderates the relationship between the four 
independent variables and if so, whether it has a positive or negative affect.  Barron and 
Kenney indicate that moderator variables are important because they often are assumed to 
reduce or enhance the influence that specific independent variables have on specific 
responses in question (dependent variable).  In general terms, a moderator is a qualitative 
(e.g., sex, race, class) or quantitative (e.g., level of reward) variable that affects the 
direction and/or strength of the relation between an independent and dependent variable.  
Specifically, within correlational analysis framework, a moderator is a third variable that 
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affects the zero-order correlation between two other variables (Baron and Kenny, 
1986:1174).  Put simply, a basic moderator variable is one that influences the strength of 
a relationship between two other variables.  Viewed as a basic moderating variable, status 
(rank) may be shown to have a positive affect on the relationship between the variables, 
or not.   
 For hypothesis one, multiple regression techniques were used to determine the 
relationship between the independent variables knowledge, education, training, and 
experience, and the dependent variable, effective performance, with status as a 
moderating variable.  Figure 6 shows a typical model.  Each independent variable was 
examined separately with status (i.e. rank) as the moderating variable and effective 
performance as the dependent variable.  The assertion in hypothesis one is that the 
respondents will perceive the rank of the employee to have little effect on the value each 
independent variable has on being able to perform effectively.  Status (i.e. rank) is 
hypothesized to have no effect on the relationship between variables and perhaps could 
be an artificial barrier to employing enlisted airmen in some technical and management 
duties currently reserved for officers, which prevents full exploitation of the acquired and 
developed human capital already within the Air Force.   
 
 
Figure 6.  Typical, One Independent, One Moderating, and One Dependent Variable 
Regression Model. 
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In hypothesis two, the data was separated in three rank categories:  an enlisted 
category consisting of TSgt - SMSgt; a CGO category; and a leader category consisting 
of CMSgt and officers in the rank of FGO and above.  A combination of regression and 
ANOVA will be performed on the data to determine the extent of the difference that the 
respondents in these rank categories perceive status to have on the relationship between 
the independent variables and the dependent variable, effective performance.  The 
assertion in hypothesis two is that there will be no significant variation in the 
respondent's perception in each of these rank categories.         
Hypotheses Three and Four Evaluation Design.   
Figure 7 shows a proposed schematic relationship, showing each of the independent 
variables in a vertical alignment with the dependent variable, indicating that a certain 
level of knowledge, education, training, and experience can individually have a positive 
or negative affect on effective performance. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Vertical Variable Model.   
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Hypothesis three will have the independent variables knowledge, education, 
training, and experience individually regressed with the dependent variable, effective 
performance, to determine the effect each of these independent variables has on the 
dependent variable without status as a moderating variable.  Figure 8 shows a typical 
model.   
 
Figure 8.  Typical, One Independent, One Dependent Variable Regression Model. 
 
The assertion in hypothesis three is that the relationship between the independent 
and dependent variable will be significant and that the relationship will not significantly 
increase or decrease as a result of status being removed from moderating the relationship.  
These outputs will be compared to the outputs from hypothesis one and is hypothesized 
that no significant difference will be found.   
Similarly as in hypothesis two, hypothesis four will have a combination of 
regression and ANOVA conducted and the results will be compared.  The assertion in 
hypothesis four is also that there will be no significant variation in the respondent's 
perception in each of these rank categories.         
 Hypothesis Five Evaluation Design.   
 All the independent variables status, indoctrination, PME, knowledge, education, 
training, and experience will be analyzed together against the dependent variable, 
effective performance, as modeled in Figure 9 below.  Figure 9 shows a schematic 
relationship that models all seven independent variables in a horizontal alignment with 
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the dependent variable.  This model indicates that a certain level of each of the 
independent variables, together, may has an overall affect on effective performance. 
   
 
Figure 9.  Horizontal Variable Model. 
 
The independent variables will be in a prioritized order based on the outcome of 
section six (S6) of the questionnaire that asks the respondents to prioritize the 
independent variables using a paired comparison scale (Figure 10 shows the independent 
variables in a random order).  The assertion in hypothesis five is that when regressed 
together, knowledge, education, training, and experience will statistically account for a 
significant amount of the variance in the model and status, indoctrination, and PME will 
account for an insignificant amount.  Similarly, as in hypothesis one, the respondents will 
perceive the rank, indoctrination, and PME of the employee to have little affect on the 
value each independent variable has on being able to perform effectively and will 
perceive knowledge, education, training, and experience to have the most affect on 
effective performance.  This would further support the assertion that status (i.e. rank) 
could be an artificial barrier to employing airmen.   
Section Three – Supervisory Determination (S3)   
 Section three (S3) consisted of one item and separated respondents who 
supervised airmen from those who never have by asking the question "Do you now or 
have you ever in your Air Force career supervised any number of airmen"?  Respondents 
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who answered “no,” were directed to section six (S6) and skipped section five (S5) while 
respondents who answered “yes” were directed to section four (S4), then proceeded to 
section five (S5).  The term “supervise” was defined as being in charge of and 
responsible for subordinate airmen who you may or may not write performance reports 
on.   
Section Four – Supervisory Demographics (S4)  
 This section consisted five items and determined the number of years the 
respondent has been a supervisor; the number of airmen he/she supervised at the time of 
the survey; the most people he/she has ever supervised; the rank categories such as NCO 
or CGO; and the level of command he/she currently works.  This data provided 
demographic information about the supervisors who answered the items in section five 
(S5).  The data will be used in descriptive statistics and will allow potential separation of 
other data based on the number of people supervised, number of years as a supervisor, or 
the level of command at which the respondent supervised.  Separation based on one of 
these factors may show similarities or differences in the data.  The data will also be cross-
tabbed against other demographic data to find errors as necessary.   
Section Five - Effective Performance, Supervisor Perception (S5)  
 Section five consists of a 39 item scale and addresses hypotheses six through ten:   
¾ H6:  Supervisors’ perception of status will not moderate the individual 
relationships between the independent variables knowledge, education, 
experience or training and the dependent variable effective performance. 
 
¾ H7:  Enlisted (TSgt-SMSgt), officer (CGO), and leader (CMSgt and FGO) 
supervisors will not differ on their perception of the effect status has on the 
individual relationships between knowledge, education, experience or training and 
effective performance. 
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¾ H8:  Supervisors’ perception of knowledge, education, training, or experience, 
individually, will increase the ability to determine effective performance.   
 
¾ H9:  Enlisted (TSgt-SMSgt), officer (CGO), and leader (CMSgt and FGO) 
supervisors will not differ on their perception of the effect knowledge, education, 
training, or experience, individually, will have on the ability to determine 
effective performance. 
 
¾ H10:  Supervisors’ perception of knowledge, education, experience, and training 
will significantly increase the ability to determine effective performance, while 
status, indoctrination, and PME will not significantly increase the ability to 
determine effective performance.     
 
The intent of section five (S5) is similar to that of section two (S2) but is for 
respondents who supervise airmen only.  Only respondents who answered “yes” in 
section three (S3) (i.e. they now supervise or have in the past supervised airmen) were led 
to this section (S5), after completing section four (S4, Supervisor Demographics).  The 
assertions in this section are the same as in section two (S2) and the items in the survey 
are similar to the items in section two (S2) but now are asking the respondent to consider 
the question from a supervisor’s perspective only.  Table 3 shows how the items in 
section five were divided into each variable.   
 
Table 3.  Section Five Variables and Items.   
Variables Items 
Knowledge  Q5.2, Q5.10, Q5.21,  
Education  Q5.3, Q5.12, Q5.23, Q5.30, Q5.35,    
Experience  Q5.5, Q5.14, Q5.25, Q5.32,  
Training  Q5.4, Q5.13, Q5.19, Q5.24, Q5.31, Q5.37,   
Status  Q5.6, Q5.11, Q5.16, Q5.20, Q5.26, Q5.33, Q5.38, Q5.39  
Indoctrination  Q5.7, Q5.17, Q5.27,  
Professional Military Education Q5.9, Q5.18, Q5.28, Q5.34,    
Effective Performance Q5.1, Q5.8, Q5.15, Q5.22, Q5.29, Q5.36,     
 
 
Respondents were asked to consider the representative duties, responsibilities, or 
requirements he/she perceives that their subordinates require to perform in the AFS.  As 
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an example, an acquisition manager respondent would consider what he/she perceives to 
be required for their subordinate acquisition personnel to plan, organize, direct, and 
coordinate acquisition worker activities.  Each item in this section was worded to reflect 
that only supervisors were answering the items about their subordinates; everything else 
remained the same as the items in section two (S2).  This data gave insight to what 
airmen who are or were in supervisory positions perceive as important for their 
subordinates to perform effectively.  The same statistical analysis as in section two (S2) 
will be used to analyze the data collected in this section (S5). 
Section Six – Independent Variable Paired Comparison Scale (S6)    
 Section six (S6) uses a paired comparison scale.  Alreck and Settle indicate this 
will measure simple, dichotomous choices between alternatives when the focus is 
exclusively on the evaluation of one entity relative to one other.  They suggest to reduce 
the intransitivity that is often found when paired comparison scale data are analyzed that 
rating the alternatives two at a time will avoid most of the limitations and problems 
inherent in paired comparison (Alreck and Settle 2004:127-128).  In this section, 
respondents are required to rank order a pair of the independent variables from section 
two (S2), one relative to the other, under the assumption that he/she had to choose 
between the two.  All seven independent variables were paired into 21 combinations, 
which are all possible combinations without duplication.  The respondents were asked the 
same question “For each pair of variables, select the one you believe is most important 
for a subordinate to have to perform effectively – if you had to choose between the two.”  
A pair of independent variables, along with their associated definitions, were provided to 
choose from.   
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This data will determine, in priority order, what the respondents perceive as most 
to least important in order to perform effectively and will further define the importance of 
status in a worker's ability to perform effectively.  Further, this paired comparison will 
assist in the sequence the variables are places during multiple regression analysis in 
sections two (S2) and four (S4).     
Section Seven – Organizational Culture (S7) 
 This section consists of an 11 item scale and a free comment space.  These items 
address hypothesis 11.     
¾ H11:  Enlisted and officer airmen do not differ on their perception of the concept 
that eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in nonstrategic duties will not 
negatively affect Air Force culture. 
 
This section wishes to determine if enlisted and officer airmen differ on their 
perception of the interchangeable rank concept in nonstrategic duty positions (without 
violating the chain of command or customs & courtesies) and assigning enlisted 
personnel to these duties (who are otherwise qualified in accordance with the AFIs) 
would adversely affect the culture of the Air Force.  Nonstrategic duties are those that are 
not part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command.    
The assertion is that enlisted and officer airmen will not differ on their perception 
and will show that eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment will not negatively 
affect Air Force culture.  Enlisted and officer airmen already interact in close proximity 
in many organizations without violating Air Force culture.  Air Force enlisted airmen are 
an educated career force and have or can be trained and educated the same as officers and 
should be able to perform in the same duties to increase the capability of the Air Force.  
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This hypothesis should support the interchangeable rank concept and can be implemented 
while maintaining a chain of command and customs and courtesies.     
Respondents were asked to select the number that appropriately indicates the 
extent to which they agree with each statement about Air Force culture.  A six point 
Likert scale was used as shown in Figure 5.  A typical item in this scale included "A 
chain of command is important to effective organizational performance.  Eliminating 
rank as a qualifier to employment in duties that are not part of strategy, plan of action, or 
chain of command will not negatively affect this." or "Commitment and holding a high 
sense of responsibility to the organization is what is important to our Air Force culture.  
Having enlisted and officer airmen performing the same technical duties would violate 
existing Air Force culture.  Eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in duties that 
are not part of strategy, plan of action, or chain of command will not negatively affect 
this."     
Four of the items in this scale (Q7.1, Q7.2, Q7.5, Q7.6, and Q7.8) are loosely 
based derivatives of an organizational culture scale developed by Abraham Carmeli and 
Ashler Tishler in their article, The Relationships Intangible Organizational Elements and 
Organizational Performance, in the Strategic Management Journal 25: 1257-1278, 2004.  
The other six were developed based on personal knowledge of Air Force customs and 
courtesies and chain-of-command.  Each item states an important part of organizational 
culture then ask the respondent whether eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in 
duties that are not part of strategy, plan of action, or chain of command will negatively 
affect this part of organizational culture.  This requires respondents to weigh whether 
eliminating rank in these duties will affect culture.  Should the respondents perceive the 
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qualification to be more important, their response on the Likert scale should be further to 
the right and if they perceive rank to be of more importance, their response should be 
further to the left.  From these items, an understanding of the importance of rank on 
organizational culture can be determined. 
Because this is a previously unexplored topic based on publicly available 
literature, the free comment space gives respondents an opportunity to comment on 
anything they wish concerning the affect of eliminating rank in non-strategic, mid-level 
duties will have on Air Force culture.  The comments are listed verbatim in Appendix C 
and any possible trends/consistencies will be briefly summarized in chapter four.       
Similar descriptive and inferential statistics as described in section two will be 
used to analyze the data from this section where applicable.  A pair t-test or analysis of 
variance will be conducted, separating the data between officer and enlisted airmen.     
Section Eight – Air Force Personnel Transformation (S8) 
 This section consists of a 13 item scale and a free comment space.  These items 
address hypothesis 12.        
¾ H12:  Eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in nonstrategic duties is an 
acceptable method to assist in meeting the intent of transformation.   
 
Using descriptive statistics, this section wishes to provide fundamental data to 
determine the respondent’s perception on whether relaxing the rank requirement and 
employing some enlisted airmen (who are otherwise qualified) in the same duties 
designated for some non-rated company grade officers is an acceptable realignment of 
human capital and supports Air Force transformation efforts.  Nonstrategic duties are 
those that are not part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command.    
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The assertion is that eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in nonstrategic 
duties will positively affect future transformation because it eliminates an artificial 
barrier to employing Air Force airmen.  Successful mission accomplishment and effective 
performance can be accomplished regardless of the rank of the airman in these duty 
positions.  Proper supervision, management, and leadership of the airmen in these duty 
positions still apply. 
Respondents were asked to select the number that appropriately indicates the 
extent to which they agree with each statement about Air Force transformation.  A six 
point Likert scale was used as shown in Figure 5.  A typical item in this scale included 
"Knowledge is more important than the rank an airman holds when employing airmen in 
mid level duty positions that are not an integral part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain 
of command" or "The concept of assigning qualified enlisted and company grade officer 
airmen in similar duties put the right person in the right place at the right time."   
 The scale is broken into two sub scales.  One sub scale consists of six items 
(Q8.1, Q8.2, Q8.4, Q8.5, Q8.7, and Q8.11), and represents the respondent’s perception of 
the importance of rank in nonstrategic duty positions when compared to qualifications 
such as knowledge, education, training, and experience.  Two of these items (Q8.7 and 
Q8.11) ask specifically for their perception of the importance of status or rank when 
employing airmen in mid-level duty positions that are not an integral part of a strategy, 
plan of action, or chain of command.  These items were developed by combining the Air 
Force specialty requirements as listed in AFI 36-2105 with the importance of rank.  The 
items require the respondent to decide what is more important between a job qualification 
(such as education) and rank when employing airmen in mid-level duties.  Should the 
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respondents perceive the qualification to be more important, their response on the Likert 
scale should be further to the right and if they perceive rank to be of more importance, 
their response should be further to the left.  From these items, an understanding of the 
importance of rank versus a job qualification can be determined.  No existing scales or 
items were used to develop these items.  The second sub scale consists of seven items 
(Q8.3, Q8.6, Q8.8, Q8.9, Q8.10, Q8.12, and Q8.13) and represents the respondent’s 
perception of whether eliminating rank as a qualifier and integrating qualified enlisted 
and officer airmen in similar duties supports transformation.  These items were developed 
from our understanding of how transformation is defined in the 2004 U.S. Air Force 
Transformation Flight Plan.  For example, putting the right people in the right place at the 
right time with the most effective use of resources is a concept of transformation.  One of 
the items requires the respondents to determine whether the concept of integrating 
qualified enlisted and officer airmen in similar duties assists this transformation concept.  
Similar items were developed in the same manner.  No existing scales or items were used 
to develop these items.    
Because this is a previously unexplored topic based on publicly available 
literature, the free comment space gives respondents an opportunity to comment on 
anything they wish concerning the interchangeable rank concept and transformation.  The 
comments are listed verbatim in Appendix C and any possible trends/consistencies will 
be briefly summarized in chapter four.         
Similar descriptive and inferential statistics as described in section two will be 
used to analyze the data from this section where applicable.   Together, both concepts 
represented by the subscales must hold true for the hypothesis to have merit.   
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Section Nine – Demographics (S9) 
 The questionnaire ends with seven demographic questions and a final comment 
space.  The questions ask for the respondent’s to provide their age, gender, grade (rank), 
AFS, Time-in-grade, Total Active Federal Military Service Date, and whether any officer 
was prior enlisted.  One other question requested the respondent’s to mark whether their 
day-to-day duties are technical or managerial in nature using the scale in Figure 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
The data will be cross-tabbed against other demographic data to check for errors 
and may be used as a way to separate the cases, based on any one of these items, to show 
similarities or differences.  One or more of the items requesting age, gender, and grade 
will be used as a control variable in the regression analysis.   The final comment space 
gave respondents an opportunity to comment on anything they wish.  The comments are 
listed verbatim in Appendix C and any possible trends/consistencies will be briefly 
summarized in chapter four.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
               Technical------------------------------------------------------------Management 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 V 
 
Figure 10.  Technical, Management Scale.            
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IV.  Results 
Preliminary Data Analysis 
The survey reached 2,758 active duty Air Force personnel and the database was 
populated with 727 competed surveys at the time data collection for the purposes of this 
research was terminated.  This resulted in a response rate of 26.4 percent.  Access to the 
survey was not terminated and respondents continued to complete the survey through 18 
January 2006, at which time the survey was removed from the website.  There were a 
total of 749 completed cases in the database at the time it was removed from the website.  
This database can be used in follow-on research if necessary.  
None of the completed cases (i.e. a completed survey) from the respondents were 
deleted due to significant errors in the data.  The web based survey process eliminated 
most accidental errors.  Cases one and two were deleted because they were part of the test 
phase of the survey process and cross-tabbing revealed three errors in respondent’s age.  
Case 57 listed their age as “1968” and it was changed to 36 years old; and case 82 listed 
their age as "3" and it was changed to “no answer.”  Case 472, listed their age as "17" and 
rank as Colonel.  The other demographic data in this case indicated the age was a mistake 
and the rank was correct.  Their age was changed to “no answer” and the data was kept.  
All other data in all cases appeared legitimate and was used in statistical analysis.   
The remainder of the chapter will describe the statistical analysis and answers to 
the hypotheses in chapter three.  First, all applicable demographic data from sections one 
(S1), three (S3), four (S4), and nine (S9) will be described.  Second, the paired 
comparison from section six (S6) will be analyzed because it will be used in sections two 
(S2) and section five (S5).  Third, the hypotheses in section two (S2) will be analyzed, 
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then the hypotheses in section five (S5).  Then the hypothesis from section seven (S7) 
and the hypothesis from section eight (S8) will be analyzed.  Finally, a brief section about 
the extensive comments that the respondents provided will conclude this chapter.             
Survey Demographics Results 
 Respondent Personal Demographics  
 The survey was taken by active duty enlisted and officer airmen between the rank 
of TSgt and Brigadier General.  Six of the Colonels that the survey was e-mailed to were 
promoted to Brigadier General since the list of names from AFCMO was developed.  The 
data from these six Brigadier Generals were included in the statistical analysis.  There 
were 99 female and 624 male respondents (four respondents did not answer this question) 
between the ages of 22 and 61 years of age.   
 The survey was sent to 1,678 enlisted and 1,395 officer airmen totaling 3,073 
personnel.  This 283 difference (9.2 percent of the total) in the additional number of 
enlisted respondents than officers is because a higher response rate from AFIT students 
(approximately 925 officers) was anticipated, which would have more closely evened the 
number of enlisted and officer respondents.  Figure 11 shows respondent’s rank in a bar 
chart.  The completed cases in the database consisted of 435 enlisted respondents and 287 
officer respondents totaling 722 respondents (five respondents did not answer the 
question about their rank).  This equates to a response rate for enlisted respondents of 
25.9 percent and 20.6 percent for officers.   
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Figure 11.  Respondent’s Rank. 
 
 Enlisted Education  
 All 435 enlisted respondents annotated their education level at the time they first 
enlisted in the Air Force and their highest education level they hold now.  Figure 12 
shows this data.  Interesting is that 323, 74.3 percent, of all enlisted respondents increased 
their education level since enlisting in the Air Force.  Figure 13 charts the difference in 
education from enlisted respondent’s first enlistment until the time they took the survey.  
For example, 99 enlisted respondents increased their education level two degrees.  This 
means, for example, a respondent who enlisted with a high school diploma increased 
his/her education two degrees to a bachelors degree or a respondent who enlisted with an 
associates degree increased his/her education level to a masters degree.      
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Figure 12.  Enlisted Respondent’s Education.   
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Figure 13.  Difference in Education From First Enlistment to Now.   
 
Section Six – Independent Variable Paired Comparison Results     
Respondents ranked a pair of the independent variables (Knowledge, Education, 
Experience, Training, Status, Indoctrination, and PME), one relative to the other, under 
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the assumption that he/she had to choose between the two.  All seven independent 
variables were paired into 21 combinations, which are all possible combinations without 
duplication.   
Each of the variables were tabulated to determine which was selected the most to 
which was selected the least.  Figure 14 shows a basic mathematical order to what 
independent variable was selected the most to least, indicating which independent 
variable the respondents perceived to be most important to least important for a 
subordinate to perform effectively.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Also, a percentage of the number of times an independent variable was selected 
over its paired independent variable was determined.  For example, if all respondents 
selected training every time it was an option (i.e. each respondent had six opportunities to 
select training, multiplied by all 727 respondents), training would have been selected 
4,362 times.  However, training was selected 2,969 times, which results in a 68.1 percent 
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Figure 14.  Independent Variable Count. 
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select rate over the other independent variables.  Figure 15 shows the percent each 
independent variable was selected over its paired independent variable.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These ordinal scales of perceived importance of the independent variables will be 
used in the sequence the variables are places during multiple regression analysis in 
sections two (S2) and five (S5).     
Limitations 
 One limitation with the data is the low internal consistency values on some 
variables, which may result in imprecise data.  The internal consistency of some of the 
subscales are low, indicating that the items may not be truly measuring what they are 
supposed to measure based on a correlation of the items within the scale.  Cronbach's 
alpha is the most common form of internal consistency reliability coefficient.  By 
convention, a lenient cut-off of .60 is common in exploratory research; alpha should be at 
least .70 or higher to retain an item in an "adequate" scale; and many researchers require 
a cut-off of .80 for a "good scale" (http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/reliab.htm).  
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Figure 15.  Variable Selection Percentage.  
 
  66
 A second limitation in the data is that some of the independent variables are more 
than moderately correlated.  Cohen and Cohen indicate correlations are relationships 
between two or more variables or sets of variables.  They have three fundamental 
dimensions: significance, direction, and magnitude.   There is usually some level of 
correlation between variables and is expressed, either positive or negative, as a small 
correlation if between .1 and .3; moderate correlation if between .3 and .5; or strong 
correlation if .5 and above (Cohen and Cohen, 1883, 67-69).  This correlation indicates 
that there is a moderate or strong linear relationship, appropriately, between the two 
variables and that the correlated variables are moderately or strongly dependent on each 
other.  One variable is not the cause of the other but can be related because, in this 
situation, they are directly proportional to each other or are so close to the being the same 
thing.  This correlation between independent variables will result in some of the 
explained variance overlapping during the regression process and in the ambiguity in the 
interpretation of the regression because the variables are not well estimated, indicating a 
small change in the data values may lead to large changes in the estimates of the 
coefficients.  This correlation between variables may result in imprecise data and is being 
identified as a potential limitation.   
A third limitation is that the variable, did not accurately measure what they 
purport to measure.  Each of the independent items that were the basis of the scales and 
subsequent variables already contained the relationship with effective performance within 
them.  Each of the items in section two (S2) and section five (S5) of the survey asked 
whether a specific preparation or trait the respondent, or their subordinate, had would 
influence one’s ability to perform effectively.  Because of this line of questioning, the 
  67
scales/variables did not exclusively represent the conceptual idea of the independent 
variables and may have resulted in several regression problems.  Although the dependent 
variable did not have this problem, it did not measure effective performance in a way that 
can be correlated with factors such as knowledge, education, training, experience, or 
status but measures the respondent’s perception of what constitutes effective 
performance.     
Section Two – Effective Performance, Employee Perception Results  
 Subscale Variables    
 A subscale variable was calculated for each of the subscales using the items as 
listed in Table 2, Section Two Variables and Items, in section two (S2) with the 
exception of the education variable.  Item Q2_30 was removed from the scale in order to 
improve its internal consistency.  In the effective performance sub scale, item Q2_22 was 
reverse coded in the survey and was recoded before it was used in the effective 
performance variable.  The item was written such that it was obviously to any respondent 
who read the item that it was written backward and the respondents would rate the item 
low on the Likert scale (i.e. “strongly disagree” or “disagree”).  This was done to spot test 
whether the respondents read the items and their responses were reversed before being 
used in the statistical analysis (i.e. “strongly disagree” was changed to “strongly agree,” 
“disagree” was changed to “agree,” etc).  All variables were normally distributed based 
on the high number of cases used in each variable as well as all Shapiro-Wilk scores 
being greater than .90.  Table 4 shows applicable descriptive statistics for all variables 
required in this section.   
 
  68
Table 4. Section Two Variables, Descriptive Statistics 
 
 n Alpha Mean Std Deviation 
Knowledge 708 .41 4.21 .55 
Education 655 .60 3.19 .78 
Experience 691 .48 3.37 .65 
Training 586 .63 3.68 .58 
Status 204 .74 2.66 .68 
Indoctrination 165 .62 2.78 .79 
PME 48 .77 3.06 .78 
Effective Performance 671 .50 3.89 .51 
  
 There was a moderate correlation between 14 pair and a strong correlation 
between two pairs of the independent variables.  Table 5 shows the correlation between 
all the variables that were used in this section. 
 
Table 5.  Correlation Matrix. 
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 Mean and Correlation Analysis   
 The limitations as explained above have no bearing on any univariate analysis 
such as evaluating the variable means and correlations.  The means for each variable are 
listed in Table 4 above.  The means reinforce the paired comparison findings that status is 
the least important independent variable when compared to the other independent 
variables.  The mean for the independent variable status is 2.67, which correlates to 
“disagree” on the Likert scale.  This suggests that when the respondents were given 
statements asking whether status was important in order to perform effectively, the 
respondents disagreed on average.  All of the other independent variables, with the 
exception of indoctrination, had means greater than 3.0, which correlates to “Neither 
Agree Nor Disagree” or “Agree” on the Likert scale.  This suggests that when the 
respondents were given statements asking whether each of these independent variables 
was important to perform effectively, the respondents were indifferent or in the case of 
the independent variable knowledge agreed on average.    
 As a post hoc calculation, the status variable was redefined, consisting of items 
Q2.11, Q2.20, Q2.26, Q2.33 and Q2.38; items Q2.6 (i.e. the importance of time-in-grade) 
and Q2.16 (i.e. the importance of time-in-service) were removed from the scale because 
they may have been measuring a need for experience rather than a need for status.  The 
cases were further separated into enlisted and officer categories and a new mean were 
calculated for status in each rank category.  The mean in the officer category was 2.69 
and the mean in the enlisted category was 2.48, both correlating to “disagree” on the 
Likert scale.     
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 Withstanding the limitations, the correlation between status and effective 
performance (r = .116) suggests there is not more than a small correlation between these 
variables and that the movement in status has a minimum affect on the movement of 
effective performance.       
 Control Variable 
 The respondents’ rank will be used as a control variable for all regression 
analysis.  A control variable is a constant, whose impact is removed in order to analyze 
the relationship between other variables without interference, or within subgroups of the 
control variable. 
¾ H1:  Respondents’ perception of status will not moderate the individual 
relationships between the independent variables knowledge, education, 
experience or training and the dependent variable effective performance. 
 
This hypothesis could not be answered because the method used did not produce 
enough significant data.  Four separate models, one for each independent variable, were 
individually regressed and compared.  All four models used rank as a control variable, a 
single independent variable, status as a moderating variable, and effective performance as 
the dependent variable.  The reason for developing four separate models for this 
hypothesis was because problems with scale reliability and correlation between 
independent variables were anticipated in the methodology stages of this research.  The 
education model was rejected and with the exception of the knowledge variable, none of 
the variables were significant predictors of the dependent variable; therefore, an accurate 
determination whether status moderates the relationship between any of the independent 
variables and effective performance could not be made.  Scale reliability, correlation 
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between independent variables, and the wording of each item played a role in the poor 
significance in the data.  Interaction terms were not explored.   
To make the moderating variable for each model, the independent variable status 
was individually multiplied by each of the independent variables; knowledge, education, 
experience, and training (i.e. knowledge*status, education*status, experience*status, and 
training*status).  The product of these resulted in four interim variables. Finally, to center 
each of the interim variables, their means (µ) were subtracted from them (i.e. 
(knowledge*status-µ), (education*status-µ), (experience*status-µ), and    
(training*status-µ) to produce the four moderating variables.  Each of these variables was 
used as the moderating variables in the regression procedure.  In extensive detail, Cohen 
and Cohen give an example of indirect effects [moderating variables] and indicate that 
when they are not significant they have no interaction with the other variables in the 
model (Cohen and Cohen, 1883, 356-361).   
In the model (n = 189) regressing knowledge, the moderating variable status (i.e. 
knowledge*status-µ), and effective performance, the model was accepted (F = 11.3, p = 
.00) indicating the variation explained by this model (adjusted R-squared = .14) was not 
due to chance.  The variable knowledge was a significant predictor (β = .32, p = .00) and 
the moderating variable was not (β = .08, p = .31), indicating status does not moderate 
the relationship between knowledge and effective performance.  Knowledge and the 
moderating variable were strongly correlated (.55), condition index (26.0).  A condition 
index above 15 indicates a potential problem with correlation.  Residual values were 
normally distributed (µ = 0, σ = 1).       
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In the model (n = 183) regressing education, the moderating variable status (i.e. 
education*status-µ), and effective performance, the model was rejected (F = 1.7, p = .17) 
indicating a poor model to explain the variation.  The variable education was not a 
significant predictor (β = .16, p = .16) nor was the moderating variable (β = -.04, p = 
.74).  When a model is significant, but it has variables that are not, it is an indication of 
collinearity problems.  Education and the moderating variable were strongly correlated 
(.77), condition index (17.1).  Due to the rejected model and insignificant education 
variable, it cannot be determined whether status moderates the relationship between 
education and effective performance.  Residual values were normally distributed (µ = 0, 
σ = 1).   
In the model (n = 190) regressing experience, the moderating variable status (i.e. 
experience*status-µ), and effective performance, the model was accepted (F = 2.9, p = 
.04); however, the variable experience was not a significant predictor (β = .04, p = .72) 
nor was the moderating variable (β = .14, p = .21).  Experience and the moderating 
variable were strongly correlated (.78), condition index (21.3).  Due to the experience 
variable being insignificant, it cannot be determined whether status moderates the 
relationship between experience and effective performance. Residual values were 
normally distributed (µ = 0, σ = 1).   
In the model (n = 178) regressing training, the moderating variable status (i.e. 
training*status-µ), and effective performance, the model was accepted (F = 2.9, p = .04); 
however, the variable training was not a significant predictor (β = .15, p = .16) nor was 
the moderating variable (β = .06, p = .59).  Training and the moderating variable were 
strongly correlated (.69), condition index (22.5).  Due to the independent variable training 
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being insignificant, it cannot be determined whether status moderates the relationship 
between training and effective performance.  Residual values were normally distributed 
(µ = 0, σ = 1).   
¾ H2:  Enlisted (TSgt-SMSgt), officer (CGO), and leader (CMSgt and Field 
Grade Officers (FGO)) respondents will not differ on their perception of the 
effect status has on the relationship between knowledge, education, 
experience and training and effective performance. 
 
This hypothesis could not be answered because the method used did not produce 
enough significant data.  Three separate models, one in each rank category, were 
individually regressed and compared.  All three models used the five independent 
variables experience, knowledge, training, education, and status.  The leader model was 
rejected and status was not a significant predictor in the other models; therefore, an 
accurate comparison between groups could not be made.  Scale reliability, correlation 
between independent variables, and the wording of each item played a role in the poor 
significance in the data.  Interaction terms were not explored.   
The enlisted model (n = 116) model was accepted (F = 4.3, p = .001) and was able 
to explain a moderate amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .15).  However, only 
knowledge was a significant predictor (β = .30, p = .004) and explained six percent of the 
variance in the model.  Status was insignificant, indicating it does not have an affect on 
the model.  There were strong correlations between experience and training (.59) and 
education and training (.53).  There was a serious problem with collinearity with the 
model (condition index = 35.0).  Residual values were normally distributed (µ = 0,          
σ = .1).   
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The CGO model (n = 19) model was accepted (F = 4.2, p = .017) and was able to 
explain a significant amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .52).  Three of the 
variables were significant predictors: knowledge (β = .42, p = .04) and explained two 
percent of the variance; training (β = .41, p = .001) and explained 32 percent of the 
variance; and education (β = -.64, p = .03) and explained 19 percent of the variance.  
Status was insignificant, indicating it does not affect the relationship between the other 
independent variables and effective performance.  There were strong correlations 
between experience and training (.63), experience and status (.56) and training and 
education (.72).  There was a serious problem with collinearity with the model (condition 
index = 84.4).  Residual values were normally distributed (µ = 0, σ = .82).   
The leader model (n = 18) was rejected (F = 2.25, p = .12) and none of the 
predictors were significant.  There were strong correlations between knowledge and 
effective performance (.63); experience and education (.53); and knowledge and training 
(.58).  There was a serious problem with collinearity with the model (condition index = 
73.3).  Residual values were normally distributed (µ = 0, σ = .80).   
¾ H3:  Respondents’ perception of knowledge, education, training, or 
experience, individually, will significantly increase the ability to determine 
effective performance.   
 
This hypothesis was broken into four sub hypotheses where each independent 
variable was individually regressed with the dependent variable, effective performance.  
This hypothesis was not rejected based on all the separate models’ and independent 
variables’ significance values all being accepted.  When combining the amount of 
explained variance in all four models, 56 percent of the variance is accounted for by 
knowledge, education, experience, and training in determining effective performance.  It 
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is understood the variance accountability would not be the same in a significant model 
that regresses all the independent variables together with the dependent variable.  The 56 
percent variance accountability could have been better if scale reliability, correlation 
between independent variables, and the wording of each item were better.   
In the model (n = 654) regressing knowledge and effective performance, the 
model was accepted (F = 67.4, p = .00) indicating the variation explained by this model 
was not due to chance.  Knowledge was able to explain a reasonable amount of the 
variance (adjusted R-squared = .17) in the model, which suggests other variables, not in 
the model, explain more of the variance.  This is logical since more than knowledge is 
required to perform effectively.  The independent variable knowledge was a significant 
predictor (β = .41, p = .00).  The large beta coefficient indicates knowledge has a sizeable 
impact on the variance in the model and a good predictor of effective performance in this 
model.  Collinearity between the variables proved to be slight in this model.  Although 
the tolerance value (.99) was acceptable, the condition index (20.12) proved that a 
potential collinearity problem exists.  Residual values were normally distributed             
(µ = 0, σ = 1). 
In the model (n = 617) regressing education and effective performance, the model 
was accepted (F = 7.0, p = .001) indicating the variation explained by this model was not 
due to chance but education only explain a small amount of variance (adjusted R-squared 
= .02) in the model, which suggests it is a small factor in determining effective 
performance.  The independent variable education was a significant predictor (β = .14, p 
= .001) but the small magnitude of the beta coefficient indicates the level of education 
would not considerably change the variance in the model and is a small predictor of 
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effective performance.  Collinearity is not significant in this model with acceptable 
tolerance value (.89), and condition index (10.0).  Residual values were normally 
distributed.  Residual values were normally distributed (µ = 0, σ = 1). 
In the model (n = 644) regressing experience and effective performance, the 
model was accepted (F = 17.03, p = .000) indicating the variation explained by this 
model was not due to chance but experience only explain a small amount of variance 
(adjusted R-squared = .05) in the model, which suggests it is a small factor in 
determining effective performance.  The independent variable experience was a 
significant predictor (β = .22, p = .000) but the small magnitude of the beta coefficient 
indicates the level of experience would not considerably change the variance in the model 
and is a small predictor of effective performance.  Collinearity is not significant in this 
model with acceptable tolerance (.97) and condition index (14.2).  Residual values were 
normally distributed (µ = 0, σ = 1).   
In the model (n = 551) regressing training and effective performance, the model 
was accepted (F = 15.4, p = .000) indicating the variation explained by this model was 
not due to chance but training only explain a small amount of variance (adjusted R-
squared = .05) in the model, which suggests it is a small factor in determining effective 
performance.  The independent variable training was a significant predictor (β = .22, p = 
.000) but the small magnitude of the beta indicates the level of experience would not 
considerably change the variance in the model and is a small predictor of effective 
performance.  Collinearity is not significant in this model with acceptable tolerance (.98) 
and condition index (16.7).  Residual values were normally distributed (µ = 0, σ = 1).   
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Post Hoc 
In an attempt to determine the amount of variance status may explain on effective 
performance, it was individually regressed however, the model (n = 191) was rejected       
(F = 2.3, p = .106) and the status variable was not a significant predictor (β = .11, p = 
.14).  Collinearity is not significant in this model with acceptable tolerance (.99) and 
condition index (10.6).  Residual values were normally distributed (µ = 0,  σ = 1). 
¾ H4:  Enlisted (TSgt-SMSgt), officer (CGO), and leader (CMSgt and FGO) 
respondents will not differ on their perception of the effect knowledge, 
education, training, and experience, individually, will have on the ability to 
determine effective performance. 
 
Similar to hypothesis two, this hypothesis could not be answered because the data 
did not produce enough significant results.      
¾ H5:  Respondents’ perception of knowledge, education, experience, and 
training will significantly increase the ability to determine effective 
performance, while status, indoctrination, and PME will not significantly 
increase the ability to determine effective performance. 
 
This hypothesis could not be answered because the method used did not produce 
enough significant data.  This model (n = 35) included all the independent variables in the 
order established in section six (S6), Independent Variable Paired Comparison Results, in 
an entry method with one independent variable per block.  The model was not significant   
(F = 1.07, p = .41) and cannot be accepted as a method to answer this hypothesis and 
explain effective performance.  Table 6, shows some of the values of each model.  As 
shown, none of the beta coefficients of the independent variables were significant due to 
problems with collinearity.     
Based on its low tolerance value (.32), being close to zero and the condition index 
(48.53) being well over the 30, the value at which multicollinearity becomes a serious 
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problem, is too difficult to determine the separate effects of each independent variable on 
the dependent variable.  This problem can be attributed to the lack of internal consistency 
of most of the scales as described above as well as the close relationships between the 
independent variables.  The fine differences in the description of experience, knowledge, 
training, and education made it difficult to distinguish between the items that described 
them on the survey.  Also, for example, airmen who receive education, training, 
experience, etc become more knowledgeable, hence making these difficult to separate.   
 
Table 6.  Multiple Model Value Table. 
 
Variables  
Entered 
Adjusted 
R-Squared  
(when added to model) 
Beta 
(β) Sig Tolerance 
Condition  
Index 
Rank -.030 .067 .751 .66 9.46 
Experience -.057 -.519 .123 .27 12.17 
Knowledge .056 .404 .069 .64 14.55 
Training .027 .010 .978 .23 17.93 
Education .000 -.174 .580 .30 22.56 
PME .014 -.075 .799 .34 34.12 
Indoctrination -.008 .231 .491 .26 39.07 
Status .016 .390 .207 .32 48.53 
 
 
Section Five – Effective Performance, Supervisor Perception Results   
 Subscale Variables and Limitations 
 A subscale variable was calculated for each of the subscales using the items as 
listed in Table 3, Section Five Variables and Items, in section five (S5) with the 
exception of the training variable.  Item Q5_31 was removed from the training scale in 
order to improve its internal consistency.  All variables were normally distributed based 
on the high number of cases (n) used in each variable as well as all Shapiro-Wilk scores 
being greater than .92.  The same limitations as in section two are applicable in the 
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calculations in this data.  Table 7 shows applicable descriptive statistics for all variables 
required in this section.       
There is a moderate correlation between 11 pair of the independent variables but 
most significant are the strong positive correlations between eight pairs.  This correlation 
between variables may result in imprecise data and is being identified as a potential 
limitation.  Table 8 shows the correlation between all the variables that will be used in 
this section.  
 
Table 7.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable n Alpha Mean Std. Deviation 
Knowledge 666 .52 4.24 .48 
Education 640 .67 3.24 .67 
Experience 653 .59 3.42 .63 
Training 609 .71 3.97 .56 
Status 284 .87 2.56 .76 
Indoctrination 294 .67 2.92 .82 
PME 258 .88 3.11 .95 
Effective Performance 660 .66 4.02 .51 
 
This correlation indicates that there is a strong linear relationship between the two 
independent variables and that the correlated variables are strongly dependent on each 
other.  One variable is not the cause of the other but can be related because they are 
directly proportional to each other or are so close to the being the same thing.  This 
correlation will result in some of the variance overlapping during the regression process 
and in ambiguity in the interpretation of the regression because the variables are not well 
estimated.  This indicates that a small change in the data values may lead to large changes 
in the estimates of the coefficients.   
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Table 8.  Correlation Matrix.   
 
 
  
 Mean and Correlation Analysis   
 The limitations as explained above have no bearing on any univariate analysis 
such as evaluating the variable means and correlations.  The means for each variable are 
listed in Table 7 above.  The means reinforce the paired comparison findings that status is 
the least important independent variable when compared to the other independent 
variables.  The mean for the independent variable status is 2.56, which correlates to 
“disagree” on the Likert scale.  This suggests that when the respondents were given 
statements asking whether status was important in order to perform effectively, the 
respondents disagreed on average.  All of the other independent variables, with the 
exception of indoctrination, had means greater than 3.0, which correlates to “Neither 
Agree Nor Disagree” or “Agree” on the Likert scale.  This suggests that when the 
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respondents were given statements asking whether each of these independent variables 
was important to perform effectively, the average response was indifferent or in the case 
of the independent variable knowledge he/she agreed. 
 The correlation between the status and effective performance (r = .147) suggests 
there is not more than a small correlation between these variables and that the movement 
in status has a minimum affect on the movement of effective performance.       
  Control Variable 
 The respondents’ rank will be used as a control variable for all regression 
analysis.  A control variable is a constant, whose impact is removed in order to analyze 
the relationship between other variables without interference, or within subgroups of the 
control variable. 
¾ H6:  Supervisors’ perception of status will not moderate the individual 
relationships between the independent variables knowledge, education, 
experience or training and the dependent variable effective performance. 
 
This hypothesis was broken into four sub hypotheses where each independent 
variable was individually regressed with the dependent variable, effective performance, 
and status used as a moderating variable.  The moderating variable was calculated as 
described under hypothesis one.  
This hypothesis was not rejected and suggests that status does not play a role in 
the relationship between the independent variables knowledge, education, experience, 
and training and the dependent variable, effective performance.  Four separate models, 
one for each independent variable, were individually regressed and compared.  All four 
models used a single independent variable, status as a moderating variable, and effective 
performance as the dependent variable.  All models and independent variables were 
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significant and the moderating variable, status, was insignificant in every model, 
indicating it has no affect on the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables.  The aggregate variance explained by all models was 68.8 percent.  It is 
understood the same amount of variance accountability would not be the same in a good 
model that regresses all the independent variables together with the independent variable.  
The explained variance could have been better if scale reliability, correlation between 
independent variables, and the wording of each item were better.     
In the model (n = 270) regressing knowledge, the moderating variable status, and 
effective performance, the model was accepted (F = 38.5, p = .00).  The entire model was 
able to explain a considerable amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .295).  The 
variable knowledge was a significant predictor (β = .51, p = .00) and the moderating 
variable was not (β = .08, p = .23).  The variables in this model had a moderate level of 
collinearity (tolerance = .66, condition index = 22.6).  Residual values were normally 
distributed (µ = 0, σ = 1). 
In the model (n = 266) regressing education, the moderating variable status, and 
effective performance, the model was accepted (F = 7.59, p = .00).  The entire model was 
able to explain small amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .069).  The variable 
education was a significant predictor (β = .23, p = .02) and the moderating variable was 
not (β = .03, p = .77).  The variables in this model had a moderate level of collinearity 
(tolerance = .33, condition index = 20.4).  The residual values were normally distributed 
(µ = 0, σ = 1). 
In the model (n = 265) regressing experience, the moderating variable status, and 
effective performance, the model was accepted (F = 11.7, p = .00).  The entire model was 
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able to explain a good amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .108).  The variable 
knowledge was a significant predictor (β = .39, p = .00) and the moderating variable was 
not (β = -.13, p = .21).  The variables in this model had a moderate level of collinearity 
(tolerance = .34, condition index = 22.3).  The residual values were normally distributed 
(µ = 0, σ = 1). 
In the model (n = 262) regressing training, the moderating variable status, and 
effective performance, the model was accepted (F = 24.9, p = .00).  The entire model was 
able to explain considerable amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .216).  The 
variable training was a significant predictor (β = .43, p = .00) and the moderating variable 
was not (β = .03, p = .66).  The variables in this model had a moderate level of 
collinearity (tolerance = .58, condition index = 20.9).  Residual values were normally 
distributed (µ = 0, σ = 1). 
¾ H7:  Enlisted (TSgt-SMSgt), officer (CGO), and leader (CMSgt and FGO) 
supervisors will not differ on their perception of the effect status has on the 
relationship between knowledge, education, experience and training and 
effective performance. 
 
This hypothesis could not be answered because the method used did not produce 
enough significant data.  Three separate models, one in each rank category, were 
individually regressed and compared.  All three models used the five independent 
variables experience, knowledge, training, education, and status.  Although all three 
models were accepted, status was not a significant predictor in two of them; therefore, an 
accurate comparison between groups could not be made.  Poor scale reliability, 
correlation between independent variables, and the wording of each item played a role in 
the poor significance in the data.  Interaction terms were not explored.   
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The enlisted model (n = 104) model was accepted (F = 6.6, p = .00) and was able 
to explain a reasonable amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .25).  There were 
three significant predictors in the model; knowledge (β = .43, p = .001), education (β = 
.26, p = .023), and status (β = -.29, p = .014).  Status contributed four percent of the 
variance.  There were strong correlations between experience and training (.54), 
experience and education (.52), experience and status (.55), and knowledge and training 
(.71).  There was a serious problem with collinearity with the model (condition index = 
36.8).  Residual values were normally distributed (µ = 0, σ = .97).   
The CGO model (n = 34) model was accepted (F = 3.9, p = .006) and was able to 
explain a reasonable amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .35); however, only 
experience was a significant predictors (β = .49, p = .018).  Since status was insignificant, 
its affect on the model could not be determined.  There were strong correlations between 
experience and effective performance (.57), experience and status (.54), and knowledge 
and training (.79).  There was a serious problem with collinearity with the model 
(condition index = 117.2).  Residual values were normally distributed (µ = 0, σ = .91).   
The leader model (n = 97) model was accepted (F = 11.3, p = .00) and was able to 
explain a reasonable amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .39); however, only 
knowledge was a significant predictor (β = .44, p = .00).  Since status was insignificant, 
its affect on the model could not be determined.  Seven pairs of variables were strongly 
correlated and there was a serious problem with collinearity with the model (condition 
index = 67.9).  Residual values were normally distributed (µ = 0, σ = .97).   
 
 
  85
¾ H8:  Supervisors’ perception of knowledge, education, training, or 
experience, individually, will increase the ability to determine effective 
performance.   
 
This hypothesis was broken into four sub-hypotheses where each independent 
variable was individually regressed with the dependent variable, effective performance.  
The hypothesis was not rejected based on all the separate models and independent 
variables’ significance values all being accepted.  When combining the amount of 
explained variance in all four models, 56 percent of the variance is accounted for in 
determining effective performance.  It is understood the same variance accountability 
would not be the same in a model that regresses all the independent variables together 
with the dependent variable.  The 56 percent variance accountability could have been 
better if scale reliability, correlation between independent variables, and the wording of 
each item were better.      
In the model (n = 644) regressing knowledge and effective performance, the 
model was accepted (F = 125.2, p = .00) indicating the variation explained by this model 
was not due to chance.  Knowledge was able to explain a significant amount of the 
variance (adjusted R-squared = .28) in the model.  The independent variable knowledge 
was a significant predictor (β = .53, p = .00).  The variables in this model were 
moderately correlated (.53), condition index (21.4).  Residual values were normally 
distributed (µ = 0, σ = 1). 
In the model (n = 619) regressing education and effective performance, the model 
was accepted (F = 15.6, p = .00) indicating the variation explained by this model was not 
due to chance.  Education was able to explain a small amount of the variance (adjusted R-
squared = .05) in the model.  The independent variable education was a significant 
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predictor (β = .22, p = .00).  The variables in this model had a small correlation (.22), 
condition index (12.0).  Residual values were normally distributed (µ = 0, σ = 1). 
In the model (n = 633) regressing experience and effective performance, the 
model was accepted (F = 18.1, p = .00) indicating the variation explained by this model 
was not due to chance.  Experience was able to explain a small amount of the variance 
(adjusted R-squared = .05) in the model.  The independent variable experience was a 
significant predictor (β = .23, p = .00).  The variables in this model had a small 
correlation (.23), condition index (13.6).  Residual values were normally distributed       
(µ = 0, σ = 1). 
In the model (n = 592) regressing training and effective performance, the model 
was accepted (F = 65.4, p = .00) indicating the variation explained by this model was not 
due to chance.  Training was able to explain a good amount of the variance (adjusted R-
squared = .18) in the model.  The independent variable training was a significant 
predictor (β = .42, p = .00).  The variables in this model had a moderate correlation (.42), 
condition index (17.8).  Residual values were normally distributed (µ = 0, σ = 1).  
¾ H9:  Enlisted (TSgt-SMSgt), officer (CGO), and leader (CMSgt and FGO) 
supervisors will not differ on their perception of the effect knowledge, 
education, training, or experience, individually, will have on the ability to 
determine effective performance 
 
Similar to hypothesis seven, this hypothesis could not be answered because the 
data did not produce enough significant results.      
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¾ H10:  Supervisors’ perception of knowledge, education, experience, and 
training will significantly increase the ability to determine effective 
performance, while status, indoctrination, and PME will not significantly 
increase the ability to determine effective performance.     
 
This hypothesis could not be answered because the method used did not produce 
enough significant data.  This model (n = 182) included all the independent variables in 
the order established in section six, Independent Variable Paired Comparison Results, in 
an entry method with one independent variable per block.  The model was significant    
(F = 15.34, p = .00) and explain a significant amount of variance (adjusted R-squared = 
.39), which is attributable to knowledge and training, the only significant variables.  
Table 9, shows some of each variable’s values in the model.  As shown, the beta 
coefficients of five of the independent variables were not significant (experience, 
education, PME, indoctrination, and status).  Having an acceptable model with several 
insignificant independent variables is an indication that collinearity problems exist.        
 
Table 9.  Multiple Model Value Table. 
Variables 
Entered 
Adjusted 
R-Squared 
(when added to model) 
Beta 
(β) Sig 
Tolerance
Value 
Condition 
Index 
Rank (control) .05 .055 .425 .71 9.5 
Experience .12 .005 .952 .48 11.7 
Knowledge .35 .351 .000 .45 14.7 
Training .38 .210 .024 .40 20.3 
Education .38 .094 .235 .54 27.8 
PME .39 .092 .471 .21 28.5 
Indoctrination .39 .095 .443 .22 31.4 
Status .39 -.108 .271 .35 42.3 
 
 Further, based on the tolerance value (.35) being close to zero and the condition 
index (42.3) being well over the 30, the value at which multicollinearity becomes a 
serious problem, it became difficult to determine the separate effects of each independent 
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variable on the dependent variable.  Table 9 shows a steady decrease in tolerance values 
and steady increase in condition indexes as additional variables were added to the model.  
This problem can be attributed to the lack of internal consistency of most of the scales as 
described above as well as the close relationships between the independent variables.  
Overall, 12 of the correlations between each of the variable were moderate and nine were 
strong, contributing to the problems in this model.  The fine differences in the description 
of experience, knowledge, training, and education made it difficult to distinguish between 
the items that described them on the survey.  Also, for example, airmen who receive 
education, training, experience, etc become more knowledgeable, hence making these 
difficult to separate.   
 Post Hoc Analysis 
The same data as used in hypothesis ten was reanalyzed using principal axis 
factor analysis with an orthogonal (Varimax) rotational method.  The purpose of this 
factor analysis with rotation was to allow SPSS to combine statistically similar items into 
the same categories (factors).  This reduces the convergent validity between the 
independent variables and eliminates as much correlation between the factors as possible, 
making the data easier to interpret.  SPSS was arranged to automatically extract only 
factors with Eigen values over one, and suppress any item that had an absolute coefficient 
value less than three.   
Prerequisite factor analysis testing suggests factor analysis is appropriate for this 
data with an acceptable Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (Chi-Square = 4316.7, sig = .00) and 
a meritorious Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure (.87).  The factor analysis suggests eight 
factors (all Eigenvalues > 1) can explain 57.3 percent of the variance between the factors.  
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 The factor analysis resulted in a matrix of eight factors with 23 items having no 
cross-loading between factors and 16 items having cross loading between two or more 
factors.  Fifteen of the 16 cross loaded items were eliminated in order to reduce the 
correlation and optimize the reliability of the new scales that were produced in this 
analysis.  One item that had cross loading, Q5_29, remained to assist in the reliability of 
the effective performance scale.  All items remaining (23 with no cross loading and one, 
Q5_29, with cross loading) in the eight factors were analyzed to determine what scale 
they came from as described previously in section five (S5).  Table 10 show the rotated 
factor matrix with the values of the cross factored items removed, showing which factor 
each of the 24 remaining items were in after the rotation phase.   
 
Table 10.  Rotated Factor Matrix.   
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In factor one, two of the items (Q5_7 and Q5_27) were from the indoctrination 
scale and two (Q5_9 and Q5_18) were from the PME scale; in factor two, both items 
(Q5_11 and Q5_38) were from the status scale; in factor three, one of the items (Q5_2) 
was from the knowledge scale, one (Q5_30) was from the education scale, one (Q5_14) 
was from the experience scale and the remaining three (Q5_4, Q5_13, and Q5_19) were 
from the training scale; in factor four, three of the items (Q5_8, Q5_29, and Q5_36) were 
from the effective performance scale and one (Q5_39) was from the status scale; in factor 
five two of the items (Q5_6 and Q5_16) were from the status scale and one (Q5_36) was 
from the effective performance scale; in factor six, two items (Q5_12 and Q5_35) were 
from the education scale and one (Q5_31) was from the training scale; factor seven had 
no items remaining in it once all the cross factored items were removed; and factor eight, 
had three items (Q5_1, Q5_15, and Q5_29) from the effective performance scale.  Item 
Q5_29 is the one item that cross-factored between factor four and factor eight.  Next, 
similar items between factors were combined, if reasonable, to further simplify the 
analysis without introducing excessive correlation or unreliable scales.     
 Factor one remained separate from the other factors, creating an 
indoctrination/PME scale.  The two status items in factor two were combine with the 
status item in factor four and the status item in factor five, creating a status scale.  All six 
items in factors three were combined, creating a scale that merged knowledge, education, 
experience, and training.  Finally, the effective performance items in factors four, five, 
and eight were combine, creating an effective performance scale.  The result of this was 
four new scales/variables indoctrination/PME (IP), status, 
  91
knowledge/education/experience/training (KEET), and effective performance that were 
used in a multiple regression.  Figure 16 shows the new model. 
 
 
 
   
 
Figure 16.  Factor Analysis Model. 
   
With the exception of the effective performance scale, all scale variables were 
calculated with the items as described, except the effective performance variable.  Item 
Q5_25 was removed from the effective performance variable to improve its reliability.  
Table 11 shows some descriptive statistics of the new scale variables.  
         
Table 11.  Descriptive Statistics. 
 
Scale Variables n Alpha Mean Std. Deviation 
KEET 579 .74 3.7 .52 
IP 577 .82 3.3 .82 
Status 313 .70 2.4 .76 
Effective Performance 661 .62 4.0 .53 
 
 
  
All variables were normally distributed due to the large number of cases and high 
Shapiro-Wilk values (lowest = .95).  None of the correlations between variables were 
higher than moderate (highest = .40).      
This new model (n = 253) included the four new variables that were input in an 
entry method with one independent variable per block; rank first, then KEET, then IP, 
then status, with effective performance being the dependent variable.  The model was 
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significant (F = 14.64, p = .00) and explain a reasonable amount of variance (adjusted R-
squared = .18).  In this model, all beta coefficients were significant.  Table 12, shows 
some of each variable’s values.  Having a significant model and significant independent 
variables is an indication that collinearity in the model has reduced due to the 
reconfiguration of the items/scales.  In this model, KEET explained 11.4 percent of the 
variance, status explained 3.6 percent of the variance, I/P explained 2.7 percent.          
 
Table 12.  Multiple Model Value Table. 
Variables 
Entered 
Adjusted 
R-Squared 
(when added to model) 
Beta 
(β) Sig 
Tolerance
Value 
Condition 
Index 
Rank (control) .001 .016 .793 .831 8.51 
KEET .115 .325 .000 .805 9.04 
IP .142 .253 .000 .727 11.04 
Status .178 -.227 .001 .749 21.53 
 
 The tolerance value (.75) and condition index (21.5) show a noticeable 
improvement, drop, in the amount of multicollinearity in this model when compared to 
the model used in hypothesis ten.  Residual values were normally distributed (µ = 0,        
σ = 1). 
Section Seven – Organizational Culture Results 
¾ H11:  Enlisted and officer airmen do not differ on their perception of the 
concept that eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in nonstrategic 
duties will not negatively affect Air Force culture. 
 
Statistics 
An independent sample t-test was conducted to test this hypothesis by comparing 
the means of enlisted and officer respondents when considering whether they differ on 
their perception of the concept that eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in 
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nonstrategic duties will not negatively affect Air Force culture.  All 287 officer cases 
were used and of the 435 enlisted cases, 287 were randomly selected for this comparison.  
The scale consisted of 11 items with one item, Q7_3, being problematic to the internal 
consistency of the scale so it was eliminated from the scale.  The 10 item scale with all 
574 cases was reliable (.81) and when separated, the 287 enlisted cases were reliable 
(.82) and the 287 officer cases were also reliable (.81).  The culture variable had an 
overall mean of 3.3 (enlisted 3.4, officers 3.3) and standard deviation of .67 (enlisted .66, 
officers .67).  The normality of the data was suitable (n = 528) and a Shapiro-Wilk test 
for normality ranging from .75 to .89 with an overall of .85.  The Levene’s test for 
homogeneity of variance indicated the variances of the enlisted and officer respondents 
were homogenous (F = .29, p = .59).     
Results 
The findings reject this hypothesis (t = 2.4, p = .017), indicating enlisted and 
officer respondents do differ on their perception of the concept that eliminating rank as a 
qualifier to employment in nonstrategic duties will not negatively affect Air Force 
culture.  The higher average in the enlisted respondents indicate they are more in favor of 
the concept that the officer respondents.  However, the difference in the two samples is 
by a mean of .14, with a standard deviation of .06.  Both means fall between the “neither 
agree nor disagree” and “agree” categories on the Likert scale.  Further, 95 percent of the 
time the difference between the groups can range from .03 to .25. 
As a note, the double negative in the hypothesis (…not negatively…) was 
intentional.  The intent of this hypothesis was to determine only whether the respondents 
perceived the concept that eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in nonstrategic 
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duties would have a negative affect on Air Force culture, not to determine whether the 
affect would be positive.      
Item Q7_11.   
Item Q7_11 specifically asked “As an organization the Air Force should consider 
the concept of employing enlisted and company grade officer personnel in similar duties 
where grade is not an integral part of strategy, plan of action, or chain-of-command.”  It 
was intended to get a future direction of the concept presented in this research.  The mean 
response to this item (n=707) alone was 3.4 with a standard deviation of 1.1.  Based on 
the Likert scale a three response equated to “Neither Agree nor Disagree” and a four 
response equated to “Agree.”     
Post Hoc Analysis 
To further examine the data, it was divided into four categories to see if the 
differences were specifically between enlisted and officer respondents or based on 
another trait.  An ANOVA was conducted on four categories: (1) TSgt, MSgt, and 
SMSgt; (2) CMSgt; (3) CGOs; and (4) FGOs, including the six general officer 
respondents.  There were 37 CMSgt respondents; therefore, 37 random cases were 
selected from each of the other categories for this comparison.  Item Q7_3 was not 
included in the scale to improve its internal consistence. The overall scale was reliable 
(.80) as well as within each category (NCO .82, CMSgt .75, CGO .81, and FGO .82).  
The culture variable had an overall mean of 3.3 (NCO 3.4, CMSgt 3.2, CGO 3.5, FGO 
3.3) and standard deviation of .67 (NCO .71, CMSgt .63, CGO .62, FGO .69).  The 
normality of the data was suitable (n=140) and a Shapiro-Wilk test for normality ranging 
from .73 to .88 with an overall of .99.  The Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance 
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reveals the variances between the categories was homogenous (F = .84, p = .48).  Based 
on these findings, if a hypothesis similar to H11 was asked to these four groups, it would 
not have been rejected (F = 1.6, p = .19), indicating that when divided, NCO, CMSgt, 
CGO, and FGO respondents do not differ on their perception of the concept that 
eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in nonstrategic duties will not negatively 
affect Air Force culture.           
Section Eight – Air Force Personnel Transformation Results 
¾ H12:  Eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in nonstrategic duties is 
an acceptable method to assist in meeting the intent of transformation.  
 
The items for this hypothesis were broken into two subscales.  Subscale one 
represented the respondent’s perception of the importance of rank in nonstrategic duty 
positions when compared to qualifications such as knowledge, education, training, and 
experience.  Subscale two represented the respondent’s perception of whether eliminating 
rank as a qualifier and integrating qualified enlisted and officer airmen in similar duties 
supports transformation.   
Variables were developed for each subscale.  Subscale one had a good reliability 
(.80), once item Q8_7 was removed from the scale, and subscale two had a poor 
reliability (.57) even with item Q8_10 removed from the scale.  The data in both 
variables were normally distributed based on the number of cases used in each variable (n 
= 693, n = 682) and on their high Shapiro-Wilk values (.94, .98) accordingly.  The means 
and standard deviations of both variables (variable one: µ = 3.7, σ = .67; variable two: µ 
= 3.6, σ = .53) indicate the respondents’ perception were between a three “Neither Agree 
nor Disagree,” and four “Agree,” on the Likert scale.  This incline toward “agree” 
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indicates that the respondents tend to agree, more so than disagree, with the concepts that 
make up this hypothesis.             
Comments Received on Surveys 
       There were a total of 270 cases, 37 percent, that included comments.  Most of the 
comments were extensive and did not universally accept or reject the proposed concept in 
this exploratory research.  Some common themes are to maintain the chain-of-command 
and customs and courtesies.  Others include the difference in compensation for the same 
job would be unfair to enlisted personnel and that the propensity for unprofessional 
relationship would increase.  Some claim enlisted and officer personnel and currently 
performing the same duties in some areas and that this concept would work in some 
situations.   
No data analysis was conducted on the comments; however, due to the 
unexpected large volume received, they were included in Appendix C.  All comments are 
as written by the respondents except were indicated.  Portions of some comments were 
removed by the author to protect respondent’s personal information and privacy.    
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V.  Discussion 
This research explored an asymmetrical concept of personnel management.  
Regardless of the limitations presented in chapter four and most undisputable is that 
status placed last in the compared comparison where respondents were forced to select 
one variable over another that they perceived to be important for a subordinate to perform 
effectively.  Also, the analysis of the means and correlation between status and effective 
performance indicate status has little effect on one’s ability to perform effectively.      
This asymmetrical concept is not without its complications and some of the data 
was implausible due to insignificance from poor scale reliability, correlation between the 
independent variables, and problems with the wording of the items in the survey.  
Withstanding these limitations and base on the statistically significant data in the 
regression analysis in H3, H6, H8, H10 (post hoc findings), H11, and H12, the results 
lend themselves slightly toward the idea that status, rank, has little affect on one’s ability 
to perform effectively.  The results of the regression in hypotheses three (all respondents) 
and eight (supervisor respondents) indicate knowledge, education, experience, and 
training account for 56 percent of the variance, indicating the ability to perform 
effectively can be determined partially from these variables.  Hypothesis six shows the 
aggregate variance explained by knowledge, education, experience, and training is 69 
percent and status had no affect on the relationship between these independent variables 
and the dependent variable effective performance, again an indication status has no 
bearing on effective performance.  In the post hoc analysis in hypothesis 10, knowledge, 
education, experience, and training (calculated as a single variable) accounted for 11.4 
percent of the overall variance, status accounted for 3.6 percent, and indoctrination/PME 
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accounted for 2.7 percent.  The findings in hypothesis 11 suggest that when the 
respondents were divided by enlisted and officer, the groups did differ on whether this 
concept would not negatively affect Air Force culture; however, the means of both 
groups both were in between the “neither agree nor disagree” and “agree” selections on 
the Likert scale.  When the respondents were divided in four categories (NCO, CMSgt, 
CGO, and FGO) the respondents did not differ and the means of all groups were in 
between the “neither agree nor disagree” and “agree” selections on the Likert scale.  
Finally, hypothesis 12 suggests the respondents overall perceived this concept to be more 
inline with personnel transformation efforts than not.  The overall respondent means was 
also in between the “neither agree nor disagree” and “agree” selections on the Likert 
scale. 
Qualitatively, this research provides extensive literature indicating human capital 
management bases personnel on skills held without a class separation as an efficient way 
to manage personnel.   
With additional research into this topic, the Air Force stands to magnify its 
capability with an increase in the number of airmen employed, without additional cost, by 
further exploiting the knowledge, education, training, and experience of its enlisted 
airmen.  The emphasis is on further utilization and the expansion of the enlisted force 
without violating the chain-of-command, customs and courtesies, or officer career 
progression.  It is not intended on resurrecting past programs such as Warrant Officers or 
enlisted pilots, nor is it aimed at moving toward a laissez-faire concept of management; a 
chain-of-command and leadership still apply.          
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The comments indicate there are strong opinions on this topic and should be 
further researched; hence analysis of these comments, in Appendix C, is the first area left 
for future research.   Seven additional areas highlighting the need for further research 
including an economic evaluation, duty position review, total force comparison, tracking 
voluntary enlisted education, institutional administration, repeat research with different 
variables, and transforming officer duties to enlisted duties instead of the interchangeable 
rank concept.   
Economic Evaluation 
This thesis briefly showed the potential cost savings of employing enlisted in lieu 
of officer airmen but did not extensively research the economic side of human capital in 
terms of monetary return on investments or rates of return, to the individual or 
organization, by providing no cost education and training to its airmen.  The following 
questions are left for future research:   
¾ What are the economic benefits to the Air Force for sponsoring education 
opportunities to its enlisted airmen? 
¾ How can the Air Force improve its return on investment for the sponsored 
education it provides to enlisted airmen?   
¾ What, if any, loss in investment is the Air Force currently losing?   
Duty Position Review 
  
The results of this research support a comprehensive reevaluation at Air Force 
enlisted and officer duty positions to determine where rank is not a strategic factor and 
employing qualified enlisted airmen is appropriate; Air Force Instructions 36-2105, 
Officer Classification, and 36-2108, Enlisted Classification, require review.  The criteria 
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for any Air Force duty position should not be increased or decreased in terms of 
qualifications required to perform effectively; an advanced academic degree requirement 
should neither be levied on positions currently not requiring a degree nor should a degree 
requirement be taken away from positions currently requiring a degree.  The criteria in 
terms of knowledge, education, training, and experience should not be changed for any 
position.  Enlisted or officer airmen must meet these qualifications to be employed in 
positions that require a degree.  A study must be performed on how to effectively employ 
qualified enlisted airmen in officer career fields while simultaneously preserving officer 
training and progression.  A possible approach that can be modeled is in aircraft 
maintenance, where junior officers are rotated throughout the maintenance organization.  
The junior maintenance officers that are rotated throughout the organization often do not 
hold the primary knowledge base to be in charge, but rely on the NCO/SNCO to mentor 
them.  The intent of the rotation in these areas are to gain career broadening and 
experience so that the junior officer can lead similar organizations in the future with a 
basic knowledge of the operations in the lower levels of the organization.   
This research recognizes that a change in what duties enlisted airmen are 
employed in will have an affect on the potential for the career progression of the enlisted 
airmen.  To ensure enlisted progression, the approach could be similar to any other career 
broadening position that enlisted airmen take in their career.  Generally, leaving one’s 
primary career field to fulfill a career broadening opportunity, then returning to the 
primary career field could be a basis to accommodate the change described in this 
research.  The following questions are left for future research:     
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¾ How can qualified mid-level enlisted airmen be employed in company grade 
officer duties while ensuring officer career progression?  
¾ How can the enlisted promotion system accommodate this change?    
Total Force Comparison       
Figure 17 shows the military officer/enlisted breakout for active duty, reserve, and 
guard services.  It is understood that the mission of active duty, reserve, and guard are 
somewhat different but their end goals are similar. 
 
 
Figure 17.  Military Officer/Enlisted Breakout. 
(Department of the Air Force, Air Force Handbook, 108th Congress, First Secession, 2003:3). 
 
The following questions are left for future research:    
¾ How can the active duty Air Force increase its percentage of enlisted airmen and 
decrease the percentage of officer airmen (similar to the Air National Guard’s 
percentages), while maintaining mission accomplishment?   
¾ What are the economic benefits to the Air Force of employing more enlisted in 
officer billets?   
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Tracking Voluntary Enlisted Education 
It is safe to say that enlisted airmen will continue to voluntarily pursue advanced 
academic degrees.  However, there are two unknown factors: 1) not knowing how many 
enlisted airmen will pursue education each year; and 2) what degree programs will 
enlisted personnel graduate in each year.  The following questions are left for future 
research:    
¾ How can the Air Force employ the interchangeable rank concept of this research 
with the number of enlisted airmen pursuing advanced degrees not being 
constant?     
¾ How can the Air Force stabilize or anticipate the number and types of degrees 
(BA/BS or MA/MS), enlisted airmen pursue, in order to ensure a selection of 
enlisted airmen with appropriate advanced degrees to fill new duty positions 
requiring an advanced degree? 
Institutional Administration          
The concept of this research would require a considerable reevaluation and 
several process and procedural changes as well as Air Force instruction and manning 
document changes.  Also, how to actually initiate the process of identifying qualified 
enlisted airmen and employing them in positions commensurate with their education 
qualifications would need research.  A starting point, to develop a more thorough process, 
could be that once enlisted airmen graduate with BA/BS, they are notified of career 
broadening opportunities that uses their education, at which time he/she volunteers for 
the available position.  If critical shortages become a problem, a non-volunteer process 
may be initiated at the Air Force’s discretion.  If the enlisted applicant is accepted, then 
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he/she proceeds to the career broadening position, that may or may not require additional 
education (i.e. MS/MA, etc.) for a predetermined number of years (i.e. controlled tour).  
This position could be at any level of command.  After the assignment is completed, the 
enlisted person would return to his/her primary career field.    
      This research surveyed mainly TSgt through CMSgt and Lieutenants through 
Colonel.  A future research topic could include a Delphi study or interviews of general 
officers. 
Repeat Research with Different Variables 
 The intent of this follow on research is to repeat the research to attempt to answer 
the hypotheses with different variables that have less cross factoring such as those 
developed in the post hoc factor analysis.  Further, to use factor analysis with different 
rotational methods.     
Transforming Officer Duties to Enlisted Duties 
 As this title implies, instead of interchanging ranks as necessary as described in 
this research, determine what CGO level duties can wholly be transferred to enlisted 
personnel.  The following question is left for future research:   
¾ What CGO level duties can be transferred to the enlisted force without negatively 
impacting mission accomplishment?  
Conclusion 
      With effort from many organizations in the Air Force, this concept has the 
potential to transform Air Force airmen management and how we employ our airmen.  In 
the levels of employment targeted in this research, rank has little bearing on one’s ability 
to perform effectively based on the significant data in this research; it is qualifications 
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such as knowledge, education, training, and experience that matters.  This concept assists 
the efforts made to transform the Air Force and does not appear to have a negative affect 
on its culture.  It is not intended to be a concept of equality toward all airmen but is 
intended to increase the capability of the Air Force within the existing manpower and 
budget constraints by putting the right person, in the right job, at the right time.     
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Appendix A:  Survey 
Survey Cover E-mail/Letter 
From: Romano Daniel M CMSgt AFIT/ENS  
Sent: Thursday, December 22, 2005 10:01 AM 
Subject: Air Force Human Capital Management Survey 
You were randomly chosen from a list of enlisted and officer personnel to take part in 
this web-based survey that is collecting data for a research effort that is examine the 
impact of placing more emphasis on qualifications and less on rank when employing 
forces in selected technical and management positions.     
Your participation in this survey is extremely valuable to the accuracy of the results and 
is completely voluntary and anonymous.  Your responses will only be used in analysis 
that is in combination with all other responses.  The survey should take you 
approximately 20 - 25 minutes to complete.  Please answer all questions based on your 
knowledge and experiences.  When you are finished please ensure you click the submit 
button at the end of the survey, which will send your answers to the survey data base.  It 
is very important that you click the submit button at the end of the survey to forward your 
answers to the survey data base.   
This survey has been approved by AFPC/DPAPS (survey control number - 05-129; valid 
through 30 June 2006) and is sponsored by USAF/DPPF.   If you have any questions 
regarding this survey, please contact CMSgt Dan Romano by e-mail at 
daniel.romano@afit.edu or by phone at DSN 785-3636 or commercial at (937) 256-
8564.  Thank you for taking your valuable time to answer this survey.  
Please click on the following link to begin the survey.  
http://www.afit.edu/en/Surveys/dromanoSurvey/  
 
DAN ROMANO, CMSGT, USAF  
Graduate Student, AFIT/ENS/GLM  
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Appendix B:  Human Subject Exemption and Survey Approval Letters 
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Appendix C:  Respondent Comments 
 
Case – 8  
Rank – O-1 
Comment – I think that one important aspect is the perspective personel will have on this issue. An enlisted 
person may feel lighted or undermined if an Officer (Higher Rank and Pay Grade), did the same job he/she 
was doing. Based on this concept, there might be a tendency to undermine the rank/authority of said officer 
in various ways (uprofessional relationships or insubordination). 
 
Case – 10 
Rank – O-2 
Comment – Felt like the questions were being repeated over and over again. I had difficulty differentiating 
between the questions. 
 
Case – 15  
Rank – O-3E 
Comment – Having worked in an environment for several years where ranks wre not used, I did run into 
more infractions than normal assignments concerning cutoms and courtesies and chain of command. 
Furthermore, I noticed that is these infractions went unpunished, then the performance of the unit was 
negatively affected due mainly to gossip, rumors, and perception by outside organizational personnel. 
Therefore, I do not believe this environment shows potential to be replicated to the Air Force as a whole; it 
is useful for certain situations only. 
 
Comment - Hope you also looked at the number of positions you're considering and the number of enlisted 
who would be qualified. If not, then pull enlisted demographics from AFPC homepage. I have no 
suggestions on determining the number of positions. Also, if there isn't a shortage of CGOs (given Force 
Shaping initiative), then are there too many enlisted personnel in jobs that they are over qualified for? 
Perhaps certain jobs should be reclassified. 
  
Comment – Took me about 35 minutes. 
 
Case – 16  
Rank – O-2  
Comment – Bottom line, I feel the AF, should utilize the abilities of every airman. So regardless of rank, if 
someone is the best person for the job, they should be performing in that capacity. 
 
Case – 20 
Rank – O-4 
Comment - The premise is intriguing. I believe there are many places where qualified enlisted personnel 
could effectively perform similar functions as some junior officers where there is not a chain of command 
issue. I believe this would be the exception rather than the norm. Age and time in service would be critical 
to determining where this would be appropriate. I've seen conflict among junior enlisted personnel over 1 
stripe due to previous college education. I see the potential for even greater problems where substantial pay 
differences for similar work could be an issue for junior members (both officer and enlisted). I've been in 
offices where the basic job function of GS-7 was the same as a mid-level captain and a GS-13. Conflicts 
over pay differences were avoided by an understanding of additional requirements related to each pay 
grade. Implementation of the proposed approach should be approached with great caution and only 
implemented on a wide scale after several (read 5-10 yrs) of pilot studies at various organizations and 
command levels. It could work well in a number of organizations regardless of the people involved, or it 
could only work due to the people involved. Any pilot studies should use people without handpicking for a 
desired outcome to get a truer indication of what circumstances it might be successful. I tried to answer the 
survey in terms of my most recent assignment. However, my answers change significantly as I look back 
on other assigments. This was especially true when interations with other intelligence organizations was 
involved. Analysts at other intel organizations were often senior GS (13-14). Inputs from CGOs or senior 
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NCOs would occasionaly be dimissed by some of these analysts regardless of the validity of the military 
member's input based solely on their lack of rank. (Thankfully this wasn't always the case and there were 
many great senior analysts that actively sought out these inputs.) I'd be interested in seeing the results of the 
survey and learning about such a system might actually be implemented. 
 
Comment - There are organizations with the right people where such a concept could be implemented 
successfully. It will require a severe organizational cultural change for some organizations and/or people. 
The personnel office does not have a track record of successfully placing officers to maximize their training 
and education now. Adding this additional layer of options may only makes matters worse while frustrating 
the placed enlisted personnel as well (whether into an unreceptive office or an office receptive to the idea 
but lacking the ability to leverage the enlisted member's education, training, and experience). 
 
Case – 21 
Rank – O-2 
Comment – I answered the questions "being a CGO, NCO, SNCO, etc. is not important to be effective" as 
N/A for my job but what I would have liked to have said is that being a CGO or NCO and above is 
important. My point is that I don't think it has to be one or the other, particularly, but at least one of them. I 
think being below an NCO is not advantageous for the positions I have held. Also, I would like to say that I 
think the idea of employing enlisted and officers in similar duties happens in the Operations Flight of CE 
squadrons with the Facilities, Infrastructure, etc. elements. I held one of these positions and the other three 
were held by two SMSgt's and one civilian. It worked well to have the different ranks as I learned a lot 
from all three of these individuals. You can contact me if you have questions. (RESPONDENT’S NAME 
REMOVED BY AUTOR) 
 
Case – 22 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – This last section disturbs me--such thought works in some of the office settings, but get out 
into the field of battle--as so many Airmen are currently and projected to be deployed in the future--in what 
have typically been Army missions--and someone has to be in charge. The officer/enlisted system does 
that--not saying it always works and there are countless examples where the enlisted person took charge 
(natural leadership) and saved the day (REFERENCE TO RESPONDENT’S HOME TOWN REMOVED 
BY AUTHOR). 
 
Comment – This concept could possibly work in the business world...but look at AFMC for 
example...where SNCOs are currently being used as PEMs...they get NO respect when they go to the table. 
I found it quite embarassing that the two CMSgts that worked for me neede me, as a young major, to go to 
the table for them--because I had the utmost respect for them as the technical experts they were--but the 
civilians in the room---GS 14s and 15s--simply did not respect them. Your proposed concept would only 
work with a major organizational shift. 
 
Case – 24  
Rank – O-3 
Comment – Rank is not given arbitrarily. It is a qualification to have rank. Everyone has opportunity to 
achieve rank according to their abilities and their own effort. It is important to respect rank. Everyone 
should be allowed to contribute to the organization to their full abilities. Don't use that fact to attack the 
military rank system. 
 
Comment – I wonder why we have officers at all? 
 
Comments – Good Luck 
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Case – 25  
Rank – O-2  
Comment – If we have officers and enlisted airmen doing the same job, we're in effect paying 2 people 
differently to do the same job. Why not re-evaluate the slot and make a decision as to what demographic 
best fills the job? 
 
Case – 31  
Rank – O-4  
Comment – Examples of what scenarios you had in mind for the rank mix would be helpful. 
 
Case – 32  
Rank – O-3  
Comment – The statements to which I am agreeing & disagreeing are quite vague. Sometimes I agree or 
disagree only under certain circumstances. I'm not sure anyone can learn anything from the resutls of this 
survey. 
 
Comment – I strongly question the value of this survey. The statements to which I am agreeing & 
disagreeing are vague and could easily be subject to misinterpretation. 
 
Comment – I question the value of this entire survey. It's very vague, and I'm concerned that it's results will 
be misleading. 
 
Case – 33  
Rank – O-2E  
Comment – Question 10 - having either enlisted or officer employed in the required dutes would not have a 
negative affect. However, assigning both office and enlisted to required duties would have a negative affect 
in that as short handed the Air Force is already, this perception would only take away valuable man-hours 
that could be spent elsewhere. I have on a couple of occations put the most qualified person SNCO vs. 
NCO and NCO vs. Amn and found that the rank rarely mattered. If you put the most qualified person in the 
job, they, as well as their position, are repected. The only problem I had is with intra-service agancies. For 
some reason the Army always wants to talk to a SNCO or an officer. In those cases, I would just make sure 
to have the appropriate mouthpeice available even though the SrA was calling the shots for the shift. 
 
Comments – I feel that there will be a decline in effective personnel management. I beleive that there could 
be a danger of making a AAD position for enlisted a stepping stone requirement for rank. I beleive that 
enlisted should not be excluded from these postions, but care must be taken not to make it seem like it 
should be requirement. There are some assumptions that go along with the rank. CGO's have bachelor 
degree's, FGO's have masters, SNCO should have a CCAF. Rank can have some influenced on people who 
do not know the person. Many a times, I have had to repeat exactly what my Amn or NCO's have told 
someone just because the person didn't beleive that someone of that low of rank could make that kind of 
decisions. 
 
Case – 41  
Rank – O-3  
Comment – Because younger officers without real-world experience possibly offer less to the position 
(until they've gained this experience in their military AFSC), it only makes sense to place NCOs/SNCOs 
who have experience/quality work in the same positions to ensure the AF mission is completed efficiently 
and effectively. 
 
Case – 42  
Rank – O-4  
Comment – Great concept that should be applied in numerous AFSCs. Huge "old school" cultural barriers 
will be biggest hurdle. Until status quo of this concept is realized, the rating system would probably benefit 
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Enlisted troops: "...fills position previously held by a Major..." and not Officers: "...fills position previously 
held by enlisted troop..." I'm behind the concept, but the "sell" needs to address cultural barriers. 
 
Case – 43  
Rank – O-1  
Comment – Qualification and Experience superceed rank in job performance. Enlisted may perform many 
of the technical tasks afforded only to officer billets. However, asking a qualified enlisted member to work 
along side a qualified officer to perform the same task and then paying the enlisted member less will 
frustrate the member. 
 
Case – 44  
Rank – O-3  
Comment – I don't have any strong objections to seeing officers and enlisted personnel performing the 
same jobs, but I do not see many situations where this should be applicable. Ideally, each job is evaluated 
for its required qualifications. Many jobs designated as "officer jobs" require specific technical or other 
knowledge obtained via a college education. Many non-supervisory officer jobs are already filled by 
officers of different ranks (although rarely by more than +1 or -1 difference in rank). My biggest concern is 
for promotions and evaluations. Officers are promoted based upon their competiveness with their peers, 
and the comparative level of the duties performed. It is important for an officer to perform a job 
commensurate with his/her rank (i.e, for a captain to be seen filling a lieutenant's position is seen 
negatively). To shift to a more "skills-based" system would require a significant cultural shift to avoid 
penalizing officers who perform the same jobs as lower ranking personnel (officer or enlisted). In addition, 
in many career fields, it would be difficult to quantize someone's skill level beyond training courses 
attended, time in the career field, and time in service. Rank requirements for non-supervisory jobs capture 
the latter two factors in a reasonable way. 
 
Case – 47  
Rank – O-2  
Comment – Whether this becomes a problem or not will largely depend upon how it is done and the 
character of the Amn, NCOs, SNCOs chosen to do these duties. 
 
Comment - What this survey is proposing could potentially be resolved by bringing back the Warrant 
Officer ranks. Aren't those some of the jobs that a warrant officer is supposed to do? 
 
Case – 49  
Rank – O-3  
Comment – A separate purpose and mindset for enlisted/officer roles is as beneficial to the military today 
as it ever was. I've worked n the civilian world for over 7 years before joining the military -- what a mess! 
The professionalism of the enlisted personnel has inspired me to be a better officer. If every person with 
experience does the work of an officer, then who will be focusing on the critical role of doing the work of a 
SNCO. When the SNCOs are not doing their jobs the NCOs will fail and then the Airmen will be poorly 
led and the mission will suffer. Junior officers will suffer if the SNCOs are not mentoring them, and as 
junior officers rise in rank the senior officers will be less competent. Bottom line: I predict a serious erosion 
in the ability to conduct missions and lead effectively if SNCOs are used interchangably with CGOs. 
 
Comment – I suggest you look hard for potential unintended consequences of changing the way the 
military is organized. What are the possible consequences to NCOs, Airmen, CGOs, commanders? 
 
Case – 51  
Rank – O-3E  
Comment – Very interesting survey. I was enlisted for 11 years (E1-E6), a cadet for 4 years, and have been 
commissioned since '98. Can always find someone, regardless of rank, who is sharp regardless of 
opportunities and tools provided to them. On the other hand, there are plenty of folks who've been around 
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for awhile and/or have had everything at their disposal including PME, eduaction from a top University, 
etc... who're complacent with surfing the internet at work. 
 
Case – 54  
Rank – O-4  
Comment – I have no problem with Officers and enlisted performing the same duties. My only concern is 
having SNCOs (MSgt and above) performing the duties of Lts and Capts. I believe that most SNCOs 
should be holding leadership positions vice serving as technicians. 
 
Case – 57  
Rank – O-4  
Comment - Survey method holds little face validity. I'm not 100% sure what I answered! 
 
Comments – I understand the initiative here but there are many like me who have seen these situations in 
work and its a mess for officer and enlisted career progression. Could work if there was an entire 
paradigm sift in an entire AFSC across MAJCOM, NAF, WING, SQ, FLT, etc. to effectively evaluate or 
implement. 
 
Case – 59  
Rank – E-9  
Comment – I have personally worked side by side with officers on projects and day-to-day duties without 
any problems. However, there are officers and enlisted alike who fail to learn from each other and have 
problems working together. Like any other change, the concepts posed by the questions in the survey 
would take time and proper management to become a part of the USAF culture. 
 
Case – 60  
Rank – O-3  
Comment – I think that having people with two distinct pay grades performing the same job would 
adversely affect morale. A Captain and a Technical Sergeant may have similar qualifications (education 
primarily) but there is a LARGE pay gap. If they are to perform the exact same work, I think that the pay 
issue must be dealt with. 
 
Case – 62  
Rank – O-2E  
Comment – Employing enlisted and company grade officer personnel in similar duties would be a good 
practice in all aspects except for two: (1) The officer would feel that he or she, by virtue of rank, should 
have more responsibility than the enlisted member, and may feel demoralized if he or she didnt, and (2) 
The enlisted member in a similar duty would have less success gaining agreement and coordination from 
higher ranking field grade officers, unless the enlisted member was a Chief Master Sergeant. 
 
Case – 63  
Rank – O-3  
Comment – If an enlisted troop has an educational background at the same level as the officer corp, one 
would agree that it would make sense to put them in equal positions. The problem is, the officer gets paid 
better, and each experiences different benefits. If there jobs are the same, then they should get paid the 
same (or somewhat close), right? That wouldn't happen in the situation you are proposing. The education 
they both have (off. and enlisted) contributes in different ways to the mission -- even if they have identical 
degrees -- both of which benefit the AF in a positive way. There's no easy solution here -- it's unfortunate. 
Thankfully, a highly educated enlisted troop (assumed to be one of the best among his/her peer) should 
have an easy time getting to OTS. Then the problem is starting at the bottom of the rank structure again -- 
possibly the commissioning rank of prior service folks should be based on their previous enlisted rank? SrA 
to 2Lt -- not a problem. MSgt to 2Lt is a problem.   
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Case – 64  
Rank – O-3  
Comment – Having officer rank helped me lead my flight with credibility that I might not have otherwisw 
had as a 24 year old with only a couple of years experience in the Air Force. On the other hand, some 
officer positions probably could be held by enlisted personnel without harm to the mission. 
 
Case – 66 
Rank – O-4  
Comment – The Special Operations Forces already do this to a large degree. The more qualified soldier, 
regardless of rank (officer or enlisted), will lead the tactical group in the field. Pilots, to a lesser degree (no 
enlisted pilots), do this. The lead pilot in a 2 or 4-ship formation, regardless of rank, is responsible for that 
tactical group. Qualification and experience are the factors considered most important in these situations 
and there is no reason why these factors could not or should not be employed in other military duties or 
situations. 
 
Case – 67 
Rank – O-3E 
Comment – This survey is to long. I got tired of it towards the end. 
 
Case – 68 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – This issue depends greatly upon what AFS and position you're considering. While in general I 
would agree that knowledge and experience are the most important factors, sometimes it does make a 
difference whether the office holder is enlisted or officer. 
 
Case – 69 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – Assign duties to most junior rank capable of performing it: there shouldn't be mixed 
officer/enlisted shops performing identical duties--strikes me as a misallocation of resources. Moreover, 
always desirable there be off-duty camaraderie as well -- comparable rank among peers encourages this. 
 
Case – 70 
Rank – O-3 
Comment – I am an intelligence officer and have seen enlisted and officer performing the same duties with 
no negative results, but this may have been purely because of the job of briefing the Wing CC and pilots. 
Some enlisted members enjoyed their jobs more knowing that we performed the same basic duties. The 
officers still played the oversight role on the final product, but we all were equally trained to deploy in the 
same positions and perform the job at home. 
 
Case – 74 
Rank – O-2 
Comment – Trying to eliminate rank will not only undermine AF culture, it's also an asinine idea. This 
survey is too long. 
 
Comment – This survey is too long. 
 
Comment – This survey was too long. 
 
Case – 76 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – Some may see this idea as an erosion of traditional officer/enlisted roles, but I think there may 
be increased opportunities in some career fields for officers to work with enlisted personnel. Speaking as an 
officer/engineer, having more interaction with enlisted personnel would be a good thing. 
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Case – 78 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – If we still had specialists, such as warrent officers, I would strongly agree with this issue. I was 
enlisted and earned my commission. I agree that there are enlisted airmen more qualified in most instances 
than some of the officers especially in some technical areas. However, placing officers in comparable 
positions to our enlisted confuses many issues and absolutely errodes the officers status and most likely his 
or her chances at promotion. It's difficult to tell what's driving this train of thought from a few survey 
questions but they are enough to give me the impression that we're looking to save money by injecting 
chaos into our core structure at a time when we require more clarity. 
 
Comments – For a few specialty areas this may be a good thing; AAD billets that are based on specified 
levels of technical skill comensurate with the AAD program and in those instances this makes sense. On a 
broader level what message are we sending. It used to be an officer was assigned to a position to do a job 
that required leadership and management skills and our enlisted corps provided the specialtists and core 
experience to get the mission done. If an airman wanted more general and leadership roles there was a clear 
path to get there. It worked for me. The concept of putting the right person with the right skills in the right 
place to get the job done makes sense but you're using it to support a position that if poorly executed will 
errode the role of officers in the Air Force, particularly on the support side. You have so many qualifiers 
(integral part of strategy, plan of action, or CoC) that your definition is unclear, and finally one of the 
reasons we have a fraternazation policy is to avoid contempt and familiarization with the officer corps in a 
way that errodes good order and discipline. If this concept is not well executed it will drive a similar wedge 
between our officer and enlisted corps. This also doesn't seem to offer a step up or incentive for enlisted 
troops. If we have a large enough corps of enlisted with the skills we need let them excel at these jobs and 
transfer the officers to jobs they can do. If our officer corps isn't worth of following that is a real issue that 
needs to be addressed. I believe we have the greatest AF in the world and if our enlisted folks can be put in 
more satisfying jobs that better reflect their talent, skills, and increasing education level lets absolutely do it 
but either/or will errode officer credibility. You draw a clear line in the survey between technical skill and 
leadership ability. If officers aren't in positions where they can be leaders they don't need to be there even if 
that requires a smaller officer force. Flying is a technical skill. I'd love to see enlisted flyers come back to 
the AF especially for depot flights and UAVs so more officer flyers could get more training and fighting in. 
But again, where you draw this line is crucial. 
 
Comments – This topic must address all of the issues that effect our culture and where we want to be as a 
force beyond the short term cuts we know we need to endure to support the war effort. The best qualified 
person should fill each position. But this is a fundamental change that if implemented across the Air Force 
could make filling a position easier but at a huge potential cost. 
 
Case – 80 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – I believe that for many jobs, experience, judgement and responsiblitiy are key performance 
factors. I believe that mid-grade officers and senior NCOS can fill the same duty positions, as long as it 
does not create a situation where a junior member is supervising a senior member. 
 
Case – 83 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – I don't particularly like the way this survey was applied. It seems there is an specific agenda 
being pushed and I don't feel comfortable with the "gut feeling" I get from the limited questions/answers 
available on this subject. 
 
Case – 84 
Rank – O-3 
Comment – In general I found the following verbage hard to fully understand: "Eliminating rank as a 
qualifier to duties not part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command will..." I do not fully 
understand what you type of duties you are describing, but I answered the best I could. 
  138
Comment – I believe in the concept of interchanging qualified enlisted and company grade officer 
personnel, but I'm not confident in the AF's assignment process to achieve that well. Ideally it could be 
more "flexible" for personnel management, but in reality I think it would create major complications in 
assignment/career management for both enlisted and CGOs. To be honest I think the CGOs would get the 
short end of the stick because they have fewer connections, mentors, etc. looking out for their career 
interest (because they are younger and not as well connected as SNCOs). I can see well qualified SNCOs 
doing great work in CGO jobs that they are well qualified for, while CGOs miss out on growth 
opportunities. I think CGOs have a hard time getting good leadership opportunities already and have little 
to no mentorship to help them find those jobs. The assignment process is already haphazard, without 
mixing assignments between CGOs and SNCOs. 
 
Case – 87 
Rank – O-3 
Comment – If they will be performing the same duties they should be the same grade. Mixing grades with 
the same duties leads to contempt on one side or the other. I've held the grades E-1 to E-5 and O-1 to O-4. 
In my opinion, blurring the lines between the enlisted force and the officers would damage morale on both 
sides. If anything needs to be changed, bring back the Warrant officers grades who can then be 
specialized/technical but outside the so called strategy, plan of action, or chain-of-command structure. 
 
Comment – Again, don't mix E's and O's with similar duties. Determine one grade for the job and stick with 
it. 
 
Case – 88 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – At my first duty station, company grade officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted were trained to 
perform the same duties, without regard to rank. Often, mid-level NCOs were in a role as an instructor for 
an officer. On duty there were no negative impacts to mission performance or unit morale. 
 
Comments – In this section, it is difficult to answer on the agree or disagress side. The way the questions 
are worded require an understanding of AF personnel management. It takes a personnelist to understand the 
impacts on managing AF personnel within a career-field. Certainly, if as a commander I have more 
qualified personnel for a position based on the inclusion of enlisted personnel for a given position, I will 
have more options, flexibilty, etc. 
 
Case – 89 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – Assuming I understand the ultimate goal of this line of questioning, I know that we, the AF, is 
at a crossroads in trying to effectively and efficiently utilize our enlisted AFIT graduates. Although the 
questions and answers above seemed to force me to answer one way or the other, I don't think it's as easy as 
that. It's not black and white. There aren't absolutes and yes, there are certainly instances where 
interchanging and O vice an E or vice versa won't affect an organization. But that's subject to 
organizational chemistry. Yes, over time and a change in our AF culture, it would become more the norm 
and acceptable. At this time, I can't say that it won't have an impact, negative or positive, on an 
organization. 
 
Comment – Again, big difference in "can" or "will." Sure, organizations deciding to use qualified enlisted 
personnel in mid-level positions traditionally held by officers "can" result in effective mission outcome but 
I can't say it "will." 
 
Comment – I didn't answer the supervisory section because I don't currently supervise anyone. 
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Case – 90 
Rank – E-9 
Comment – I believe that the narrowing educational gap between enlisted and officers necessitates an 
examinination of current rank structure. Not only should qualified NCOs and Officers work in the same 
duties; the military should think about having everyone enter at the lowest rank. In this way everyone 
would be judged on merit and potential rather than an artificial status which is conferred at the beginning of 
one's service. We now have many cases of where people who are of the same age, educational level and 
experience work together. However, one is "in charge" only because they chose the officer career path. 
This demeans the accomplishments and experience of the NCO. These situations lead to morale problems 
and an inefficient use of resources. 
 
Case – 92 
Rank – O-3E 
Comment – If I understand the goal correctly, you would place the appropriately qualified personnel in a 
position commensurate with their knowledge, education and experience, regardless of rank. As I see it now, 
AFPC attempts to do this within their limits (CGO, NCO, SNCO, etc.) and doesn't do it very well. If you 
add another level to this, AFPC will probably do a worse job. Additionally, I have worked in an 
environment where CGOs, NCOs, & SNCOs performed the exact same technical duties, only separated by 
supervisory levels (AFSN at Gunter AFB). The work environment was fine, but I felt underused (EE with 
experience doing a job easily handled by competent NCOs with training). AFPC did not do a good job of 
matching job responsibilities, simply plugging the right rank in a hole. 
 
Comment – While I see the advantage for enlisted with AAD, won't this undermine the already diminished 
sense of rank importance in the AF? Compared to other services the AF already is seen as quite lax in 
customs and courtesies and if a Capt, MSgt, and SrA are doing the same job, this will continue to foster 
that. The other factor is don't most degree holding enlisted folks become officers? 
 
Comment – I see the merits of this study, but are there actually enough enlisted AAD and technical 
backgrounds sufficient to cause this type of change in assignments. Just a guess, but I would say the 
overlapping percentage is less than 5%. On the other hand, if we could develop this capability, jobs 
currently held by CGOs could be converted to enlisted positions permanently. 
 
Case – 94 
Rank – E-9 
Comment – Worst survey I've ever taken. In Section VI, military skills are always grouped with other 
skills. Military skills may not always be necessary in many jobs. In section VII, what are "duties not part of 
a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command?" All duties are inherently one of these. I hope no decisions 
are based on this survey. 
 
Comment – I decided not to waste any more of my time on this. If you improve the survey, I'd be willing to 
try it again. 
 
Comments - I made them in previous sections. 
 
Case – 96 
Rank – Not provided. 
Comment – It is more important what the person is capable of, how they have performed in the past and 
their ability to execute the funcitons of the job than is the rank or status they hold. Good organizations 
search for skills and abilities that have been proven or have a high likelihood of being proven. Weak 
organizations are focused on rank and status. To describe more think about this: I really don't care about 
who the person is, but if they can do it. We should be results oriented. If the right person for the job is 36 
years old because the organization needs experience the brand new person needs to take heed of that. Case 
in point...we don't need a brand new officer straight out of school to beleive he is the answer to everything. 
Often times the NCO and SNCO with 10-20 years of experience should be running the show. This is a 
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civilian viewpoint. I want results. If the person can't lead get out of the way. If they are hampering the 
progress get them out of the way. We don't have the manpower anymore to be trying to work around 
people. Give leaders the chance to lead. Give people with potential the chance to learn, but let them grow in 
an environment where they are told to listen to their experienced professionals. 
 
Case – 97 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – I believe Officers and Enlisted can/should work together. However, there still has to be a chain 
of command and established roles and responsibilities within the Officer and Enlisted force, based on rank 
and/or experience. 
 
Comment – I agree with the concept under "similar duties" however, I don't feel enlisted and officers 
should be doing the same tasks. 
 
Comment – I believe Officers and Enlisted can be closer integrated, but there still needs to be a 
boss/worker relationship at all ranks to maintain dicipline and roles of responsibilities. 
 
Case – 98 
Rank – O-1 
Comment – My previous assignment was as a Cadet at USAFA, and it was only upon leaving that my 
PAFSC was set to 92T0. 
 
Case – 100 
Rank – E-9 
Comment – There are other services where rank is everything. It must be considered in a purple world. 
 
Comment – While my current duties are very management centric, I require a high level of technical 
knowledge. The scale at the end doesn't really capture that I require both a high degree of management 
ability and a high technical competancy. 
 
Case – 104 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – I will gladly take the experience of an NCO as equal to the rank of a CGO if they are both 
committed to the mission. Unfortunately, my recent experience with several E-7s was that they tried to 
minimize work instead of lead the mission. 
 
Case – 107 
Rank – E-9 
Comment – Why only CGO duties? Many SNCOs today are accomplishing duties at the level of Field 
Grade Officers. 
Comment – Qualifications and grade are still tied to each other to a point. Can't have SrA, regardless of 
education, performing a job that should be a Capt or Maj. At the SNCO level we acquire the status to be 
able to fill these positions based on experience and eduction. Part of that status is the practical support from 
our senior leadership. Many SNCOs have AADs but with the exception of developmental positions, we 
shouldn't require these for enlisted positions. There is a military necessity for a rank structure...although I 
agree there should be less of a pay gap between an educated enlisted force and officers, we can't blur the 
lines between officers and enlisted. 
 
Case – 112 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – Rank has traditionally been directly related to perception of ability/capability. Reality is that 
rank is directly related to overall responsibility. The mix of officers/enlisted in similar duties helps increase 
organizational capability by capitalizing on the experience of the enlisted person while maintaining the 
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responsibility inherent in the officer duties. Poor organizational decisions are often made because of the 
(mis)perception of officer capability. 
 
Comment – Similar to before...using the experience of an enlisted person leverages the investment made in 
their training and education while allowing the junior officers an opportunity to gain practical management 
experience without the expectation of technical competency. 
 
Comment – Reward systems will need closer scrutiny as well. Giving an officer an MSM for something the 
enlisted person doing the same job gets an AFCOM or AFAM for will negatively impact motivation. The 
reward should not be rank-dependent, but performance-dependent. Performance reports will also be 
impacted and possibly require modification. 
 
Case – 113 
Rank – E-9 
Comment – I am the CFM for the (SPECIFIC AFSC REMOVED BY AUTHOR).  (SPECIFIC AFSC 
REMOVED BY AUTHOR) people perform similiar duties alongside officers (Maj and below usually) 
without negative impact to the mission. At times, however, the close association of enlisted with junior 
officers has caused some problems with customs and courtesies. Call me at DSN (NUMBER REMOVED 
BY AUTHOR) if you would like to discuss. The (SPECIFIC AFSC REMOVED BY AUTHOR) AFSC 
might be a good case study. 
 
Comments – Integrating folks into positions that are not key leadership positions based on skill rather than 
rank is a good idea. With many positions we already do that; for example a SSgt acting as the unit Resource 
Advisor can tell a Col that a purchase isn't authorized. In this case and with many other positions, the 
authority is inherent with the position, not the rank of the individual sitting in the position. However, I do 
feel that positions like "Superintendent," "NCOIC," "Commander," etc. need to be based on grade. 
 
Case – 114 
Rank – E-7 
Comment –  Some questions were hard to answer. Some situations will need an individual with rank status. 
Others would not, depending on the task. 
 
Comments – Education is great and everyone should pursue it. I don't feel and individual with higher 
education should necessarily be given a higher status job. Performance on the job should definitely be a 
wager. Education will help an individual get promoted, if deserving. 
 
Case – 115 
Rank – E-9 
Comment –  There must be good order and discipline within an organization. It is important to have 
qualified, motivated, and balanced leadership in order to maintain a hierarchy in which all personnel can 
grow into their respective roles and responsibilities. Also, affording personnel the best training and 
experience possible is invaluable to teach or enhance skills required to lead and manage. 
 
Comments – In my opinion, losing many of the field training detachments in the 90s was one of our biggest 
mistakes. I believe our supervisors and trainers would be better served by having detachments at the base 
that serve to provide an education/training environment, away from the duty location, to teach skills and 
knowledge required. Whether this is PME, OJT, or other types of courses is not the question. PME helps to 
teach management skills and leadership responsisbilities. The detachments, training classes, and even 
distance learning, can and should be utilized in order to allow personnel to develop and hone AFSC skills. 
In the question of the enlisted and officer jobs...there are some areas where I think an enlisted leader of 
appropriate grade can perform jobs previously reserved for officer personnel. 
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Case – 120 
Rank – E-8 
Comment –  Having officers and enlisted performing similar duties side-by-side will negatively impact 
mission accomplishment due to people performing like duties but with different pay and privilages. The 
same situation exists when you have military working the same jobs as contractors or government civilians. 
For those jobs that officer and enlisted perform together, the officer positions should be eliminated and 
converted to enlisted positions. 
 
Comments – Again, the issue of compensation for people doing like duties is likely to negatively affect 
morale and mission. How do you explain to the E-6 who is doing the same work as the O-3 and getting less 
compensation that his work is as valued? 
 
Case – 121 
Rank – E-9 
Comment –  My organization currently assigns enlisted and company grade officers, as well as mid-grade 
civilians, to similar duties without too many problems. The unit commander and unit superintendent 
normally ensure military customs & courtesies are observed. 
 
Comment – Officers, enlisted, and civilians with similar training and experience can easily be interchanged 
to accomplish the unit's mission without harm to management of the personnel and the unit. 
 
Comment – Personally, I don't see a need for anyone above E-7 to attend AFIT for an AAD. When this was 
first being explored, I recommended grades E-5 to E-7 be the target group. While E-8s and CMSgts can 
bring significant experience to highly technical tasks, it tends to reinforce the "E-9 vs CMSgt" concept in 
subordinates. It's just my opinion... 
 
Case – 123 
Rank – O-4 
Comment –  Satisfactory performance in the development engineering career field requires an ABET 
accredited engineering degree, with no exceptions. Rather than placing enlisted personnel with ABET 
accredited engineering degrees in company grade officer positions, I recommend encouraging qualified 
enlisted personnel to obtain commissions. This would develop a cadre of junior officers with hands-on 
experience, and improve the pool of technically proficient senior leadership which is currently sadly 
lacking in the Air Force. 
 
Comment – I answered neither agree nor disagree with these questions. One disadvantage that I see with 
this proposal is that if rank is shown to have no impact on a person's job performance, it can be argued that 
those jobs that are interchangeable should probably be filled by qualified civilian personnel. 
 
Comment – This was hard to answer without specifics of the proposal. I think NCOs or SNCOs with 
technical education (especially in computer/comm fields) can and should be used to the limits of their 
abilities. Commanders need flexibility to assign the right person to the job at hand. Also, with the changes 
in the comm/computer career field I suspect that there is a large cadre of NCOs with better technical skills 
than the junior officers assigned to the career field. However, I don't believe there are very many NCOs 
with ABET accredited engineering degrees. 
 
Case – 124 
Rank – O-2 
Comment –  I believe that there should be jobs which are available only to officers and likewise for NCOs. 
There is a reason for requiring an individual to have a degree for particular jobs. Perhaps some jobs could 
be filled by either an officer or an NCO, however, this is situational dependent. Otherwise, why did those 
that came before us design the command structure as it exists today? If an NCO desires a particular position 
that is typically held by an officer, he can always compete for a commission. 
 
  143
Case – 126 
Rank – E-9 
Comment –  While enlisted Airmen can perform many of the duties of CGOs, the rank structure of the 
organization would have to be carefully scrutinized to prevent enlisted Airmen from having OPCON over 
an Officer. In my opinion, experience is much more valuable than rank in most situations, but it is contrary 
to the culture of military organizations. 
 
Case – 128 
Rank – O-3E 
Comment –  In order for an overall shift to lower ranked personnel in certain positions to work, there will 
need to be a paradigm change for everyone. This would be reguired due to our culture where historically 
rank implies experience and knowledge gained over time and circumstances. While rank is obviously not 
the only indicator of potential, it does traditionally imply that the particular person "should" have some 
experience that a lower ranking person would not have that is beneficial to the current position held. 
Overall though, there is no reason why qualified enlisted personnel can not fill many billets currently 
employing company grade officers. 
 
Case – 129 
Rank – O-2 
Comment –  I have been in a squadron where enlisted and officers (SNCOS and FGOS) did the exact same 
job, and it only helped mission accomplishment. The one distinguising characteristic was the officers 
always held positions of squadron leadership as an additional duty, not the enlisted people. However on 
individual projects, it was not uncommon for me as an lieutenant to be under a more experienced SNCO. In 
that situation, there was mutual respect for the SNCO's experience and my rank. I never saw an instance 
where there were any violations of military customs and courtesies. 
 
Case – 130 
Rank – E-9 
Comment –  #9. Giving officers an opportunity supervise, just to fill a square is very bad and creates chaos. 
There are grossly to many officers in the AF today. A ratio of 1 officer to 5 enlisted is detrimental to 
mission accomplishment. 
 
Comment – Having enlisted personnel do the same jobs as officers is fine, as long as they are recognized as 
equals...and an enlisted should be able to supervise officers with less qualifications/TIS. 
 
Case – 131 
Rank – E-9 
Comment –  Ability to get the job done, not rank are the keys to getting in the work center. Having too 
many levels in your chain of command slows down the job and adds to burocracy. Having a leader is key, 
rank should be tied to the position not the person. If a junior menber is the best person to fill a senior job 
give them the appropriate grademake him a 0-5 for that assignment. Rank should be based on ability and 
performance not privlige and paying of dues or filling career squares. Hire those best qualified and give 
them the status (rank) to do the job. 
 
Comment – Looking at this from a strictly business perspective it is easy to justify the interoperability of 
O's and E's. Once this is done we could say it's cheaper to replace all O's with E's. Problem is that we need 
O's and key to their development is holding the same positions these individuals with advanced degrees 
would hold. My feel that if it's technical it should be an E because they are specialists and can remain in 
this field indefinately. If it's broad militys knowledge and leadership...application of the technolgy it should 
be an O. 
 
Comment – Hope my inputs were helpful. Their is a fine line that must be maintained between O's and E's 
or good order and discipline will be impacted. Having a requirement for and advanced degree to hold an 
enlisted job is nothing new... look at our AF band, most have advanced degrees in music. What we need to 
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do is develop a similar program for these advanced degree types at positions were they are critical to the 
mission of the AF. These members would have to be looked at differently for promotion (like the band). Be 
careful though a potential side effect would be loss of E-8 and E-9 leadership positions due to 
congressional caps on these positions from your key enlisted leadership positions for these super techs. 
 
Case – 134 
Rank – E-7 
Comment –  I work with a officer and we do exactly the same job. I supervise more personnel than the 
officer. I have greater knowledge and wider breadth of experience. I have 3 associate degrees and will 
finish my BS this year. I am paid less for knowing more, having more responsibility, with less authority. 
Let the enlisted perform the jobs they are able to perform. Do not have Os and Es doing the exact same job 
but pauing one more based on a rank as opposed to the knowledge! 
 
Case – 138 
Rank – E-7 
Comment –   As the enlisted forces becomes more and more educated, it is logical that enlisted and officer 
personnel with the same knowledge and education level will work side by side in the future. 
 
Case – 140 
Rank – E-8 
Comment –  Qualifications and experience are a better indicator of success than rank. there are many times 
within an AF organization when you get an officer who has never suoervised anyone who now has to lead 
the team. Invariabley there is a huge learning curve in understanding team dynamics and providing 
appropriate leadership and guidance. I have seen many times where an NCO might do the job better simply 
because they've been in a supervisory position before. 
 
Comment – This concept would more than likely give some enlisted airmen more of a reason to strive for 
higher education. Knowing that an advanced degree could open more job opportunities migh entice them 
further. 
 
Case – 142 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – Enlisted pay should match that of an officers pay if performing the same duty position. 
 
Case – 146 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – CGOs are in leadership positions based simply on their rank; positions they are not qualified 
for. Eliminating rank as a qualifier to some duties will enhance our ability to execute the mission and may 
help reduce non-essential coordination. 
 
Case – 148 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – Certain positions require a rank that some may just not take serious! 
 
Comment – Not sure what this survey is looking for. As a SNCO I feel that certain positions require certain 
rank unless you break that mold. I can relate this to First Sergeant duties, unless you actually wear the 
diamond you are looked at differently. I feel that Officers and Enlisted may not be able to change the 
perception when it comes to rank/education/experience! I'm not sure if placing an enlisted person in a 
position that needs strong backing or CGO status in a a specific position would benefit the Air Force! You 
would have to change the entire thought process that is embedded into troops since day 1.  
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Case – 154 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – I think a lot depends on the specific job that is being performed. Some jobs that interact with 
the various services are better served by personnel of rank. 
 
Case – 157 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – Specific duty positions should be identifed for staffing by either officer or enlisted personnel. 
Mixing officer and enlisted grades in the same duty position or specialty will instill confusion and a 
negative morale associated with the enlisted not being paid the same rate for doing the same job as the 
officers. From the officer perspective, I suspect it would be negative as well from the perception of their 
actual place in the chain since they are obviously filling positions capable of being performed by lower 
grades. 
 
Comment – If a duty is capable of being performed by enlisted personnel, why would you want to pay an 
offier do perform that duty? In some cases, enlisted personnel are much more qualified for a specific 
position than the officer currently billeted there. Example: Comm. Sq Chief of Maint. is currently an officer 
from a Lt to a Major depending on the size of the squadron. However, frequently the Maint. 
Superintendant, A SMgt or CMSgt, is actually running the section and is more experienced and capable 
than the officer assigned. 
 
Case – 160 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – You have questions that have one part that contradicts the other part. I can't answer them since 
I agree with one part but not the other. 
 
Comment – I think you should let people know that this takes longer then stated, track time to take the 
survey. 
 
Case – 172 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – I have always held that we place too much importance on rank/status compared to who actually 
possesses the skill sets necessary to effectively accomplish a task/mission. I have placed junior ranking 
people in positions traditionally held by higher ranking persons because the higher ranking person relied 
solely on rank/status and the junior person possessed and demonstrated the skills necessary to accomplish 
the job with vigor. I DO NOT believe in nor subscribe to the "Peter Principle" and oppose anyone that fills 
a position just because they have the correct rank/status. Additionally, I believe we can do more to enhance 
skill level progression. We must eliminate relying strictly on CDCs, courses, or tests to award a particular 
skill level, we should base the skill level award on a combination of book/test learning and actual 
performance. Having the information is one thing; however, consistently employing/applying the 
information tells me more regarding a person's professional/personal growth. 
 
Comment – We must honor the rank and file to ensure discipline; however, I have personally witnessed this 
work in my career field when the shift commander program was reduced and SNCOs assumed the duties. 
Additionally, I instructed PME and performed 1st Sgt duties for 5 years. During my PME tenure, I 
witnessed CMSgts and SMSgts handle issues as compentently, if not more so, as Major or Lt Colonel unit 
commanders. 
 
Comment – Based on my experiences, I personally feel that a person's demonstrated leadership abilities is 
most important. I do, however, understand that a person must continously study and prepare themselves to 
encounter a myriad of situations or circumstances. Focusing solely on a person's AFS doesn't adequately 
prepare them for some issues, so the ancillary education/experience is indispensable when filling the 
positions this survey covers. 
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Case – 174 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – Many enlisted personnel have college degrees, professional licenses, and have completed 
specialized certification training in both technical fields and management. An officer without these 
credentials is actually LESS qualified than an NCO or Airmam who has them, but will be assigned based 
solely on their status as an officer. 
 
Comment – I am glad to see that the Air Force is looking in to this concept. I actually did a paper on this 
subject at the SNCOA.   
 
Case – 175 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – Moving previously Officer positions to enlisted would be no problem. Having both O's and E's 
do the same tasks at the same time in the same workcenter would pose a problem. One gets paid 
significantly more and has a different level of respect/responsibilities. Pick one or the other and press on. 
 
Comment – Again, pick one or the other, but enlisted could take on significantly more responsibilities. 
 
Case – 179 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – If an enlisted person is qualified to do a job and the criteria listed here in regards to chain of 
command etc is followed, the enlisted person should be considered and put in the job as appropriate. This 
frees up officers to do what they were brought in the service to do. 
 
Comment – It is a misuse of resources to put only an officer in a job that an enlisted person could do as 
well. An example would be that only officers fly UAVs. Enlisted personnel have shown over the years that 
they can do this type of work. Look at the drones flown in the Vietnam war. They were flown by enlisted. 
There are several jobs as described in this survey that can be done by both enlisted or officers. Education 
and/or experience counts more than rank in many non technical jobs and should be used as the criteria for 
filling these jobs. 
 
Case – 185 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – 1) In the military of today, we will fight jointly, we will deploy jointly. Any process that puts 
Air Force NCOs in a traditional officer positions may present challenges for the Air Force NCO. 2) There 
is no doubt in my mind a good NCO can be as good of a leader as a CGO. 3) Many of our SNCOs are 
leading flights that many Field Grade Officers can not even imagine. I am the Superintendent of a flight of 
over 220 personnel from five different AFSCs. The leadership of a good SNCO is difficult to find in many 
officers under the rank of Lt Col. 
 
Comment – I believe in order to effectively utilize NCOs and SNCOs in a joint, strategice environment, 
better training will have to be provided to the enlisted corps. Our PME does not include enough of the big 
picture campaign strategies. 
 
Case – 188 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – Rank is very important in a military org. However, I believe with the enhanced educated 
enlisted force, many jobs currently perfromed by officers can be performed by enlisted personnel. 
 
Comment – I do not think it would be a wise investment of tax payer dollars if you were having officers do 
the exact same job as enlisted. Many officer billets today could be easily converted to enlisted billets. 
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Case – 189 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – I believe that sometime in the future we will eventually get away from the ranks of enlisted and 
officer and have a blend of both based on ability and experience. 
 
Comment – Now that I see where your survey is going, please read my previous comment. 
 
Case – 198 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – I can't think of a reason not to put senior enlisted personnel together with junior officers 
performing the same tasks they are qualified to do. I think it will give the junior officer an excellent 
perspecive on the enlisted force that he may not otherwise be exposed to. It will also open up some areas 
that are currently closed to enlisted personnel for which there is no other reason than it must be fileed by an 
officer. If one is qualified to do the job then he/she should be able to compete/interview for it. 
 
Comment – Good luck completing your degree. I am glad the previous Secretary has offered qualified 
enlisted the opportunity to get their Master's at AFIT. It will only make our senior enlisted force more 
capable and capable. 
 
Case – 201 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – Too many questions asking too close to the same thing. 
 
Case – 202 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – When given a chioce between someone with rank or experience, I choose experience first. On a 
note, while it is good to use the experience where you can, some positions used by junior officers are 
stepping stones to learn the trade before moving into a position of authority. It would be good to have that 
experienced enlisted person, but at the same time we may take away that educational tool we are using to 
train our officers. 
 
Comment – see comments from last section 
 
Case – 204 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – I feel what our AF is missing is a bigger focus on the value of active mentorship and 
supervision. It has been my experience that the troops that get mentored and supervised appropriately have 
a much greater chance at having a highly successful career. 
 
Case – 208 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – There is more to our organization as a military as compared to civilian corporations. Our rank 
structure is critical to our mission accomplishments through being able to order subordinates to accomplish 
difficult tasks without asking questiohns. Delays in decision making over authority could cost mission 
accomplishment and ultimately...lives. 
 
Comment – I do agree that some enlisted members with advanced degrees can benefit the USAF as a 
whole, but rank is of greater importance clearly identifying who is in charge and RESPONSIBLE for 
actions. As an educated enlisted member, I often work for officers who may not have expertise in a 
particular area and I give the best advice backed up by rational thought processes, but then they must make 
the decision as the ranking member. If you give enlisted members authority over officers, who is in charge? 
Who has responsibility? The sergeant had it the last project, but this time the captain? Too much change, 
too much room for confusion and error will jeopardize the mission. 
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Case – 212 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – I believe SNCOs are taking on more mgmt roles now and are some times not given the 
authority to make decisions in those positions because officer's are in charge. Being an officer doesn't have 
to mean you are automatically put in charge of a workcenter. Just as enlisted folks must prove they have the 
competence and ability to lead a workcenter, I believe officer's should be required to do the same. The Air 
Force does its junior officer's a great injustice by putting them in charge of workcenters they know nothing 
about and in essence drowning out the SNCOs in the workcenters. We seem to be the only branch of 
service that doesn't give the proper respect to our SNCOs or the proper level of authority. Look at the way 
the Navy treats its E-7s through E-9s and you will see a huge diffence. Training is vital to our continued 
success a the world's greatest Air Force. We must devote more dollars to ensuring our folks are well 
trained. You can't expect an email technician to perform like a Microsoft Certified Technician when servers 
go down if they haven't received that level of training. We put undo pressure on our Airmen to do things we 
are willing to spend the money to train them to do. 
 
Case – 217 
Rank – O-3E 
Comment – It seems that there are already many positions that CGOs and NCOs share; especially in the log 
planning area. One base may have a CGO planner and another base may have a SSgt or TSgt doing the 
same job/tasks. 
 
Case – 218 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – My observation over 15 years is that I have had enlisted members who could perform duties 
well above their pay grades and officers who could perform only to the level expected of airman. In some 
cases, rank may matter in a political/command sense, but in most cases it is the individual member who is 
either up to the task or not. Rank should not be a factor if a person proves they can perform. If the right 
individual is empowered to perform a task her/his rank will not matter, they will succeed. If we did more as 
a service to mentor, develop and empower our junior personnel in their first 4 years of service this may 
have reduced attrition and improved individual performance at the unit level. Thank you for the opportunity 
to respond via this survey and share my opinion/s. 
 
Comment – The largest hurdle will be cultural/social. Especially considering that most field/company grade 
officers have a hard time acceting that many enlisted have attained degrees equal to or greater than those 
they have. 
 
Case – 219 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – This is a very good surey and I hope there are many Enlisted and Officers from all levels 
taking it. Having midgrade officer and enlisted personnel crossing some traditional boundries, such as 
supervision and management, can only make the Air Force a better orginization. I am very proud of the 
enlisted personnel doing very well at AFIT. 
 
Case – 220 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – Rank, Knowledge and training should all be on the same accord to accomplish the mission and 
continue effective management. The ranks structure should play a part in maintaining discipline /the AF 
culture, but they should be harmonious,but Enlisted adn Officer sould all work on a level to accomplish this 
mission 
 
Case – 221 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – I believe senior enlisted members can do the same job with the same responsibility and 
urgency as officers. It will also save the AF a ton of money. 
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Case – 222 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – I believe that the organization would benefit in general and it would also contribute to the 
growth of the enlisted personnel also. 
 
Comment – As long as each person is professional and maintain military bearing I believe the concept will 
work. It gives officers the oppurtunity to learn how to right performance reports, and it helps enlisted 
personnel share some of their knowledge with the officers. This concept enables enlisted people to 
experience certain positions earlier in their career. This helps in the long run when they become SNCO's. I 
believe that it will create a stronger Air Force. 
 
Comment – Thank you for giving me the opportunity to participate in this survey. 
 
Case – 223 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – We are loosing alot of valuable mid level personal. Our young Lts sould be more involed in 
training, supervising, and working along side our folks. Not sitting back whatching. 
 
Comment – I would rather have a SSgt that knows what he doing in a position then a Capt that doesnt. 
 
Comment – The bottom line is today we are being asked to do more with less. We can not forget, We can 
not perform our mission without a strong mid level expereince pool of people. As soon as We lose our 
experence the mission will suffer. 
 
Case – 225 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – Rank is important, but does not over turn common since and specific knowledge. A persons 
ability to lead does not always come from rank, but with experience and the ability to see how to fix 
whats wrong. 
 
Case – 230 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – Rank is vital to Chain of Command and ability to control programs. 
 
Case – 243 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – Integrating enlisted and officer into similar postions will not strengthen the unit. It will cause 
problema and miscommunication in the chain of command. Who will be seen to be in charge, the officer as 
they should be or the enlisted who is under the officer? 
 
Case – 250 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – MSgt's and above should be afforded to go to AFIT programs to complete advanced degrees 
related to their speciality 
 
Comment – Currently doing this with deployments. Just because someone has a degree does not guarantee 
they have the knowledge or experience. 
 
Comment – Do not under estimate the value of your troops, many have more advanced degrees and 
experience in certain areas they you may have. Focus on each individuals strengths and assist in improving 
those weaks areas through education and training. Always remember the motto "TEAM" ...together 
everyone achives more. 
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Case – 252 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – The only thign I can see happening is resentment among junior officers in the same position as 
NCO's. Also, the reverse may happen as Jr Officers will be earning more money for the same job. I feel that 
a minimum of a NCO would be needed to fill a jr officer position 
 
Case – 266 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – Many, many times CGO's and NCO/SNCO's are essentially doing the same job/functions with 
equal responsibilities. Are my duties and responsibilities often greater than a CGO, YES. Do they (CGO's) 
rate higher on the food chain and pay scale than I do, YES. As a NCO/SNCO I might take offense to a 
CGO performing the same duties and responsibilities as I do in the same office/unit, while receiving a 
vastly different pay scale. While, I don't perceive it as related to your survey, I do feel strongly that this 
type of disparity could be eliminated by the warrant officer program. Practical experience in different 
positions in my AFS is truly KEY, over education and or rank/status. 
 
Case – 273 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – While I don't believe that having a four year degree in liberal arts makes a CGO more capable 
of performing tasks described in this section, the blurring of the lines suggested here has the potential to 
open a sizeable can of worms in respect to fraternization and possible abuse of rank. I am more apt to agree 
with the suggestion of filling critical slots within the enlisted force with little regard to rank, or within the 
officer corps without regard to rank. I am leary of assigning similar tasks within an orginization to officers 
and enlisted personnel. 
 
Case – 274 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – This is a hard subject to discuss, mostly because we respect officers because they have been 
appointed over us. They are officers because they had a degree before they came in, where as most enlisted 
personnel earn it while on active duty. For those of us (enlisted) that have a degree, it seems the system is 
outdated. We are not respected for the amount of experience that we have, most officers seem suprised 
when you tell them you have a degree. I'm afraid for some people, whether officer on enlisted, they may 
not be able to work side by side in the same position because of the rank issue. The people will be doing the 
same job, but because of rank they will be making a lot less. I'm afraid depending on the person it may 
cause decrease in respect for the chain of command and rank itself. 
 
Comment – I feel that if we ignore rank, putting the best experienced/educated person into a job is what is 
best for the Air Force. I firmly believe this is a great way for the Air Force to continue challenging its 
Airmen to be the best. I believe in rank, but if you have 3 people of the same rank just diffrent pin on dates, 
and one person would do a better job at managing a department, then we need to be putting the best 
qualified person into that job, not strictly concentrating on rank and who outranks who. 
 
Comment – I like the ideas behind this survey. We truely have some well educated/experienced enlisted 
airman out there, that are only being held back by rank. The government is paying for our educations, lets 
make use of that education before we retire or separate.   
 
Case – 278 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – The biggest problem I see today is POLITICS. People need to stop worrying about whose butt 
to kiss and press on with their jobs. Too many officers feel the need to "flex up" on enlisted people just 
because they have an MS in Basket Weaving. The NCOs have always been and always WILL BE the 
backbone of the Air Force, yet it is ironic we are the ones that get dumped on the most. We make sound 
decisions...it is our job. Don't overrule us just because you have a piece of metal on your lapel. The same 
goes for NCOs trying to kiss their way to a step promotion as well. These are a few of the reasons I will not 
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even consider doing 1 day more than 20 years. Too many headaches are induced from underachievers 
stepping on their bread and butter to move up, even though they do not possess the knowledge or skill to do 
so. 
 
Comment – Until you get the bull-headedness out of the officer corps, this concept will never reach 
optimization. The officer corps weilds a wealth of power and prestige with so few checks and balances. It is 
Officer vs Enlisted; rarely have I seen an officer OVERTURN the decisions of another officer when it 
comes to enlisted matters. To many enlisted, officers are seen as untouchable and unable to be challenged 
unless you get lucky and the person has an open mind (few and far between). I have lives and equipment I 
am responsible for and I take great pride in what I accomplish; BUT the hammer falls HARD on us while 
there is no "apparent" recourse to the officers for bad decisions that cost time and money. 
 
Comment – Politics belong in WASHINGTON, D.C.!!!!! There has been a huge transition to political 
agendas within organizations over the past several years. IT DOES NOT BELONG IN A FUNCTIONAL, 
QUALITY ORGANIZATION. We have Air Force beat into our heads in Basic. Try BEATING OUT the 
politics for a change. Of course, there are always those that enjoy having their butt kissed; I don't feel they 
should be a part of this Team since they are as much a part of the problem. I have a few years left until 
retirement, and I WILL NOT LOOK BACK. "You need people like me on that wall" and it is people like 
me that keep the Air Force on target every day. I do it for my country, not for the political A**HOLES I 
work for. 
 
Case – 279 
Rank – E-9 
Comment – While I can see some value-added in limited situations, I would proceed with extreme caution 
and sensitivity. I can agree to some situational applications, but I'm strongly opposed to this becoming any 
sort of norm. Rank, in our AF culture, is rightfully important to how we do business. 
 
Comment – Rank is NOT everything... what this survey does not capture is the degree of flexibility in 
question. Swapping a SSgt and TSgt in a one-deep technical position is no problem... nor, in some cases, is 
putting a Lt in that same job. However, putting a SSgt in a MSgt slot may cause confusion and weaken the 
rank structure -- a structure still of import to the Air Force. If taking rank totally out of the equation is part 
of transformation, then we're forgetting that we are military. If we're just talking about a limited amount of 
flexibility and getting out of the old GO/NO GO mentality, then I'm all for it. 
 
Comment – I appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback on such an important issue. 
 
Case – 282 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – As I read this survey, I see an attempt to organize Air Force unit-based leadership principles 
more in line with current Army squad-based ops. I see this as a good thing. In my opinion, the US Army 
has a better grasp on unit-based leadership principles and training (with Lts and Capts working alongside 
NCOs to accomplish the mission and learn from each other), while the USAF has a better grasp on formal 
and technical training. If we learn from each other, we both become better. 
 
Case – 284 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – Rank should never dictate position when training in involved, only expierance. If an E-4 is 
qualified to fill the position, then so be it. Rank should only dictate position when absolutely necessary 
 
Case – 288 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – I agree that officers and enlisted can be trained to do the same job and that it will not affect the 
strategy or chain of command. However, I would be afraid it would affect morale. If the enlisted person is 
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better at his job and ends up receiving more job responsibility than the officer, it could hurt morale that he 
is not receiving the same pay as the inferior officer. 
 
Case – 290 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – Having junior officers and NCOs in the same duty position would not be a wise decision in my 
career field. It is the NCOs responsibility to help mold the young officer into tomorrow's leader. To put the 
officer on the same level as the NCO, without the same training and experience as the NCO, would be 
detrimental to morale, the mission and the officers development. Part of the problem with having junior 
officers working in the same duty position as NCOs, is maturity. Speaking from experience, I have had a 
junior office attempt to "pull rank" and order me to accomplish a task his way, even though the situation 
clearly needed to be handled in a different manner. Not to say every officer acts in this manner or that 
education is not a qualifier to work in the same position, but there is a significant difference between "Book 
Smarts" and "Street Smarts." 
 
Case – 292 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – I appreciate the intent of this project, I believe the SPO's do a good job of mixing experienced 
maintainer's and career track acquisition/logistic'c officers. More enlisted manager billets from maint 
AFSC's would be beneficial in my opinion 
 
Case – 293 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – Officers working with enlisted???? Hmmmmm It is possible and could work, but implentation 
might be tricky, rank structure is hard wired into us from Basic Training, people that have been in the Air 
Force any number of years will always fear change and might not take kindly to this idea, but the new 
comers who don't know or are still moldable would be the best place to start with something like this. I 
know Officers are suppose to be leaders, but having them get some dirt on their hands would make them 
better leaders, such as the case with prior enlisted officers, they seem to have a clue and are now in a 
position to change things for the better. Yes this idea might put some NCO's out of management positions 
at the section level or on the other hand could put more workers with experience and initative on the section 
floor. As with anything give it a try and see what happens. 
 
Case – 297 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – There are many experienced enlisted personnel who would do a better job than an 
inexperienced officer! Qualifications rather than rank should be the decisive factor!!! 
 
 
Case – 301 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – In this section, many questions were asked about rank...officers vs. enlisted. I can tell you that 
many of the jobs and duties that were once officer-specific are now accomplished by Airmen and NCOs. 
It's already the reality. Rank means less now than it ever has in my 19-year career. Skill-sets and 
competence cannot be measured by rank alone. 
 
Comment – Ability and attitude is respected over rank. 
 
Case – 305 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – Mentorship from SNCO's to Jr CGO's is vital process in the growth of our future leaders in the 
officer corp. Our future leaders of the Air Force must gain a firm understanding of the enlisted corp at a 
early time in their career. 
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Comment – Education level of the enlisted should not be primary factor for this section (Interchangeable 
Rank Concept), qualifications and leadership abilities should be the forefront considerations.   
 
Case – 310 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – These questions were a little hard to answer as I could come up with many situations where it 
would not matter what rank a member held to get the job done as long as they did not supervise but there 
were many other situations where individuals who did not supervise (no chain of command) but required 
rank for respect/authority when dealing with individuals outside the particular office/job. 
 
Comment – Interchanging enlisted and officers at the mid-level with no direct chain of command is a good 
concept but if I am performing the same duties as an officer why not pay me the same? It might help for 
future promotions but if someone walks through the door and performs the sames duties and has a higher 
salary than me it would definately lower my morale. 
 
Case – 311 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – Experience is the single most important factor when considering the overall effectiveness of a 
unit. 
 
Case – 314 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – The Air Force should have the rank of Warrant Officer for those interchangeable positions like 
the other branches of service. 
 
Comment – Warrant Officer positions! 
 
Case – 316 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – It is extremely difficult to seperate rank within the structure of the enlisted/officer structures. 
People look for guidance, training and supervisory responsibilities (taking care of their people) from those 
higher in rank and experience. Time in Grade does not have a lot to do with experience. Experience is 
gained through structured training formats, schools, practice scenarios and evaluated scenarios. We do a job 
most people do not want to do. Training our team chiefs and subordinates are paramount to our survival 
and mission accomplishment. Standardized training sites offer the same training over and over to create a 
baseline knowledge level. Civilian or other military courses offer a variety to expand the knowledge base 
and decision making ability of our team members. Civilian course have the ability to change to meet and 
design scenarios quickly and do not have the limitations AETC puts on the training courses it manages. By 
removing the supervisor responsibilities of leadership, management and day to day supervision, the training 
value of interaction and demonstration are lost. The supervisor determines the minimum acceptable levels 
of training to meet the needs of the organization and mission. 
 
Comment – Rank is important when dealing in a joint service environment. The services train different and 
have different rules and regulations and certifications. 
 
Comment – I am in a one deep postion, so leadership and magement are almost the same. I have a 
supervisor but my workload is determined by our priorities. If I was at flight level, I would be the 
superintendent of my last flight. There I would be in mostly a management mode vs technical. Priority is 
given to training and providing the assets to train with. Training and education go hand in hand as long as 
they complement each other. Training in an AFS to know your job and perform the best you can is the 
primary function of a person arriving at a new duty station. Once on station and qualified, you hone those 
skills to be better than you were. Training is a life long joyful battle but get's put aside to easily for 
convenience. 
 
  154
Case – 317 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – The majority of Highly Qualified Enlisted have Duty time that would be higher than officers. 
 
Case – 318 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – While there are many jobs where SNCOs would be more than capable of performing instead of 
an officer I don't believe it should be "optional". Either have it an enlisted or an officer position. One or the 
other. Not either or. I think making it an option would undermine the military structure. As a footnote, in 
my opinion everyone should have to serve as an enlisted member prior to becoming an officer. How can 
someone lead if they don't know how to follow? 
 
Comment – I see the benifits, but I think interchanging enlisted with officers would degrade the officers 
corp status overall. Yes, maybe we have highly qualified enlisted members and maybe it's their outstanding 
abilities that would make this work, but most are only going to see it as why was an officer there in the first 
place. Once an NCO is put into a position, there will probably never be another officer put there. Just look 
at the Commandant of the SNCOA position. It used to be an O-6, now it's an E-9. Do you think any officer 
will ever run the SNCOA again? Much less an O-6? 
 
Comment – I agree with your hypothesis in that it is a good idea to put the most qualified person in a 
position rather than basing it on rank. However, I don't believe this would be good for our organizational 
structure for the reasons I have already given. 
 
Case – 322 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – The use of SNCO's in jobs that were traditionally Officer positions has become common place. 
There has been no negative trends by doing this. The only drawback is the rift it places between the two 
paths(O vs. E). The work has been transferred but the rspect, pay, and recognition has not come with it. 
 
Comment – We have placed a high emphasis on formal education. It is the dividing line separating O from 
E. Far to much weight is given to a 4yr degree over experience. In addition, with the AF push for formal 
education the Enl Corps now has the equivalent education level and the extensive knowledge base and still 
are treated as the less valuble asset. 
 
Case – 325 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – I think having an NCO with the same job as an officer would cause conflict and could be-little 
the officer to others. I think having a responsible NCO for an officer to learn from is a great idea, like an 
LT learning from a Chief. 
 
Comment – I am a firm believer that rank does not matter when it comes to technical experience. There are 
many Airmen that can outperform NCO's. Unfortunately, sometimes NCO's also lack management 
experience. As far as officers, I think they need an enlisted "mentor" when they first come into the military 
for guidance. 
 
Case – 327 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – The air force is not a corporation. It is a military entity. Corporations don't have managers 
making life and death decisions about subordinates. The Air Force does! 
 
Case – 328 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – Your AFS is just a part of the required duties. PME, Fitness, mentoring make us a more lethal 
force. My belief is the offcer corps should be developing leadership with an eye towards combat operations 
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from the start. They should also be bringing (with their degree) an advanced knowledge on something the 
AF needs.  
 
Case – 330 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – Thousands of years of military experience have proven that rank is important to our military 
cultural. Your questions insinuate rank in not important and that company grade officers and senior NCOs 
should be interchangable. I wholeheartedly disagree. 
 
Comment – We are not a corporation. The military has a unique culture based on thousands of years of 
tradition and experience. Rank is a large part of that tradition and experience. This survey seemed to be 
pushing for an interchangable CGO and Senior NCO corps. I think that is a huge mistake. When you 
diminish rank in favor of all else, you will destroy the military as we know it. Here's a better idea. Better 
define the roles of NCOs and officers and then promote the right people to fill those roles. 
 
Case – 331 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – Job placement should not be based solely on any one attribute, rather a well rounded 
combination of them. Officers - especially junior grade - should be placed with SNCOs to benifit from the 
SNCO's experience. 
 
Comment – The gap that we are trying to fill with this concept is the exact reason that the Air Force should 
have Warrant Officers. 
 
Case – 332 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – I'm currently assigned as a Project Officer (RESPONDENT’S SPECIFIC DUTY LOCATION 
REMOVED BY AUTHOR) as an TSGT. I have the same job duties and responsibilities as four Lt. Cols 
assigned to the (RESPONDENT’S SPECIFIC DUTY LOCATION REMOVED BY AUTHOR). I was 
hired based upon my previous job experience and knowledge of my career field not the rank I hold. This is 
a commom practice through all the battlelabs.  
 
Comment - Take a look at the Battlelabs, these are units that have enlisted performing same type of 
management positions as CGO's and higher. They may be useful to your research. 
 
Case – 334 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – A trained SNCO could perform duties currently requiring a CGO. Positions that require 
coordination/meetings with other Service or joint organizations may require a similar rank structure to 
enable AF positions to carry required weight. 
 
Comment – I would say MSgt is a good starting point for considering replacing duties currently held by a 
CGO. As to advance degrees, need to look at what they are and where they are from. Some routes to 
degrees in the enlisted force may not provide the broad level and rigor of education required in some CGO 
positions. 
 
Case – 334 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – I am a dentist and do not believe the answers I provided would benifit your survey. 
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Case – 338 
Rank – O-3 
Comment – Where education is the mission, I believe "mixing" ranks would not adversely affect the 
organization. However, in other mission environments, this mixing may breed an insensitivity to the rank 
structure that is so vital to our military environment 
 
Case – 340 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – Putting enlisted and officers in same/similar duties would in my opinion create a 
concern/problem for the enlisted members they should get "equal pay for equal work." Imagine getting this 
Congressional Inquiry: "Hey, I'm a MSgt and I'm doing the same thing Capt X is. Why am I paid so much 
less than he is? It's just not fair!" 
 
Case – 347 
Rank – O-5 
Comment – A good example of enlisted and officer's working together and in some cases working similar 
tasks is the Aircraft Battle Damage Repair effort. CLSS enlisted and engineering officers work very well 
together and form cohesive teams. 
 
Case – 349 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – I missed in the email or on the first page...how much time in minutes this survey might take. 
Suggest it get included somewhere (or highlight it if I missed it) Will help person to make better decision as 
to when to take/finish the survey. 
 
Case – 345 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – Officers and enlisted personnel essentially perform different functions and are not really 
interchangeable. 
 
Case – 355 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – Employing officers and enlisted in the same duties will lead to resentment by both. If nothing 
else the pay disparity will come into play on the enlisted side. On the officer side you will have prestige 
issues. 
 
Comment – If engaged in the exact same position the officer will have an advantage when dealing with any 
outside agency as they will leverage their rank to get better results for their efforts. 
 
Case – 357 
Rank – O-6  
Comment – Your survey questions became increasingly unclear with the double negative questions. At that 
point I stopped answering your questions. 
 
Case – 361 
Rank – E-7  
Comment – I believe there are many positions that CGO hold that could easily and possibly be run more 
efficiently by SNCOs. The other services have Warrant Officers to fill these positions--we should bring 
back warrant officers in the AF and then we could utilize the SNCOs and CGOs where appropriate without 
affecting AF culture or traditons. 
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Case – 364 
Rank – O-6  
Comment – I don't think you can have it both ways as number 10 and 11 above state. There is a difference 
in status, expectations, leadership, and pay/benefits that would seem idealistic to have enlisted and CGOs 
performing the same duties and not affecting that relationship. Further, education does make a difference 
and formal college education is recognized as one component of entry into the officer corps. I am aware 
some enlisted have college degrees but have opted to remain enlisted. That being said, the duties a person is 
assigned should be commensurate with rank. 
 
Comment – I don't agree with your premise that enlisted and CGOs performing the same duties leverages 
personnel transformation. Enlisted with AADs are generally have more enlisted rank and as such shouldn't 
be engaged in CGO activities but leading the enlisted corps. In addition, the AADs pursued by enlisted 
members should fit their assigned duty code. If they are gained the academic qualifications to be CGOs, 
then they should be CGOs. I don't think it is appropriate to expect enlisted to hold AADs to perform their 
duties except as senior NCOs and then they should be leading the enlisted ranks -- their job isn't to be doing 
the CGO job -- they have plenty to do in their own job. 
 
Case – 365 
Rank – E-6  
Comment – I believe now that SSgt is a guarantee in 5 years or less was a mistake and puts the burden on 
TSgts and above. SSgt is like a SrA, (just five years and you have it and not earned anymore). Rank is 
important when choosing a person for a job or task but also experience is a big factor 
 
Comment – As I stated before. I believe now that SSgt is a guarantee in 5 years or less was a mistake and 
puts the burden on TSgts and above. SSgt is like a SrA, (just five years and you have it and not earned 
anymore). Rank is important when choosing a person for a job or task but also experience is a big factor 
 
Case – 366 
Rank – O-6  
Comment – The military is built on hierarchy and the benefits from apportioning responsibility to those at 
top. Although many (most?) of AF enlisted are obviously capable of performing in equivalent jobs, it is not 
desireable to charge them with the responsibility but not the pay or rank to go with that equivalent to officer 
job. The mid-grade officer loses and the enlisted loses. Who would want to underpay enlisted and denigrate 
the officers? This does nto make sense. 
 
Case – 368 
Rank – E-7  
Comment – I am currently in an enlisted flying position, working in the wing safety office. I work with and 
for officers and at the same time, maintain a professional relationship and adhere to the chain of command. 
I perform the same level of work in the safety office as my Major and Captain counterparts. I think SNCOs 
could fill their positions with the same quality of work being produced. 
 
Case – 376 
Rank – E-9  
Comment – Why even have officers and enlisted... 
 
Comment – Personally, I think we have a great system today..I'm open to change, but caution mixing Os 
and Es with the same level of responsibilities... Os in my oppinion are in the right place today, providing 
leadership for the Org...Es are in the right place provding recommendations/suggestion and following the 
orders of the Os (commanders), but providing leadership at the same time. What's broke? 
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Case – 378 
Rank – O-5  
Comment – We should stick tot he time t4ested tradition that SNCO's teach the trade to CGOs. The CGO 
needs to be the Flight Leader and the NCO needs to be the SNCOIC. THis has worked well in the past and 
should continue to be practiced in the future. TO do away with this structure would lend to blending the 
realtionships amongst the officer and enlisted corps and that could ruin discipline. Pay issues for doing the 
same job etc....officers get paid more beacuse of the leadership role assigned to them. 
 
Comment – We must maintain the chain of command and have the CMSgt in an organziation work for the 
2LT. WIthout this basic precept (everyone knows the Chief is the resident expert) but we must maintain 
that the Jumior Officer is "in Charge" and held responsible for the mission of that unit. 
 
Comment – Thanks for asking...I am a bit confused by this survey. I came in the AF in 1979 as an enlisted 
troop. I was comissioned in 1984 through the ROTC program. The AF must maintain it's traditions as a 
chain of command discipline oriented outfit. We cannot afford to adopt this "hug them and love them" 
attitude where nobody knows who's in charge for the final answer. Training of junior officers by a 
dedicated SNCO corps is what makes us the world's best Air Force. I do not think I like this mixing of 
responsibilities talk in this survey. The Chief's job is to make sure the LT gets trained in the tricks of the 
trade and make sure the mission gets done. The LT's job is to pay attention to the Chief and learn and begin 
to make decisions and learn how those decisions affect mission accomplishment. Sorry I am a lousy speller; 
forgive me if I misspelled a few words. 
 
Case – 379 
Rank – O-6  
Comment – A small correction: As Section VI involves comparisons of two choices, the instruction should 
read "select the one you believe is MORE important", not "most important." 
 
Case – 382 
Rank – E-6  
Comment – The Air Force should employ enlisted and CGO's personnel in similar duties, it would 
definitely save DoD some $$. Fraternization could be an issue for some personnel. Warrant officers could 
solve many manning issues that are apparent in todays AF as well. 
 
Comment - I would like to hear end results and then what the AF intends to do. 
 
Case – 384 
Rank – E-6  
Comment – Rank should be equal responsibility. If you are suggesting a more qualified TSgt should do a 
Majors Job becuase the Major is inept the answer is not to underpay me to do a Majors Job, It is to kick the 
Major out and get one that can do the job. Rank/pay should be designed to be equal to the responsibilities 
of that position. PME is OK, taking college courses are ok, but time in a position with proper training and 
supervision is the key to a great office...tell me mission, train me to do the mission, then get outta my way... 
 
Comment – The only way a 0-3 and an E-3 should be doing the same or similar jobs with similar 
responsiblities is if they are paid the same. Come now be fair... 
 
Comment – Please see and understand/comprehend previoius comments. 
 
Case – 387 
Rank – E-9  
Comment – The agenda here seems to be breaking down the rank structure, which having enlisted/officer 
personnel performing the same duties would do. The blurring already occurs in close but structured 
environments, such as hospitals and aircrews. To further take away rank by performing same duties would 
eliminate professional customs and courtesies. I agree many jobs held only by officers could be done by 
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enlisted, but the choice for which career path to choose is open for a long time and a clear distinction 
should remain. 
 
Case – 389 
Rank – E-8  
Comment – At flight level, and above, the AF should keep an officer and a SNCO side by side. This will 
help the SNCO with management procedures and wil help the officer with management, personnel, 
technical, administrative issiues not familiar to him due to the lack of exposure on his part. 
 
Comment – Replacing officer with qualified NCOs will only creat a generation of officer that only know 
hoe to deal with officer issues. The involvement of officers with SNCOs early in their career (O1, O2, O3) 
is important to us (AF) to grow a well rounded officer. Is not always about saving money by placing an 
NCO in an officer's place. 
 
Comment – As with my comments before. Replacing officers with qualified SNCOs is not a good idea. 
They need to be kept together so they can learn from each other. 
 
Case – 392 
Rank – O-6  
Comment – I'm having a tough time following where this is going. The rank structure in the military has its 
purpose...we are military personnel first and technicians second. We must uphold the expectations of our 
nation for performance as military personnel first and foremost!! This survey would seem to suggest that 
enlisted personnel should be running the AF--they are the backbone of our service, don't get me wrong--
but, when push comes to shove, it's the commissioned officers who are directly responsible for the 
consequences of our military actions. 
 
Comment – If we were IBM, we could interchange people of differing pay scales into similar jobs--we are 
not IBM--we prosecute military activities for the United States of America. The military tradition of rank is 
recognized internationally--when looking to negotiate government to government, other nations will look 
for a "commissioned" officer first and foremost. I think your research survey is trying to equate officer and 
enlisted personnel on the technician level. Come on out, I'll hire you for your experience, but never will I 
place you into the same position I would a CGO--that would be the wrong use of a valuable resource. Sorry 
I couldn't be more help. 
 
Case – 394 
Rank – O-5  
Comment – I'm not sure that your questions on subordinates really "work" for larger organizations. I'm a 
Deputy Group Commander and have many different specialties and career fields under me. I would answer 
differently to many of the questions depending on which group we're talking about. Not sure if my answers 
are of much value. 
 
Case – 399 
Rank – O-6  
Comment – This is a very touchy proposal. It could work in some environments not in others. The 
questions are too general, especially for someone who supervises several thousand people in a extremely 
broad number of jobs. 
 
Comment – I've been in situations where officer and enlisted were basically doing the same job, but 
ultimately decisions must be made and rank wins. 
 
Comment – Interesting concepts, but would face many challenges in implementation. 
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Case – 401 
Rank – E-6  
Comment – keeping the enlisted and officer corps seperate is good even though enlisted are being just as 
educated as officers so I feel the pay should be closer as enlisted are getting their education while working 
8-12 t hours a day 
 
Case – 406 
Rank – O-2E  
Comment – Sorry, I got tired of all the bs questions. My bottom line is: Rank doesn't make a good 
engineer. Although if one is an engineer and doesn't get promoted, they will not stick around. Some of us 
have experience with industry and know more than most of the officers appointed over us. 
 
Case – 408 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – your language is stilted and confusing. the questions are repetitve, and irritating and that 
irritation will surely explain why the results are skewed. and too long 
 
Case – 410 
Rank – E-9 
Comment – A very long survey.  
 
Comment – The survey is too long. 
 
Case – 411 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – I thing your questions are too broad and subject to different interpretations. I thing you should 
phrase the questions to a particular situation. Like would it be okay for a senior NCO to be incharge of 
personnel office and supervise junior officers? 
 
Comment – You haven't defined what is an integral part of a strategy, plan of action, chain of command, 
but I can't think of any AFS that isn't in some way integral. 
 
Comment – I needed more examples to understand the type of situations you are considering assigning 
people to with out regard to rank. 
 
Case – 413 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – enlisted & CGOs employed in similiar duties should be paid similiarly, otherwise don't employ 
enlisted in CGO jobs just to save money. 
 
Case – 417 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – Rank is not a serious qualification for most positions throughout the Air Force. Experience 
tends to outrank education when applying knowledge to everyday events. Good Luck Chief on your thesis! 
 
Case – 418 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – The slippery slope here is further graying the line between officers and enlisted. The AF 
culture is already far weaker than other services in traditional military measures. Many AFSs already mix 
officers and enlisted in similar jobs and it creates problems when dissimilar ranks compete for the 
commander/decision-maker's ear. 
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Case – 420 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – In many cases SNCOs (and some experienced junior NCOs) are already doing jobs that were 
once filled by CGOs. The key is to have qualified personnel in these positions. Now that the enlisted force 
is by-in-large much more educated than in the past, I see the use of NCOs and SNCOs being more 
prevalent. 
 
Case – 424 
Rank – O-3 
Comment – WHY IS THIS DAMN SURVEY SO DAMN LONG!!! Think about it. We are all very busy. I 
took the time to start this, but nearly every one of the first 30 questions are identical. 
 
Comment – This survey was too long. In section one, all those questions were identical. Sure some words 
were changed here and there, but 30 questions on effectiveness? Come on!?! Too long. By the end I was 
just clicking on buttons to finish. I am taking the time to give this feedback becuase I care about doing this 
the right way. People are busy, you need to ask what you want quickly and efficiently, not by rephrasing 
the exact same question 30 time just to capture a slightly different veiw point! I agree that surveys and 
feedback are essential, but this was toooooooooo long! 
 
Case – 426 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – In my 25 years I have seen many junior officers who had plenty of education in charge of 
section, offices and programs where they were not as effective had they been able to put some AF 
experience under their belts. Education is important but it is not a substitute for experience. If AF/military 
leaders really mean it when they say the NCO/SNCO corps is the back bone of the AF/military they should 
put NCO/SNCOs in positions based on their experiences and capabilities not whether they are officer or 
enlisted. Will co-habitation of officers and enlisted in these jobs traditionally staffed by officers lead to 
familiarity and breakdown the officer/enlisted relationships? It could happen but I think most NCO/SNCOs 
understand what is required and will maintain a disciplined relationship with officer regardless the 
situation. 
 
Comment – Rank does not determine who is right for the job. Case in point is when the SALTY OLD 
sergeant with the combat experience was the informal leader of a squad or platoon. All due to the 
experience and knowledge gained by doing the job "under-fire". In our case it is the growth experienced as 
one progresses in a military career not solely the education the person had that matters. 
 
Comment – The shape of the future AF is important to keeping us the premier AF in the world. I hope the 
leadership of today is able to embrace the capabilities of today's enlisted force. 
 
Case – 431 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – This is a poorly designed survey Question 7 in section 7 - what does that mean? If you 
eliminate rank for a requirement to command not part of chain of command???? Other questions were also 
poorly worded and confusing. 
 
Comment – I disagree with the concept of having both enlisted and officers performing the same duties in 
the same office. If there are currently positions on the books that can be filled by qualified enlisted 
personnel or officers, then I would recommend making all of the positions at a given location either officer 
or enlisted, but not mixed at the same location. Also, this survey has taken far longer than the advertised 
15-22 minutes, even without the time I've taken to type in the additional comments. 
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Case – 432 
Rank – O-5 
Comment – Unfortunately this is one of the porest surveys I have taken. The last questions, rank and org 
sctructure, were loaded questions tying to "force" me to a certain answer. "Eliminating rank..." in most 
cased caused me to select a different answer, usually Disagree, than I would have otherwise. 
 
Comment – These questions were a convoluded way to ask if I believe and Company Grade Officer and 
NCO could perform the same jobs and could be equally effective. My opinion is yes, and I'd like to see this 
carefully applied throughout the AF!! 
 
Comment – Repeated: The survey was very difficult to take, way too complex. Basic questions should have 
been asked, with qualifiers required by AFIT to make it more academic. Not sure this will yeald the 
accurate results you are looking for. 
 
Case – 435 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – This is the military. Organization is based upon rank structure and that's what sets us apart 
from our civilian counterparts. I've worked in both civilian companies and the military, and the military 
adds more discipline. Merging the officer and enlisted corps in order to accomplish mission will blur the 
lines and chain of command. From being an enlisted troop and then an officer, I don't see your purpose or 
point. The military structure has worked throughout history, longer than any other form of organization. 
Don't mess with it! 
 
Comment – Okay, from working in a military software organization, we had issues with CGOs working 
side by side with airman and NCOs. The CGOs were basically workers and not supervisors. On one hand, 
the airman and NCOs were disgruntled because they were doing the same job with less pay (unequitable). 
On the other hand, the CGOs were disgruntled because they were doing the same work as airmen/NCOs 
and felt that they were not growing as officers. I don't see any questions pertaining to job satisfaction, 
growth potential, etc. Also, to adequately portray responses, you need to break this up into categories of 
responses because various ranks will answer these questions differently based on rank biases. 
 
Comment – 1. Make sure you separate the results according to rank structure or they'll be a scew in the 
results. 2. You need to add inputs on what airmen/NCOs perceive versus officers. When I was enlisted, I 
always felt like I could do as well a job as an CGO. As an officer, I look at young enlisted and understand 
that they may have the technical abilities, but lack leadership. You need to take this into consideration. 3. 
You need to take into account competencies. I see no input or questions relating to competencies. 
 
Case – 437 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – Interaction and mentoring new LT's by SNCO's I believe will enhance an officers career. 
 
Case – 438 
Rank – O-3E 
Comment – I currently hold to the belief that senior enlisted personnel and company grade officers 
complement each other rather than provide substitutes/redundancy for one another. While at certain levels 
(flight especially), either can often cover the other's duties for short periods of time, the flight members 
need the cohesive efforts of both a SNCO and CGO working together for the best organizational outcome. I 
tend to see the daily management of flight activities as the realm of the SNCO, while the CGO is there to 
provide a connection to senior leadership, policy, culture, upcoming trends and changes, and to work on 
longer-term issues. The CGO needs to be present at that level of organization, however, in order to 
understand the strengths and weaknesses of the flight first-hand. This is often construed as micro-
management when the CGO gets too involved in the daily activities of the flight, and this often results from 
a senior leader (MXG CC) who is overly concerned with the daily activities themselves. I find this to be 
detrimental to the organization, often leading to a general feeling among airmen that "no matter what we 
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do, it won't be right". This "meddling" effect is unfortunate and should be avoided at all costs; the problem 
is that some junior CGOs are taught early-on that they need to be knee deep in everything that's going on 
out on the flight-line. This, I believe, is another mistake. While they should be aware of the situation, their 
leadership role is not one of directing a crisis response effort during a major fuel spill. Their leadership 
effort has already taken place, and if they've done their job, then they'll see a well executed response as the 
crisis is taken care of by those trained in how to handle it. 
 
Comment – The questions get more interesting as you go! I feel I may need to comment on each of these. 8. 
There is some flexibility created, but not to the extent that you can plug-and-play enlisted for officer in 
each circumstance. I believe this would work in SOME instances. 9. The added flexibility in 8. creates a 
problem when you look at career progression. While the very BEST enlisted folks could no-doubt do the 
same job in some circumstances, how do you then allow CGOs to gain the experience needed at that same 
level? They don't need the experience so they can play pro-super, but they do need it to understand how the 
pro-super makes his decisions. If CGOs don't gain this knowledge, then they're bound to plan, direct, and 
strategize later in their careers in ways that create increased complications when it comes time for 
implementation. 10. Qualification isn't the criteria for putting someone in the right place at the right time. 
It's a mix of qualification, experience, background, and perspective. I emphasize the perspective part, 
because I feel only CMSgts with AADs would possess the breadth of experience and understanding of how 
the Air Force works necessary to fill such jobs. I'd hate to see a TSgt in such a position simply because 
their perspective is still overly narrow in my opinion. 11. I believe it will complicate the personnel 
management effort immensely, but may offer some added capability. It could be worth the effort. 12. Rank 
is still important simply because nobody operates in a bubble. In Acquisition Logistics positions, there are 
often CGOs and SNCOs filling similar positions. Sometimes this is a problem simply because of the 
contractor's perspective of who he's talking to. I've seen a SMSgt make recommendations based on his 
flight-line experience that were not in line with the goals of the acquisition program. While he was justified 
in addressing his opinion, he lost credibility with the contractor because he was over-emphasizing his side 
of the problem. In my experience, the CGOs in those positions are able to better convey the problems 
without burning bridges with the contractor team. 13. The idea of "interchanging" personnel doesn't sit well 
with me. The idea of selecting candidates based on individual merit would seem to offer a more 
supportable approach. If we go for the "interchangable" position idea, then we obviously have a problem 
and should ask ourselves if we need officers in those positions to begin with. If not, then we need to get 
them out of there. If so, then the personnel folks need to do a better job of conveying why an officer is 
required for such a position. What I'd REALLY like to see is another enlisted-to-officer program added for 
those enlisted personnel who have excelled throughout their careers and are striving for more. While few 
Chiefs will relish the idea of becoming a 2LT, I'd propose a conversion program for Seniors and Chiefs 
involving an OTS type experience, followed by a direct commission to mid-grade Capt where they'd be 
eligible to compete for Major in 3 years or so. I'd revise the O3E pay scale so they're not losing any money 
when they commission, and guarantee them the same amount of time to compete for Major as the regular 
Captains. For those fast burners, this would be the equivalent of allowing them to basically pursue 2 very 
different Air Force careers over their lifetime and retire at a higher grade than originally possible. 
 
Comment – (COMMENT REMOVED BY AUTHOR.  DISCUSSED RESPONDENT’S CURRENT 
DUTY LOCATION) 
 
Case – 439 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – Having the appropriate rank/chain of command is very important but some of the civilian 
positions could be eliminated, simple fact that the buddy system in the civilian world (prior military 
personnel who have retired or seperated) hinder the squadron moral or production because the Air Force 
should evolve and they old timers seem to want to keep everything the same, making things become stale to 
progression. Getting rid of civilians should not be as hard as it is when the mistakes are made they should 
be held as accountable as the military counterpart. 
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Comment – The promotion scale needs to have a hands on basis, when personnel work 12'sand the other 
have work 8's weekends/holidays off their is no fairness. The new PT program forces personnel to work 
extra time to get a workout, where personnel in hospitals and MPF's etc. There is no equal bases when 
office jobs are affecting morale when the hours and down time do not come close when the flightline, cops, 
fire department and CE fail to come close to down time and working extra time to complete things that the 
personnel on dayshift type hours complete during duty hours, MPF's, Hospitals and other services should 
be open atleast 2 days every other week so that nightshift personnel can complete their mission essential 
business without staying at work or on base for an exrta hour or two to complete mission requirements due 
to office hours. 
 
Case – 441 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – I had very few strongly agree/disagree answers mainly because I haven't given many of these 
issues much thought in the past. That said I do think there are plenty of positions currently held by CGO's 
that could be performed equally as well (or better) by SNCO's. In todays enlisted force even some TSgt's 
have had significant training/education in many management functions, these highly qualified NCO's may 
be considered as well. 
 
Case – 442 
Rank – O-3 
Comment – It's hard to say with Mngt...It is the person...not the rank or status...the officer could be 
good...may not...same with enlisted. I believe you are either born an effective leader or learn over a long 
period of time... 
 
Case – 447 
Rank – O-3E 
Comment – If rank is not a requirement for a duty then the Air Force should put an enlisted person to 
perform the task as it is more cost effective. If officers and enlisted are doing the same task then the 
question immediately is asked. Why are you getting paid more than me to perform the same task? I have 
been in this situation and it was not good for morale, the chain of command, or mission accomplishment. 
There is an equivalency between senior NCOs and CGOs. Any good CGO knows to depend on senior 
NCOs for insight. However, there must be a chain of command. The Air Force would do better to promote 
enlisted to officers based on performance and change the rank system than to start putting officers and 
enlisted to perform the same task side by side. 
 
Comment – I am prior enlisted. I have worked in places where knowledge and experience were key in 
accomplishing the task. However it only worked within a framework that had a chain of command. There 
still has to be someone who "facilitates" harmony and provides direction. Mixing officers and enlisted in 
the same tasks is detrimental to good order and discipline. If the enlisted person is just as qualified (I have 
often seen the enlisted as more technically qualified), educated, and with the same leadership abilities then 
there should be a method of promoting them to officers. 
 
Comment – Please do not view my comments as denigrating to our enlisted. I have been consistently 
impressed with the quality of our members. Many have bachelors and advanced degrees and can 
accomplish whatever they put their mind to. I do feel however that under the current system you have to 
make a choice. If you seek to lead and focus on leadership then you should try to become an officer. If not 
when you make senior NCO ranks you have the respect of both officers and enlisted. It goes without saying 
that senior officers also enjoy this respect. 
 
Case – 448 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – In the intelligence community, we have SNCOs performing the duties of a LtCol, yet a 05 is 
being paid to sign off the data and speak in forums with their 2 SNCOs passing information and in some 
cases providing the meeting or group the specific data. Reducing the number of Officers billets and 
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increasing the number of qualified production assest would increase the over all productivity and reduce the 
cost. Warrent Officers would be a welcomed addition to the force structure. They would provide the 
experienced based mid-level leader currently held by Lt's with 2-4 years experience keeping out of trouble. 
Another option would be limited duty officers, those SNCO's willing to cross to the Officer track to provide 
an additional 10 years and serve as thte mid level leaders. their would be a 60/40 split with 60% in the 
warrent/ Limited duty officers and 40% career based officers. The cost to benifit return would be extremely 
effective in these days of shrinking budgets Chief, Thank you for allowing me to take part in your survey. 
(RESPONDNET’S NAME DELETED BY AUTHOR) 
 
Comment – We must be careful in how this is implimented, educated officers must be leaders for this to 
work. They must have both "book smarts" and practicle experience. 
 
Case – 453 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – Survey is confusing and a waste of time 
 
Case – 454 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – Most junior officers know far less about how to get things done than the SNCOs do. They are 
also usually less effectve leaders and managers. 
 
Comment – Bring back Warrant Officers and Enlisted Pilots. 
 
Case – 456 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – The Air Force needs to provide leadership training to junior officers that teaches the same 
styles as enlisted PME. Officers as supervisors to airman and NCOs can negativly affect their carriers due 
to lack of leadership education. 
 
Case – 458 
Rank – O-2 
Comment – CMSgt Romano, I appreciate the direction you are taking with this survey. I believe this thrust 
will help several career fields, but may be a detriment to others. 
 
Comment – Supervision is NOT the same as Management. 
 
Comment – Wow, that was too long. 
 
Case – 460 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – Results of this survey may indicate the AF is agreeable to allowing education and training to 
replace rank structured duty positions but I don't think the other branches of service have the same mindset. 
They have a highly structured point of view and are extremely rank conscience. 
 
Case – 461 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – Seems you have developed a targeted survey...I believe it to be somewhat skewed...eliminate 
rank, PME, CDCs and eliminate the culture that has been built for many years...engrained...consider giving 
enlisted airmen, NCOs and SNCOs more responsibliies comensurate with their grade. Promote enlisted and 
continue to force out the officers...lets see 5 1/2 years experience as a captain or 25 as a Senior Master 
Sergeant...who do you want running your most complex critical duties? I have higher education level than 
over 90% of the officer core in my career field...though, I get the title as Superintendent and get my ass 
worked off...I don't see the cushy jobs, the accelerated promotions...if the jobs were merit based, I know I 
would be making a lot more money and doing a lot better job than I am...the enlisted force pays the price 
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for the officer leaders...we write their performance reports through our actions...educate and promote your 
enlisted force! Eliminate the waste and redundancy of officers performing the same jobs as 
SNCOs...honestly, I've been making the tuff calls for over 20 years...do you think I really need to run my 
decisions through an 0-3 to an 0-5...we are upside down...if your NCO corps is the back bone of the Air 
Force, then we need to strengthen the E1 - 4 ranks, start at the foundation and work our way through the 
ranks...but remember, doing more with less means less! These are some of the reasons I am retiring after 25 
years of service...the BS political promotion system, the waste and redundancy and the enlisted guy getting 
the shaft on almost everything. Have we really come a long way or is this cyclic? After every major world 
conflict we in the military get drawn down...now personnel cuts will continue to reduce your overall 
efficency. Think about it...if you lower the ASVAB scores you're not getting a better product...you're just 
getting an under performer. Thats why we get a lot of the crap of society into the military. 
 
Comment – Please continue to elminate officers! I am all for getting rid of the road blocks to my success. 
While you are at it, lets cut out the positon of First Sergeant...seems to be a wasted part of a unit...transfer 
the responsiblities of the first sergeant back to the SNCOs and Officers running the organizations. 
 
Comment – I believe your title of "Human Capital Management" is an oxy moron! You need to call it what 
it is...human resource management...too many times we in the military continue to build jobs for the sake of 
building empires...honestly, what would our founding fathers say about the double and tripple layer of 
supervision to commander's? Lets cut out the redundancy...here's something to ponder...if we elminated the 
performance report and went to a web based reporting system of only markings with limited comments 
such as education we'd eliminate a lot of wasted man-hours. We've done nothing but create BS by things 
like 30+ combat programs, commanders special interest items (CSIP)...which is another way to spell 
metrics...read Genral Patton's memoir's...staticstics and quantitative management are not new the 
military...all great leaders has some system...the problem is we have no real leaders or postive influences 
because of the dogma created by the less than superior leaders...bottom line: Great theroy...though, when 
you start to eliminate your survey focus you will start to errode the military...thanks for the oppurtunity. 
 
Case – 463 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – I believe a seasoned SNCO will perform better in these positions then a recently commissioned 
college graduate. 
 
Case – 472 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – Terrible survey, hard to follow, and not clear. 
 
Case – 475 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – If Company Grade Officers can fill similar duties as those of their enlisted counterparts, why 
do they need to be officers? Reducing the number of officer slots or converting the position to an enlisted 
slot would be more cost-effective. 
 
Comment – The questions do not lead to plausable outcomes since it has not been tested and it would seem 
a waste of taxpayer dollars to hire an officer to do an enlisted job. Also, what positions are not mission 
critical that have not been reduced or deleteed already? 
 
Case – 477 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – One would hope the promotion system values experience and technical skill. If we are 
promoting people to higher grades who do not have BOTH techical and leadership skills, we need to fix the 
promotion system, not design a system where "rank does not count." I believe effective leadership of 
people and management of resources and programs are, in fact, technical skills. We seem to imply here that 
there are effective military leaders with limited technical skills. I am not sure how that is truly possible in 
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our setting. Likewise, we seem to imply here that there is some population of highly technically-skilled 
folks who just cannot get promoted, but that we should give them more responsible positions. Frankly, I 
have met very few of these kinds of folks in 23 years in the Air Force. I have met a lot who seemed to 
believe in their own minds they were technically skilled, and were angry at fellow NCOs and officers who 
got promoted based on a variety of factors (including, interestingly, tests designed to gauge technical 
knowledge). All of our education and training should be cumulative, preparing our people for higher levels 
of responsibility, both technical and managerial. No one aspect of the education and training process is 
more important than the other. PME simply makes better officers and NCOs. Technical training does the 
same thing. In the final analysis, we need officers and SNCOs who can both lead and manage. That a 
Senior Airman may have stronger technical skills in one area is no reason to place him in charge of the 
shop that a TSgt should run. Make the TSgt smarter, and teach him not to feel threatened by smart 
subordinates. 
 
Comment – As an enterprise, it is not possible to interchange positions on an ad-hoc basis without 
negatively impacting the assignment process. Yes, local commanders need to make best use of their 
assigned talent, but randomly interchanging positions at local levels gives the assignment system an 
unmanageable movement challenge. 
 
Comment - This is a truly interesting survey and study effort. It has merit and deserves study. However, I 
believe we best serve our nation and institution by ensuring our promotion, school selection, and 
assignment systems promote and move the right people in the SNCO and officer grades. If we have Chiefs 
and Colonels with limited technical skills and limited leadership skills, then in those instances, we have 
failed. Our young enlisted members deserve technically competent leaders and managers. 
 
Case – 480 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – Why not eliminate commissioned/non-commissioned status and just pay according to the job? 
 
Comment – I believe that enlisted should be compensated with additional pay if we are doing the same job 
as an officer. 
 
Case – 482 
Rank – O-2 
Comment – I think that rank should be overlooked in the case of a captain/lieutenant filling similar jobs... 
the captain has more experience, but the lieutenant may have a better understanding. However, a 
captain/lieutenant should not be interchangeable with a junior enlisted member-- if so, then those positions 
should all be turned over to enlisted members. That would indicate something wrong with our 
commissioning services if an undergraduate degree makes no difference in who does a job. 
 
Comment – Even if an enlisted member has more education/training/experience than an officer, the 
managerial aspect can not be separated from doing one's job in the AF. 
 
Comment – Good Luck with your thesis! 
 
Case – 486 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – It is always good for Officers to work with enlisted in sort of a mentoring role. I have seen 
many benifits with Lt and even Capts woking with SNCOs. I do not feel they should be doing exactly the 
same job though. I have never felt it was right to pay two people different amounts for the same job. 
Examples a contracting Lt and a MSgt doing the same job. A 2E2 and a 3C doing the same job. 
 
Comment – A lot of this is dependent on the person, just as in any job. In some cases it makes a lot more 
sense to have an officer though. Especially when dealing from a Majcom, DRU, etc decision making level. 
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Case – 487 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – I am unclear at what level of leadership this section is trying to determine if rank should be a 
qualifying factor. I feel that company grade officers need to have experience in supervision in order for 
them to become better leaders. However, that does not mean that SNCOs could not perform the same job 
just as effectively. In fact due to the supervisory experience some SNCOs have, they could probably do a 
better job than an inexperienced company grade officer. I feel that company grade officers need the 
positions so that they can learn supervisory responsibilities for career growth. 
 
Comment – I do think that interchanging QUALIFIED enlisted personnel and company grade officers can 
provide flexibility to organizations and the AF as a whole; however, I do not think it would be good to 
flip/flop enlisted and officers in the same duty position. For an example if an office is being held by an 
officer and when they PCS then fill the position with an enlisted person and then possibly fill it again with 
an officer. I feel this may create thoughts that the officer is not performing a function commensurate with 
his grade. I feel that mid-level positions need to be looked at on a case-by-case basis and if it can be filled 
by a qualified enlisted person then make that position a permanent enlisted position. Again, I feel that it is 
very important for company grade officers to receive experience supervising at mid-level positions prior to 
attaining squadron commander or higher positions. 
 
Comment – It was difficult to answer the training/education part of the survey dealing with my specific 
AFSC. My AFSC like others, has been merged and transformed into something different than when I was a 
technician. Depending on what workcenter a person is assigned to determines the level of education 
required. If a technician is assigned to a workcenter responsible for maintaining cryptographic equipment 
then very little education is required, anymore, as most repair actions involve replacing bad units 
(personnel no longer troubleshoot down to specific boards, etc). If howerever a technician is assigned to a 
workcenter where they are responsible for maintaining computers, servers, switches, routers etc then 
education to include commercial vendor training becomes significantly more important. 
 
Case – 488 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – I thought rank in the military was the result of performance, education, training and experience. 
If it's not, why stop at the mid level in positions that are not an integral part of a strategy, plan of action, or 
chain of command? How do we grow our future force if everything is interchangeable? 
 
Case – 490 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – Not really sure what you are trying to determine in this survey? Putting the best person in a job 
regardless of rank/education/etc. is the best way to be effective. With that in mind under current practices 
for me to get the right people means they have attained a certain level of rank/education that is inherent 
with their positions. 
 
Case – 493 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – Rank has a definate place in the military. There needs to be a clearly defined chain of 
command along with military disipline and order. This aside, often times there is too much importance 
placed on the rank of an individual when it comes to whether or not that person can accomplish the task. 
More importance should be placed on actual knowledge and whether or not the individual has in the past 
and can effectively accomplish the task. 
 
Case – 498 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – There are many times that unqualified officers are placed into a position soley on rank, and not 
upon qualifications, whereas many enlisted are not consider for their input due to their enlisted status...they 
may be respected in their area, but just not have the "duty title" to be involved or at the decision level. 
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Comment – Depending on the job it comes down to capability. Just because an enlisted person has a BA in 
human resources doesn't necessarily qualify them for a job over a person that has worked it, and knows the 
systems. 
 
Comment – Confusing survey, I don't think all the information is given to accurately answer the questions. 
Some questions have one answer for younger Airmen, but would be answered differently for the 
NCOs/SNCO ranks. 
 
Case – 500 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – I have no idea what this survey is all about. We are in the military. There is a structure. If you 
think it needs to be changed, then we should get rid of the military all together and become a civilian force. 
Also, Section VII could have been worded better. "Not negatively affect this" is a double negative and 
confusing when read. 
 
Comment – The miliary has a rank structure that has been place for a couple hundred years. I was a TSgt 
when I got my Masters Degree at 13 years. I could have applied for OTS and become an officer, but I was 
happy where I was and didn't want to start over. I don't want to be considered an "equal" with CGOs--I 
would appreciate respect for my education level and experience, but I don't need to hold the same job as a 
CGO (and get paid less). If you are going to recommend equal pay for positions, that's a different story. 
 
Case – 503 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – On a nursing unit, every shift requires a "chain of command" structure 24/7. So there is a 
danger in interpreting these responses as only the flt/cc or element leader needs to be an officer. Also, in the 
health care profession, licensure and credentials are frequently the ruling factor regardless of either 
experience or education. 
 
Case – 506 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – Need a way to go back to the previous section. For example, have a continue/next section 
button and a back button. 
 
Case – 515 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – In my particular specialty, Officer and Enlisted personnel do hold some of the same positions 
with the same duty requirements. I have not encountered degraded operations, morale, or mission 
accomplishment strictly due to this fact (although, as a caveat, there is generally a very high officer to 
enlisted ratio in my AFS. . . quite contrary to many AFSs . . . which does impact the inter-personal 
interactions and military customs/courtesies dynamics). There are occasionally minor "disturbances" but 
this is generally related to personality issues, rather than an organizational or leadership problem. Allowing 
QUALIFIED personnel to perform identical duties without regard to rank, outside of the chain of 
command, does not seem to be an issue within my particular "area of experience". However, I do see the 
potential for this type of circumstance to present problems in other "spheres of influence"/AFSs, as 
personnel not accustomed to this type of working environment could feel either threatened or 
uncomfortable due to the "apparent" contradiction to military protocol and customs. Like anything new, it 
will meet with some resistance and hesitation, regardless of its effectiveness. 
 
Case – 516 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – To answer these questions one must imagine such positions without a rank structure. This is 
very hard to do. Even in civilian employment there is rank by virtue of one's position. I do not understand 
how this could be viably assessed from those who only know the rank structure. 
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Case – 517 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – Enlisted personnel should be able to hold mid-level positions, it would broaden their scope of 
experience 
 
Comment - Enlisted personnel should be able to hold mid-level positions, it would broaden their scope of 
experience 
 
Case – 518 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – Chief - I think you asked the wrong questions. Nothing in this survey considers how we might 
fight in the next 20 years - as part of a joint, coalition, expeditionary force. Regardless of how good enlisted 
troops might become, our partners in the other Services and from other nations will want to deal with 
officers. You gave that notion some attention in your early questions, but lost track of it later. Your 
proposal to eliminate rank qualifiers may work for personnel offices, but would have limited applicability 
elsewhere. 
 
Comment – Rather than collapsing officer and enlisted ranks (which the Chinese did so unsuccessfully and 
abandoned), let's consider increasing the chances for enlisted with advanced academic degrees to become 
officers. I say that tongue-in-cheek. I guess I don't see what the problem is with being a Chief. Chiefs run 
700-900 member aircraft maintenance squadrons. There are handsful of captains and a lieutenant colonel as 
the commander in those squadrons, but the Chiefs run it. What's wrong with that? Is the problem that we 
don't have opportunities for Chiefs in other career fields (i.e., personnel) to lead? Then have them transfer 
into other career fields, like paralegals did. I think what you're really making a case for is revival of warrant 
officer grades in the AF. If we want just technical experts, we should hire civilians or contractors. They 
have the staying power and employment flexibility we need. If we want leaders, we need officers because 
we need a big enough pool we can cull down to the senior leaders we eventually need. If we want a mix of 
technical and leadership skills that will also be expeditionary, then we should look at warrants. 
 
Case – 521 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – Good issue. 1) CGOs need leadership and management experience. 2) CGO roles may be 
identical to NCOs/SNCOs while expectations for contributions in those roles may differ (same roles, 
different focii). 3) A role of SNCOs, in particular, can be to expose CGOs to enlisted issues. 4) Customs 
and courtesies must be rigorously observed especially if/when NCOs and CGOs share similar duties. 5) 
Repeat point 4 for emphasis! 6) Care must be taken to observe that differences of opinion between NCOs 
and CGOs with similar positions do not become E versus O issues (we respect each other and ultimately 
must perform--and be evaluated--in our very different roles in the USAF). 
 
Comment – Ref Qs 7/12: Status is important more because people have perceptions of what an individual 
can/cannot do for them based on that visible status. Perhaps the biggest challenge here is in defining the 
requirements for a given job. I, as a Major, filled a previously undefined position that was ultimately 
downgraded to a Capt slot. But the responsibilities I took on in that role were beyond what a CGO 
would/could do. Similarly, a MSgt may be able to fill a role and get that job done very effectively, but his 
overall contributions may be significantly different than the Capt who follows in the same slot, even while 
both have the same duty description. 
 
Comment – Education is extremely valuable but not emphasized; it's not one of those "first questions" 
people ask about a military member. As I answered the questions I assumed a common basis for 
comparison--we "know" every military member has gone through basic, OTS, or similar programming. I 
was also conflicted as I answered some of the supervisory questions since the bulk of my supervisory 
experiences were as a 21A, a very different world than the acquisition world of which I'm now a part. 
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Case – 527 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – Tough survey to take...took too long...not enjoyable at all. Would have appreciated knowing 
how long of a time commitment it required, then would have deleted the email. This is a bit much to 
expect. 
 
Case – 528 
Rank – E-9 
Comment – Many officers already have the opportunity to supervise, however, they should never skip over 
enlisted supervisors. Officers are generalists, not specialists, and should not be supervising specialists in the 
performance of their duties. The should be supervising the enlisted supervisors and managers in the 
execution of their specialist functions. It would be wrong to have enlisted working with officers on the 
same duties and tasks at the same level of responsibility unless the pay scales were also leveled. Officers 
(in theory - not always in practice) assume greater overalll responsibility for the organization and thus earn 
a higher status. While the AF may seek a Field Grade Officer with greater specialization and perhaps 
greater confidence in their ability to lead in a particular functional area, this specialization of officers comes 
at a price. The cost is a more stovepiped officer corps with less overall opportunities for advancement. This 
was the case with Munitions Officers of the 1960's and 70's. Although, they were technicall specialized, 
they could not get promoted past Major (or Lt Col in few rare cases) because the AF did not value their 
skill compared to Aircraft Maintenance officers and could not compete for rank. The AF decided to create 
the Aircraft Maintenance officer who would float between the two (maintenance and Munitions) areas, and 
this has caused some diversification in the specialization. Ultimately, from my viewpoint, having worked 
closely with CGs throughout my career, they need more focused guidance and training by their 
Commanders and Group Commanders on assumption of leadership and their role in the organization. True 
leaders will inherently be supervisors, others will inherently be followers, and so on... 
 
Comment – I Disagree with the concept of integrating officer and enlisted on similar duties and tasks. If we 
can do do this, then we have no reason to differentiate between officers and enlisted personnel. If officers 
are not goig to provide officership, and will provide technical task work along side enlisted personnel, then 
convert their positions to enlisted ones. We either need them or we don't, but we don't need officers doing 
the same work as an enlisted person. If we flip this coin over, can we say that if an enlisted person is 
supervising or put in charge of something, they should be considered officers? Why would we apply this 
logic to officers in the performance of technical tasks? Perhaps young officers are finding it hard to identify 
with their roles because they've been over-accessed. 
 
Case – 534 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – Everything we do is based on rank. There is no doubt rank by itself does not equal mission 
success nor is it the most important factor. The only real difference between officer and enlisted is 
education and training. We turn NCOs into officers all the time with education and training. So it's not a 
question of ability, it's a question of how we preceive status associated with rank. That's AF culture...not to 
be changed lightly. 
 
Case – 536 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – Many questions were poorly written and hard to follow. 
 
Comment – Interesting concept; a huge culture change would be required...more like culture shock! 
 
Comment – Very interesting project, it can work under the right circumstances but probably not in a joint 
environment 
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Case – 537 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – It is always important to put the right in person in the right job at the right time. The military, 
though, is a hierarchical society. If we begin placing officer and enlisted together, we will breed familiarity 
and familiarity breeds contempt. Our society has also developed the idea of status for certain types of 
positions at the expense of others. For instance, those in administration are looked upon with more regard 
than those on the line (the actual producers). There are many jobs which just by the nature of the position 
where experience is a better qualifier than education. Two that come to mind are Security Forces and 
Pharmacy. In pharmacy, the technician rarely needs the pharmacist professional judgement in the typical 
setting. The parmacy technician with many years experience only needs the pharmacist because they are 
required to have. Experience has taught them what is important and where to look for information. I really 
can't think of the need for officers in Security Forces, other than the parochial nature of our society where 
only an officers word counts (i.e. that's why there are officers in the PJs now). In addition, if we are going 
to put enlisted in what may be now officer positions, we need to define what QUALIFIED means. Face 
time with the commander doesn't mean qualified. We do not always put the best people in the job. I will 
say they are the minority, but there are enough people in leadership positions that do not fit the 
qualifications that the effectiveness of the Air Force could be called into question. 
 
Case – 540 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – In my current career field, officers and enlisted do the same job. Rank becomes an issue when 
personnel believe it is part of job knowledge/experience. Not all officers have the answer...neither do all 
NCOs.  
 
Case – 543 
Rank – E-9 
Comment – You need to consider different levels of joint officer and enlisted employment. I can not agree 
with your general questions. Specifically, at MAJCOM and Air Staff level I do see opportunities for this to 
happen. There are intangible aspects of having officers in particular positions. I would not want to see 
junior NCOs and junior officers working hand in hand. We have lost enough repect for authority from our 
younger troops. SNCOs are better suited to deal with junior officers. Additionally, we will generate a huge 
issue concerning pay disparity. It is best to let this sleeping dog sleep. The AF is smart; its already making 
money off our highly educated enlisted ranks. The other services let/push their educated enlisted members 
to cross over; need I say more. 
 
Comment – AAD, it depends on what kind of job the individual fills. Please consider the fact that 
technology is driving overlapping of AFSCs. With this said, the AF/DP community is cutting manpower 
positions...90% of which are enlisted. With this said, we need our enlisted troops in their traditional 
positions. If there are excess midlevel officers, then let them fill those positions that we will not be able to 
in the near future. Your questions are not specific enough in my opinion. Midlevel positions is vague. 
Officers are (by definition) leaders. Our enlisted force don't normally pull leadership duties/responsiblities 
until they are SSgts and don't really receive leadership respect until they graduate from NCOA. Now their 
my be some positions outside of Aircraft Mx that your concerns specifically addresses. It might be wise to 
get the opinion of other enlisted AFSCs. 
 
Comment – I already say enough :) Good luck with this and yes, I would like to see the final results. 
Thanks (RESPONDENT’S NAME REMOVED BY AUTHOR) 
 
Case – 548 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – I think the concept of having qualified enlisted and officer employed in the same duties can be 
of benifit however, I do believe there are some levels of command that require and officer in that position 
for organizational structure e.g CC 
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Case – 554 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – The type of duties and position will impact how well (or whether or not) these concepts are 
suppported. If the duty requirement calls for a certain level of education and experience, how will the 
military compensate individuals? Attention needs to be paid to the fact that specific licensing and 
educational requirements/mandates exist that must be met before individuals can even occupy certain 
AFSs...in other words, the demographics of the professional population would differ from the majority of 
folks needed to keep the organization up and running. 
 
Comment – The medical community has very unique requirements...it would be challenging to employ this 
concept. 
 
Comment – As previously stated, the medical community does not fit the profile of concepts presented in 
this survey. It is difficult to answer many of the questions because a great deal depends on the specific 
specialty, education, eperience, and licensure required to perform certain duties. The requirements are not 
interchangeable. 
 
Case – 555 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – I think the questions about eliminating rank are too broad. There are some specific jobs (e.g. 
aircrew/aircraft scheduling)that work well with a mix of officer/enlisted, but I think it has to be considered 
on a case-by-case basis. If this is to be "global" change I would recommend limiting it to lieutenants only 
on the officer side, since captains (especially senior captians) should be working on their leaderships skills. 
In my opinion, the leadership opportunities for young officers have been dwindling in recent years. 
 
Case – 558 
Rank – O-7 
Comment – The questions were sometimes difficult to understand. 
 
Case – 559 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – Creating a mid-level rank between enlisted and officer similar to the army may be benificial to 
the overall strategy, plan of action and or chain-of-command. 
 
Case – 564 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – Same job, differences in pay and class? No way... 
 
Comment – Chief, Best of luck with the project. Do you get the same weight allowance for a PCS as an 
officer? 
 
Case – 566 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – This was a poorly constructed section -- too many long questions with multiple negatives made 
it hard to follow and answer the questions ("eliminating," "not part of," "not negatively," SHEESH! What 
are you really asking? 
 
Case – 571 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – I actually believe that our system of creating Officers is very outdated by basing it on formal 
college education when so many enlisted members now have advanced degrees. I feel officers should be 
grown as a natural maturation and progression of the enlisted ranks. Instead of having SNCOs, NCOs grow 
into mid-career officers and the truly exceptional grow into senior leadership. 
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Case – 572 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – I believe that there are many jobs in the Air Force that are done by officers that could be done 
better by enlisted personnel. However, I would hesitate before having officer and enlisted personnel do the 
same jobs in the same offices. 
 
Comment – I think you might a flaw in your survey. When you ask whether rank is important, you do not 
discern between officer rank and enlisted rank. For example, you might not want a SSgt or a Lt performing 
a job, but either a TSgt or a Capt would be effective. Thus, rank is important, but not neccesarily officer 
rank. 
 
Case – 573 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – In a few of the above questions you talk of placing officers and NCO's in the same job. Unless 
you're going to pay each of them the same it could be called discrimination toward the NCO. Why should 
an NCO be paid less than an officer if they are doing the same job? That should go for bonuses too. If one 
gets a bonus everyone should be entitled to the same bonus. If you want to do away with rank, does it go 
for officers too. The AF is a two class society. It's often thought that this is why officers and some senior 
NCO loose touch with reality. Nobody can tell them "no". They are so focus on trying to get promoted they 
miss the big picture. Or they've played the game for so long and have mastered it. Senior officers get 
treated like kings, why???? They are no different then either you or I. Maybe rank should be done away 
with. Maybe people would should get paid for how long they have served and the experiance they have, not 
for whether or not they have been to college. Most anyone can be a supervisor with the right training. 
Others will never be good superervisor no matter how much training they get. Just because a person has a 
certain rank, often times doesn't mean they're qualified to do the job. In the military you are just a number 
on a piece of paper, if you think you are more then that you are mistaken. 
 
Comment – If rank doesn't matter in these positions why leave a military member in that position? Why not 
put a civilain there? The AF is contracting out about everything else why not this too. Then you won't have 
to worry about who out ranks who. 
 
Comment – Rank will always come into play. Mixing officers and NCO in the same duties/jobs where they 
work side by side and not one for the other will one day make you rethink the fratinization rules. Sooner of 
later that will be an issue. 
 
Case – 577 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – In some cases, this is already being done. CGOs are OICs of small sections (by nature of their 
rank), with qualified NCOs/SNCOs working for/with them. At first, the NCO/SNCO does the bulk of the 
work, with the CGO "ultimately responsible" for the tasks; however, as the CGO gains proficiency, they 
become more of a "team" instead of a supervisor/subordinate. The status of rank never diminishes and 
organizational effectiveness is increased. 
 
Comment – In the "doing more with less" environment we find ourselves in, flexibility is key to mission 
success. UMDs are mirroring UPMRs less and less every day. Having flexibility at the mid-mgmt levels 
might improve this situation. 
 
Comment – Even with TOTAL EFFICIENCY and TOTAL EFFECTIVENESS, you still need ENOUGH 
PEOPLE TO DO THE JOB. I'm all for getting the most out of the resources available; however, I fear we'll 
someday reach the point where we're going to ask ourselves to do more than is humanly possible. We need 
to be effective and efficient, BUT WE NEED TO BE CAREFUL IN DOING SO! 
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Case – 579 
Rank – E-9 
Comment – Selecting qualified enlisted to serve alongside company grade officers seems good for enlsited 
personnel development purposes (negative affect for the officers), but the difference in pay is such that it 
would be a travisty having two people performing the same job while receiving horrendously different pay. 
Pay needs to be a factor in any formula expecting officers and enlisted to perform the same duties. And if 
enlisted can be trained and educated to perform officer duties, why the officer ranks at all? They can 
certainly be diminished, if not eliminated. 
 
Case – 581 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – Rank is not that important when you are talking about a difference of + or - one rank. 
However, I still think rank is very important when the difference is greater than that or we are talking about 
enlisted vs. officer. 
 
Comment – In the ops side, AFS-specific experience and training is more important than rank in the junior 
ranks, i.e. airmen and CGOs. However, they are not interchangeable. The officers have their roles and the 
enlisted have theirs. In the higher ranks for both enlisted and officers, rank and AF experience are more 
important than AFS-specific knowledge and training. Again, officers and enlisted are not interchangeable. 
 
Case – 585 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – IN MANY CASES THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TECHNICAL COMPETENCE OF 
AN ENLISTED MEMBER OR OFFICER IS 0. THE DIFFERENCE IS THE AUTHORITY TO EFFECT 
AND IMPLEMENT CHANGE. i AM A STRONG PROPONENT OF EMPOWERED LEADERSHIP. 
oFTEN TIMES THE RUE CONTINUITY OF AN OPERATION IS HELD BY THE ENLISTED FORCE. 
OFFICERS MUST BE CONSCIOUS OF CAREER PROGRESSION AND OVERALL MANAGEMENT 
FUNCTIONS. I OFTEN ASSIGN MORE VALUE TO A RESPECTED SNCO'S PERSPECTIVE OVER 
A CGO. RIGHTFULLY SO, THE NCO OR SNCO USUALLY HAS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING 
OF THE ISSUE, HOWEVER THEY LACK THE BIG PICTURE PERSPECTIVE VOICED IN OFFICER 
CENTRIC FORUMS. A MARRAIGE OF THE TWO IS ALWAYS BEST. 
 
Comment – MATCH THE PERSON TO THE JOB. SOMEWHERE ALONG THE LINE, MILTARY 
ASSIGNMENTS AND PREFERENCES BECAME A DEMOCRATIC DECISION. IF YOU HOLD 
SPECIAL SKILLS THE AF REQUIRES, YOU SHOULD BE COGNIZANT THAT THOSE SKILLS 
WILL BE CALLED UPON WITHIN SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS. IN PARALLEL, SPECIAL 
ASSIGNMENTS BASED UPON A PARTICULAR SKILL SET SHOULD NOT BE A KISS OF DEATH 
FOR AN INDIVIDUAL'S CAREER. IN FACT, THE LABEL OF A MASTER IN A PARTICULAR 
AREA SHOULD BE SHOWCASED AND USED TO IDENTIFY THE INDIVIDUAL'S SEPARATION 
FROM THEIR GENERAL PEER GROUPING. 
 
Comment – SIR, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TECHNICAL AND LEADERSHIP 
CAPABILITIES BETWEEN OFFICERS AND ENLISTEDS HAS NARROWED DRASTICALLY. I 
WILL ALWAYS PROMOTE THE ADVANCEMENT AND EMPOWERMENT OF THE ENLISTED 
FORCE. EVIDENCE SHOWS THEY HAVE THE MENTAL CAPACITY AND INITIATIVE TO GET 
THE JOB DONE RIGHT, THE FIRST TIME-EVERY TIME. OFTEN, THE BIGGEST HURDLE IS THE 
AUTHORITY TO AFFECT CHANGE WHEN ITS NEEDED. I AM IN A UNIQUE POSITION 
BECAUSE MY PEER GROUP IS O-5'S & O-6'S FROM THE SISTER SERVICES. I HAVE EARNED 
THE RESPECT AND AUTHORITY FROM MY PEERS AND LEADERSHIP TO EFFECT POLICY 
AND TRANSFORMATION. MY STATURE AS A SNCO OFFERS THE JUNIOR ENLISTED FOLKS 
A TRUSTED AGENT FOR VOICING THEIR CONCERNS WITH POORLY THOUGHT OUT OR 
EXECUTED CHANGE. EVERY MAJOR POLICY BOARD SHOULD HAVE A SNCO CONTINGENT 
AVAILABLE. THESE SNCOS HAVE THEIR PULSE ON THE ENLISTED FORCE AND CAN MAP 
THE POTENTIAL PITFALLS WHEN CHANGE IS REQUIRED. THANKS FOR YOUR TIME. 
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Case – 587 
Rank – O-7 
Comment – Degree questions need flex for people who hold multiple degrees (AS, BS, MS, etc). 
 
Case – 588 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – Some question in this survey were to broad. Also, how can I decide what benefits my 
subordinate would have if he went to school or recieved more technical training, PME, I gave you my 
answer on how I feel which would be the same if I was to answer for my subordinate. The ranks should be 
airmen, NCO, SNCO & smae for officer. Not just enlisted & officer. 
 
Case – 590 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – Knowlege and experience is important in the basic operations of an organization. Rank is 
important in the operations of a military organization's culture and mission. Combining these two may 
hamper or benefit.... depending on the mission. To make this a simple "one way or the other" decision is an 
error. 
 
Case – 592 
Rank – E-9 
Comment – Pay and allowances always seems to be a quality of life issue within our force. If we have an 
enlisted and a company grade officer performing like duties with like responsibilities, then, the question 
becomes, "Why are they paid more than me?" In industry, the answer may be we are compensating for the 
officer's education level. But, in today's AF, an enlisted may hold the same eduction level (or higher) as 
their officer counterpart. 
Comment – Interchangeablility is an interesting idea; but, some formidable challenges. Thanks and good 
luck. 
 
Case – 596 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – In this last series of questions regarding enlisted and officers serving in similar duties, I think 
that Flight Commanders and Flight Superintendents do this now. The two people really run the flight 
together. 
 
Comment – I have seen many Senior Airmen and Staff Sergeants who could have served in positions 
associated with these questions. Obviously, many Senior NCOs could fill Company Grade Officer positions 
(like section commanders). 
 
Comment – A few of my responses related to supervision where a little skewed because I am an AFIT 
student and currently do not supervise. 
 
Case – 598 
Rank – O-5 
Comment – Core values are needed no matter what rank and duty title you hold! Customs and Courtesies 
are vital to our survival as a service. 
 
Case – 600 
Rank – O-2 
Comment – I think the AF and the military in general fails to take full advantage of their personnel due to 
poor selection criteria and other rules and regulations that are unnecessary. 
 
Comment - The officer enlisted division often makes our jobs harder. I have experienced several occasions 
where input from an experienced enlisted person would have had more value than anything that I had to 
bring to the table, yet enlisted personnel are not considered qualified for the position that I was in, and were 
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rarely accessible for consultation/knowledge sharing. It is hard to determine the best way to make 
improvements without currently understanding the way things are and have been in the past. 
 
Case – 603 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – Are we re-visiting the warrant officer issue? When I go to the MSS, do I trust the answer from 
the Cpt or the SNCO any differently? No. What I want is the accurate answer. He or she who delivers the 
right answer has my trust to get my next question. Our patients feel the same way about their docs, nurses, 
techs, etc. 
 
Comment – How does the word "No" affect all this. I don't know too many Colonels that say no on a 
regular basis to a General. I can't imagine a SNCO, dead to rights based on policy in the MSS, saying "No" 
to a line Colonel. There would have to be some big changes in Corporate culture. 
 
Comment – Degrees: I do have an AF funded Master's degree that is technical, I got it at AFIT after I came 
in with a Master's degree, I think this section needs to be expanded, multiple degrees is very common. Our 
enlisted Corps can do a lot more at the CGO level, if we transform how do we grow senior officers? OTS is 
the vehicle between the two. Instead of 5 Capts with Master's degrees could I do the mission with 5 MSgts 
with Bachelor's degrees? 3 Warrant officers with Master's degrees? Yes. But how do you grow the senior 
leader who as an 06 is the Group Commander? 
 
Case – 606 
Rank – O-3 
Comment – Survey could be shortened up a bit. 
 
Case – 608 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – Need to ensure the officers still are recognized as LEADERS! 
 
Comment – It would be helpful to have a status or progress bar to indicate remaining pages. Thank you 
 
Case – 610 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – The comptroller career field has put CMSgts in flight commander positions normally filled by 
CGOs at some bases and it has worked well. 
 
Comment – My experience is that SNCO rank is higher respected by senior officers than CGO rank. 
 
Comment – I fully support using SNCOs in CGO positions. Their experience and training is more valuable 
than the rank of a CGO. SNCOs also get more respect than CGOs. Any plan to allow SNCOs to fill CGO 
positions must include the development of CGOs so the AF will have qualified and experienced FGOs. 
 
Case – 611 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – If NCO's are to be given the same duties as CGO's, then their pay must be made comensurate 
with the CGO's. It would be counter-productive to have two individuals with same duties, responsibilities 
and accountability be held to different pay standards and standards of conduct as well. I would hate to see a 
TSgt as a team leam lead with some Jr Capt's and Lt's on the team (not leaders due to experience levels) 
and be the least paid member of the team with all of the responsibility and accountibility. There must be a 
"bonus" pay, or "assignment" pay associated with the positions when they are given to the enlisted troops. 
They qualify for the position by doing things above and beyond their peers, therefore they must be 
rewarded in some way, and additional pay is the most visible, and desirable reward that can be offered. 
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Comment – Be very careful here...If transition goes too far and the bulk of the positions are filled by 
NCO's, SNCO's and not enough CGO's, there will be a backlash when the CGO's that remain are now 
FGO's and have not had the opportunities to fill the "nuts and bolts" positions. You will end up with too 
many "users" and not enough "developers" in leadership positions. This will lead to ill-advised decisions 
based on "management" concepts versus experience and leadership. Something similar to what happened 
with the RIF in the mid-'80s. All you had left were pilots who spent their careers in the cockpit and they 
were thrust into technological leadership positions with no understanding of what implications they were 
mandating upon their subordinates (things like demanding the Laws of Physics be violated because they 
needed to look good). 
 
Comment – This can be a double edged sword. Take tiny steps as this course is taken, but be sure to 
compensate the NCO's and SNCO's that are the "guinea pigs" is your first steps of this experiment. The 
biggest hurdle you will run into will be resentment of pay for the same duties and responsibilities...and you 
can't place an NCO,SNCO into the same mid-level position and a CGO without also giving them the same 
responsibility and accountibility, and AUTHORITY. When you give them the responsibility, give them the 
AUTHORITY to do what is necessary to get the job done effectively or this experiment of yours could 
quickly turn into a dismal failure. Also be aware that as the mid-level positions are being filled by NCO's, 
you are not getting the opportunity to groom the future field grade officers with the breadth of experiences 
that are now available. 
 
Case – 612 
Rank – O-2 
Comment – A number of the questions in the first few sections were vague and therefore hard to answer 
well. 
 
Case – 613 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – Initial questions do not allow enough choices. I have multiple degrees, and have obtained them 
multiple ways. Regarding questions of education vs. experience (Section 1)for my position, my jobs have 
all been managerial. Therefore, it is impossible to not consider the managerial aspect of the job, and only 
consider the technical side. Regading the next portion, that of education vs experince of my subordiantes, I 
view each of the questions/answers dependent on which level of my subordinates. An airman's job versus a 
chief's versus a captain's job are two entirely differnt things, and thus dependent on different things. 
 
Case – 616 
Rank – O-3 
Comment – There is nothing wrong with the concept of employing enlisted and CGO in similar duties as 
long as all pre-requisite experience and knowledge is there. What the survey doesn't speak to so far is the 
effect on career progression. Will these jobs become highly sought after by enlisted personnel because of 
the status of what was previously an "officer" job. CGOs in my career field already have limited 
opportunities for certain jobs.....and now these opporunities would be diluted even further? I am not 
opposed to the idea....I just think that a firm plan would have to consider the career development aspects for 
all parties. 
 
Case – 623 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – On the issue of rank--in my last technical assignment (THREE WORDS RELATING TO 
CURRENT DUTY LOCATION REMVOED BY AUTHOR), I was a supervisor in an acquisition-support 
organization (operational testing squadron) that had NCOs, SNCOs, CGOs, and FGOs all performing in a 
similar capacity on differing programs. We had a problem when acquisition programs with NCO test 
managers ran into trouble--CGOs and FGOs had to be reassigned to provide "top cover" and represent our 
organization when commenting negatively on other organizations' performance (i.e., SPOs and 
contractors). This was no fault of the NCOs involved--the reality was that when multi-million dollar 
programs were on the line for delay or cancellation, the contractor/SPO would "pull rank" (either directly 
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or discreetly) and try to muzzle the NCO test manager when delivering the bad news on poor operational 
testing performance. In many cases these test managers had associate's and/or bachelor's degrees, but the 
bottom line was that rank STILL mattered when it came time to handle these sticky situations. Particularly 
in the aerospace industry, it is assumed that an NCO only has a high school education (and no real "power" 
in the corporate end of the military-industrial complex, so to speak). 
 
Comment – There are certainly positions currently held by officers that could be migrated to enlisted 
personnel with the appropriate educational credentials, but they should be examined closely to see if there 
are benefits associated with commissioned officer status that are not readily apparent based on the technical 
qualifications alone. 
 
Case – 624 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – There were several problems with the survey from my perspective. 1) There was no way to 
enter multiple Master's degree's from radically different majors. 2) More importantly, I have supervised 
very different groups of people and my answers to the survey depended greatly on which group you were 
talking about. If I answered your questions as a flight commander in a fighter squadron, my answers were 
very different than if I answered as the wing scheduler supervising enlisted and NCOs. 
 
Comment – There are a whole lot of third and fourth level effects of trying to do something like this. 
Remember, we are not IBM and placing Captains and Airmen in the same positions would cause huge 
cultural and organizational strains. Of course, there are lots of jobs being done by Captains that could very 
easily be done by Airmen or NCO's but that is a very different thing than what you are proposing (Not 
putting Airmen and Officers into the same jobs, but instead moving out levels of middle management and 
giving those jobs completely to Airmen and NCOs). 
 
Case – 625 
Rank – O-5 
Comment – We are in the military. Rank is required to clearly identify who is responsible for the actions of 
a unit. Eliminating rank and creating a set of "group thinkers" will not motivate a unit to perform. This 
survey appears to seek a consensus that rank is not important and should be eliminated as a requirement for 
technical performance in the Air Force. If we wish to eliminate the rank structure, we may as well be a 
civilian organization that is only technical in nature. I believe this would be a big mistake, since we would 
no longer be an effective fighting force. Service to the nation and self sacrafice would also become a 
casualty of such a move. 
 
Case – 628 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – aar 
 
Comment – aar  
 
Case – 630 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – I think the management duties shoudl go to those who have demonstrated the ability to perform 
versus picking someone who holds a specific rank. In some ranks, there is no testing of abilities and I have 
seen units suffer greatly when someone with no practical experience is put in charge. 
 
Comment – Again, management shoudl be based on ability and performance versus who holds the rank. 
Again, some ranks do no testing whatsoever to determine who is fit to promote...it ends up being a 
popularity contest where community activities and volunteer activites weigh more than actual job 
performance. 
 
Comment – Thanks for allowing me to participate. 
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Case – 633 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – In my experience rank comes with knowledge and experience, they go hand in hand. I've 
worked in a flight scheduling office as a TSgt with Lts, Cpts, and Majs. We did similar duties and worked 
well together. Several questions answered would depend greatly on the individual. Knowledge and training 
can reduce the need for rank if the individual with the knowledge and experience has the backbone and 
backing to do the right thing. Unfortunately some people only listen to individuals with a certain level of 
rank. Would I be as effective without being a SMSgt? I could still do the job, but I would need more 
assistance and support from leadership in order to get the job done. 
 
Comment – Rank becomes a much greater player as we transition more and more to joint environment. 
When working with sister and foreign services rank needs to be equivalent to that of the other services to be 
effective in performance of your assigned duties. 
 
Comment – Thank you. 
 
Case – 639 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – Experience is invaluable and cannot be taught in any course. Education is very important, but 
the most quailified individual(s) should fill the job first. There are many qualified enlisted that have 
qualifications and experince over Field Grade Officers with a degree. 
 
Case – 641 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – I work in a officer/enlisted crew of 13. The mission comes first and rank comes second. It's 
been done this way on this aircraft since Vietnam and has worked well. At times the close relationships do 
lead to inappropraitely addressing each other. The officers do sometimes disregard the enlisted's 
knowledge/experience because of rank. 
 
Comment – Since enlisted usually stay at a base longer than officers their experience is usually more in 
depth than an officers. 
 
Case – 643 
Rank – O-1 
Comment – I understand where you're coming from, there are officer positions not being filled because 
there are not enough qualified officers out there, so you think enlisted could fill those positions. I think its a 
good idea but goes against the Air Force culture. I think the better idea is for the enlisted to be able to 
consider those positions, but must take them as a civilian to preserve the Air Force culture. 
 
Case – 644 
Rank – O-3 
Comment – Shorter next time. 
 
Case – 652 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – I think the culture in the Air Force would drive an officer to not want to hold the same duty 
position as an enlisted person for fear of lower ratings on an OPR versus an officer working in an "officer 
only" duty.   
 
Case – 654 
Rank – E-9 
Comment – It should be a combination of rank/experience. 
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Case – 655 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – The concept of utilizing qualified enlisted personnel in the same positions as company grade 
officers in the same AF position will create more problems than it can be worth if the AF is to remain a 
Military organization. What problems will occur when a NCO becomes accustomed to co-equal 
responsibilities (or perhaps perceived superior responsibilities) and must eventually interact with lower 
ranking officers in other military sittings? Will they be able to maintain proper customs and courtesies? 
Who will lead and who will follow in other situations? Additionally, would a qualified enlisted person 
be willing to have equal responsibility with a CGO, but with less pay? I do not think the concept of co-
equals would work in almost all settings, military or civilian. Personnel with the same duties and 
responsibilities need to be perceived as equals . . . in all respects, rank and pay included. If enlisted persons 
are needed to fill slots which cannot be filled by officers, then either promote the enlisted of officers or 
eliminate the officers from working in such positions. 
 
Case – 656 
Rank – O-3 
Comment – Your questions in section 7 were very confusing. Not too sure what you were trying to ask, so I 
answered "Neither Agree nor Disagree" for most of them. 
 
Case – 657 
Rank – O-2 
Comment – This provides an opportunity to mix various backgrounds producing a richer environment for 
everyone to learn and grow 
 
Case – 663 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – I've already worked in positions (in a TDY capacity) for which I'm not qualified if I were to 
PCS. I strongly believe in allowing certain personnel to work in positions for which they have the 
appropriate knowledge. Rank should not be a limiting factor. 
 
Case – 667 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – My previous job was on a joint COCOM staff, so many of the initial questions didn't apply 
well. 
 
Case – 670 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – Use of officer vs enlisted personnel must include range and scope of responsibility 
 
Case – 673 
Rank – E-9 
Comment – Good luck 
 
Case – 674 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – By its nature, officer rank implies a certain amount of knowledge (if from nothing other than 
longevity and experience); therefore, it's difficult to accurately answer this section's questions. 
 
Case – 676 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – Too many of the answers depend on the job and requirements. It is difficult to answer them 
without the context especially when in student status and not having a job to look at in a day to day basis. 
Most of my answers were based on my last assignment. 
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Case – 677 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – I have been in organizations and jobs where CGOs, Amn, NCOs,and mid-level civilians all did 
the same work. This situation negatively effected moral and performance of both CGOs,and enlisted, 
leading to many separating from the AF. 
 
Comment - If rank (officer vs enlisted) is not important to a job, then that job should be civilianized. 
 
Case – 680 
Rank – O-3 
Comment – Questions on importance of rank aren't specific enough. I would answer the questions 
differently if differentiating between a lt & capt versus a lt and SrA. Also, depends on position. In positions 
of leadership (mx officer), rank (Capt vs. lt) usually reflects experience & maturity, but not necessarily. 
Much more important than in the position of a engineer at a SPO or lab, where importance of knowledge, 
etc. outweighs rank. Also, officers are in AF to lead. I would say that if they're not in a leadership position, 
they aren't being used correctly. With that being said, engineers, scientists, etc. don't necessarily fall into 
this role as a CGO. Could an enlisted person with proper education perform these duties? Absolutely, 
however you would need to differentiate responsibilities between the officer & enlisted, keeping in mind 
the leadership role of the officer. 
 
Case – 681 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – I understand the pragmatics associated with the approach in this section, but the USAF is a 
military organization. Young CGOs (esp the Lieutenant corps need -- require -- strong enlisted mentorship 
to help them grow into leaders. They should never be 'peers' in exact equivalent jobs: they should be set up 
for success by their bosses for leadership and their enlisted mentors should work hard to grow them into the 
USAF's future leaders. If the Lts fail, it is most likely due to their boss AND their enlisted mentors. 
 
Comment - My overall qualifying statement for this section is: everything is "possible" but not probable 
with a military organization. An enlisted airman can do an executive officers job, but we are not growing 
enlisted airmen to become tomorrow's colonels or generals. I only see this as a possible effective approach 
with the 2LT corps (new ascessions) with strong mentorship by the Lt's boss. This concept is questionable 
at best for a 1Lt. It simply will not work for a Capt and would also be a cheat to the USAF. 
 
Comment – Would not mind discussing this concept further verbally. 
 
Case – 685 
Rank – O-2E 
Comment – Rank and Org structure questions are poorly written and unclear. 
 
Comment – Lost interest at this point 
 
Case – 697 
Rank – O-3 
Comment – There are many highly qualified enlisted members that are more than capable of taking on the 
challenges of particular jobs that may be currently reserved for officers. In many cases, it is probably a 
waste of talent to not utilize the assets that these enlisted members possess. However, throughout this 
survey I was thinking of several instances where there could be problems when enlisted and officer 
positions are the same, especially when working closely in the same unit. It really depends on the 
individuals and their levels of professionalism and maturity. I think it would be a benefit to the Air Force if 
warrant officer positions were available. These positions would provide our highly qualified and motivated 
enlisted members another opportunity to take on these jobs typically filled with officers without the 
concerns related to a commission. 
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Comment - There are many highly qualified enlisted members that are more than capable of taking on the 
challenges of particular jobs that may be currently reserved for officers. In many cases, it is probably a 
waste of talent to not utilize the assets that these enlisted members possess. However, throughout this 
survey I was thinking of several instances where there could be problems when enlisted and officer 
positions are the same, especially when working closely in the same unit. It really depends on the 
individuals and their levels of professionalism and maturity. I think it would be a benefit to the Air Force if 
warrant officer positions were available. These positions would provide our highly qualified and motivated 
enlisted members another opportunity to take on these jobs typically filled with officers without the 
concerns related to a commission. 
 
Comment - There are many highly qualified enlisted members that are more than capable of taking on the 
challenges of particular jobs that may be currently reserved for officers. In many cases, it is probably a 
waste of talent to not utilize the assets that these enlisted members possess. However, throughout this 
survey I was thinking of several instances where there could be problems when enlisted and officer 
positions are the same, especially when working closely in the same unit. It really depends on the 
individuals and their levels of professionalism and maturity. I think it would be a benefit to the Air Force if 
warrant officer positions were available. These positions would provide our highly qualified and motivated 
enlisted members another opportunity to take on these jobs typically filled with officers without the 
concerns related to a commission 
 
Case – 699 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – This survey can be very misleading. The instructions mentioned to separate the technical from 
the leadership; however, many of my technical jobs required leadership. I needed to use my technical 
experience and education to recommend and take responsibility for a plan of action. Having the technical 
knowledge without leadership skills would have lead to an unsuccessful career. 
 
Case – 701 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – The major problem (no pun intended) between having NCOs and officers do the same jobs is 
the wage descrepancy and rank structure would cause problems for the organizational culture. There is no 
doubt that many an NCO is capable of doing better work than an officer; however, I could see the wage 
descrepancy and rank causing serious friction if there was no job skill or responsibility differentiation. 
 
Case – 703 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – I think making rank not a qualifier for duties could work in a limited capacity. However, it 
should be the exception rather than the rule. There could be problems if left unchecked. Although, I do 
believe that we could make it work at the SNCO and field grade level. 
 
Comment – Could work if they all worked for a field grade officer and the CGOs weren't left in the 
position for a long time...maybe they could use it as a lauching off position to somewhere else in the 
organization that needs that technical expertise. 
 
Comment – My answers relate to the Personnel career field. Although I ranked "rank" below technical 
training and expertise, rank is important when enlisted personnel do not have a higher ranking person 
available to "back them up" with customers. Customers tend to not believe our airmen so NCOs or SNCOs 
have to get involved to verify answers in many cases. 
 
Case – 704 
Rank – O-5 
Comment – I categorically disagree with the implications of this survey. If a position can be filled by an 
enlisted troop, then the CGOs filling those positions are under-employed and should be moved to 
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supervisory positions somewhere else. Enlisted troops and CGOs should not be filling the same billets--I 
don't even like the implication that they should.   
 
Comment – See previous comments in last section. 
 
Comment – The idea that enlisted troops and CGOs can fill the same positions is fundamentally wrong. To 
me, that means that the CGO is being under-utilized and needs to be moved to a supervisory position. 
 
Case – 710 
Rank – O-5 
Comment – If we are going to mix ranks, why not bring back the warrant officer program. I'm not worried 
about the officer core but I think the enlisted morale will plumment if we give a SSgt and a Capt the exact 
same job and pay one 2-3X as much. Might as well make them all civlian jobs or outsource if we have no 
need to distinguish between officer and enlisted in those technical areas. 
 
Comment – Same arguement. If we can blur enlisted and officer staff jobs, might as well outsource. I think 
unless we change the pay scale and pay people for performance like the civilians are about to do, we will 
have a hard time explaining why we need officers if we can effectively train enlisted personnel and pay 
them a measly wage to do the same job an officer now does. One or the other is getting the shaft. 
 
Case – 711 
Rank – O-3E 
Comment – In the missile maintenance career fields, enlisted members with vast weapons system 
knowledge and experience work side by side with CGO's in the technical engineering section. The officers, 
who are electrical engineers, use their knowledge of electronic theory, circuit design, etc., while the 
enlisted members, generally NCO's, use their experience with the weapons system to isolate peculiar 
problems. This type of offcer/NCO relationship seems to work out just fine, without a detrimental impact to 
the mission, chain-of-command, or unit morale. 
 
Comment – Being enlisted is not a handicap. Why should an enlisted member, who has the same or higher 
level of education and higher level of experience than his officer counterpart, be excluded from the same 
jobs made available to the officer? I can think of no good reason why this should happen. 
 
Case – 717 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – Being of a certain rank does not mean you can perform the job. We have all seen those NCO's 
and SNCO's who test well but don't have a clue about there job. Could it be that these people moved up the 
chain so quickly that they didn't gain valuable experience in their AFS? Further it is important as a SNCO 
that you have an understanding of the "big picture" not just your little section of the unit. In Security Forces 
a SNCO should understand manning, reports and analysis, pass and id, law enforcement, security, training, 
and supply issues in order to do their job 
 
Case – 718 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – One thing I'm finding in today's AF is that most officer don't want to listen to what the 
experience SNCO's has to say! They feel as if they have all the answers to all the questions. 
 
Commnet – Thanks you for the opportunity for me to express myself. Survey's like this should be done 
more often. Thanks again for the opportunity. (RESPONDENT’S NAME REMOVED BY AUTHOR) 
 
Case – 719 
Rank – E-8 
Comment – Survey is to long. 
 
  185
Case – 722 
Rank – O-4 
Comment – When I have had excess Lts I have put them in positions in which SNCOs hold the same 
position. This has been crucial to their development technically and professionally. I believe the officers 
will be better officers for that experience. 
 
Case – 725 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – Sounds like we need to bring back Warrant Officers and what used to be called "Battlefield 
Commissions". If someone has the experience and practicle knowledge to do a job, but it's over their 
current rank, promote them into it. A lot of Sergeants became very effective Warrants, Lieutenants and 
Captains this way in the past. 
 
Case – 726 
Rank – O-6 
Comment – Scope of responsibilities is aimed at certain rank structure due to the experience, education, 
training, and abilities it took to get there. We promote and hire our personnel based on different criteria in 
the enlisted and officer corps. If we break down those differences, we will eliminate what makes our 
military the best in the world. This survey steers us to a concept that would tend to downgrade wherever 
possible...to save money. Not a good strategy...and not a good concept. Help me keep our force the 
strongest in the world! There are many reasons..."No One Comes Close." 
 
Comment – While it is true it would be possible to interchange some enlisted and officer personnel in mid-
level duties, it would hamper the growth of some of those same personnel for their future development. If I 
have an enlisted filling a good OJT job, then my CGOs may not be able to learn that job. 
Comment – Like I said before, this survey leads me to believe the Air Force is considering downgrading 
many of our CGO positions. If we do that, we would severely hamper the growth of our field grade and 
senior officers by not giving them the full opportunity to learn those more technical or more management 
oriented duties. They need to learn in the job to progress to higher levels of understanding and leadership 
roles. 
 
Case – 728 
Rank – E-6 
Comment – Regarding the PME questions. All of them related to how PME affected my job. The only 
benefit that I saw from PME (NCO Prep, ALS and NCOA) was the history classes. All of the instruction on 
EPRs and speaking only apply in class. 
 
Case – 729 
Rank – E-7 
Comment – As long as the NCO that holds that position is seasoned and knows what is going on in that 
particular squadron, then there shouldn't be a problem. I don't think a piece of paper makes you better, it is 
time and experience. 
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